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Abstract 
'Critical realism' is a philosophy and method first systematised by Roy Bhaskar in 
the 1970s and now finding broad appeal across the social sciences. The striking 
claim of critical realism to remedy the perceived malaise within the contemporary 
social sciences and Marxism, and thus to provide the philosophical and 
methodological basis for comprehending the global economy, coupled with the 
growing popularity of critical realism, demands that critical realism be examined 
thoroughly from its philosophical essence to the implications it has for the theory of 
the global economy. Such an examination is carried out in this thesis. Despite the 
many appealing aspects of critical realism the thesis puts forward a negative critique 
of critical realism that is unique in its breadth and depth. The critical realist 
philosophy is argued to collapse to Humean scepticism; the critical realist method is 
argued to be incongruent with the critical realist transformational social ontology. 
Alongside the negative critique, the thesis contributes a positive statement of a 
Marxist alternative to critical realism. Regarding philosophy, the 'materialist 
dialectics' detailed by the little known Russian philosopher, E.V. Ilyenkov, is argued 
to offer the basis for Marxist philosophy. As regards method, the Hegel inspired 
'systematic dialectics', once recast on the materialist basis provided by Ilyenkov, is 
argued to transcend the critical realist method. These positive alternatives to critical 
realism are developed and brought together through a novel interpretation of Marx' s 
theory of value and exploitation. Contrary to traditional interpretations, Marx's 
theory of surplus value does not rest upon Marx's labour theory of value. Rather the 
opposite is closer to the truth: the theory of surplus value is a key step in 
substantiating the labour theory of value. This interpretation is a contribution to the 
critique of various idealist theories of value, including those under the umbrella of 
'value form theory'. The interpretation is argued to be a philosophical, 
methodological and theoretical 'deepening' of certain existing interpretations of 
Marx's Capital that stress the importance of distinguishing between the 'organic 
composition of capital' and the 'value composition of capital'. This deepening, 
enabled by materialist dialectics, is argued to remove some of the philosophical, 
methodological and theoretical obstacles that stand in the way of the collective 
development of a Marxist theory of contemporary global capital. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The Contemporary Social Sciences, Marxism and the 'Global Economy' 
The point of departure for this chapter and for the thesis overall is the deficiency of 
the contemporary social sciences. It can scarcely be denied that the comprehension 
of what is commonly termed the 'global economy' is an essential task for the social 
sciences. The global economy is exulted by neo-liberalism and has come to form the 
object of recent avowedly 'anti-capitalist' protest. However, the contemporary social 
sciences are ill equipped to theorise such an object. Mainstream economics 
considers the global economy only within the confines of individualistic and formal 
models of market exchange (Fine, 2001a). Other social sciences are doubly 
disadvantaged: (1) their main object has never been the economy; (2) the rise of 
postmodernism entailed rampant relativism and subjectivism precluding, in the 
extreme, any rational debate, let alone recognition of the objective character of 
global capital. 
Signs of a recent retreat from postmodernist extremes have merely served to 
underline the endemic weakness of the contemporary social sciences. For, alongside 
the retreat from postmodernism has been the 'colonisation' of other social sciences 
by mainstream economics (Fine, 2001a). On the basis of market imperfections, the 
economics discipline has increasingly applied its barren method and theory to non-
economic phenomena. Despite its conceptual impoverishment, this movement has 
become influential across the social sciences. Thus, instead of an appropriation of 
the economic by the other social sciences (a return to political economy) that might 
have been expected after postmodernist excesses, the opposite has occurred! As long 
as the split between economics and 'the rest' - or the paradoxical colonisation of the 
latter by the former - characterises the social sciences, the prospects for a social 
scientific theory (from within or without the economics discipline) adequate to 
comprehending the global economy appear to be non-existent. 
Marxism, which has always held out the promise of grasping society as a totality, 
should offer much better prospects for comprehending the global economy than 
mainstream social science. However, the following contemporary divisions and 
>-
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debates within Marxist thought can be highlighted, ordered according to their 
relative level of abstraction: 
(1) Marxist philosophy and method: The debates regarding Hegel, dialectics and the 
very notion of 'Marxist philosophy' are ongoing (see, for example, Science and 
Society, 2001, Volume 64, Issue 4). Prominent contemporary debates concern 
the two most recent attempts to develop a Marxist philosophy and method, viz. 
'critical realism' and 'new dialectics' (e.g. Brown, Fleetwood and Roberts, 
2002a). 
(2) Marx's theory of value: Despite being at the heart of Marx's Capital, the 
extraordinary variety of opposing interpretations of Marx' s theory of value and 
surplus value continues, if anything, to grow (Desai, 1989; Fine, 1986; Saad-
Filho, 2002). Mohun (1991, p.42) observes that 'virtually every controversy 
within Marxist economics is at bottom a controversy concerning the nature and 
status of value theory' . 
(3) The relevance of both (1) and (2) to the study of concrete historical 
conjunctures: In the wake of Althusserian philosophy and in view of the 
seemingly endless debates on value theory, there is widespread suspicion that 
neither Marxist philosophy nor Marx's labour theory of value are very relevant 
to the study of concrete historical conjunctures. Thompson (1978) remains a 
cogent statement of such suspicion; the editor's introduction to Brenner (1998) 
is a stark instance of contemporary antipathy towards Marx's value theory. 
The extent of these divisions and unresolved debates appears to have been 
detrimental to the collective development of a Marxist theory of the global 
economy. A recent example is the debate concerning Marx's theory of economic 
development and crisis, sparked by the South East Asian crisis of 1997-8 and 
fuelled by Brenner (1998). Fundamental disagreements concerning value and 
surplus value dominated the debate (see, for examples, the symposium in Historical 
Materialism, 1999-2000, Issues 4-5 - the Appendix to this thesis reproduces the 
editorial introduction to the symposium). Such was the extent of this domination that 
very few contributions provided an alternative to Brenner's (severely criticised) 
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account of the trajectory of the global economy. Indeed, according to Fine, 
Lapavitsas and Milonakis (2000, p.137), instead of 'addressing anew the historical 
specificities of contemporary capitalism ... [the debate] seems to have exposed the 
collective deficiencies of contemporary political economy in this regard'. 
Recent developments within the areas of philosophy and methodology offer a single 
diagnosis and cure for the travails of both Marxism and mainstream economics and 
social science. These developments have come to be systematised under the heading 
'critical realism' and are the object of the critique presented in this thesis, as 
discussed below. 
The Allure of Critical Realism to Practising Social Scientists and Marxists 
In the context of such apparently bleak prospects for the comprehension of the 
global economy, the philosophy and method termed 'critical realism' presents itself 
as a beacon of hope. Many practising social scientists and Marxists have been drawn 
to critical realism over the past two decades and critical realism now has a presence 
within a formidably broad range of social scientific disciplines (Brown et. aI., 
2002b). In order to understand the appeal of critical realism it is useful to consider 
the respective traditional materials taught in philosophy of science and methodology 
courses aimed at practising social scientists, or students of social science. 
Take, firstly, the 'philosophy of science'. Whilst there have been many diverse 
developments within the philosophy of science discipline itself it remains the case 
that the names of Popper (e.g. 1959), Kuhn (e.g. 1962), Lakatos (e.g. 1970) and 
Feyeraband (e.g. 1975) are likely to be the first that social scientists will invoke as 
exemplifying the 'philosophy of science'. The debate amongst these philosophers 
regarding both the correct description of, and the correct prescription for, scientific 
progress is by no means irrelevant to social researchers. The debate sensitises the 
researcher to issues surrounding 'falsifiability' and to the social context of science. 
However, the relevance might well be described as limited. Critical realism stresses 
that the debate does not contain much explicit reference to the nature of the mind-
independent real world, even though some such world is a presupposition of the 
debate. In other words it is a largely epistemological debate, leaving the researcher 
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without purchase on the mind-independent world that is the object of research. The 
impression that can be left is that any 'abstract' discourse must inherently lack such 
'real world' content and hence lack practical salience. 
Turning to the diverse 'methodology' courses, here two broad strands can usefully 
(if, again rather sweepingly) be picked out. On the one hand there are 'quantitative' 
courses concentrating, for example, on the theory and practice of statistical 
inference. On the other hand there are 'qualitative' courses considering, for example, 
the theory and practice of questionnaire design. Both qualitative and quantitative 
courses and methods may have a positive role to play but they are often difficult to 
use in practice; i.e. in the context of a real world object. And, by their very nature, 
such courses must focus on the method rather than on the object. The impression, 
once again, is left that a high level of generality necessarily implies abstraction from 
explicit consideration of mind-independent reality (i.e. abstraction from ontology). 
According to the critical realist argument, philosophy need not be a mere side issue, 
of little practical relevance. Critical realism articulates what practitioners often 
already feel implicitly to be the case. There are many concepts at the level of 
generality of philosophy that refer to the real, mind-independent world. Through 
such reference, these concepts are practically important. Firstly there is the basic fact 
of science itself Through the hard practical effort of science, knowledge of the 
mind-independent real world is grasped. Remarkably this fact is not made explicit in 
the debate between Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. It may be recognised implicitly, but 
the failure to make it explicit leads to an unwarranted divorce of philosophy from 
reality. For example the concept of 'paradigm' or its Lakatosian counterpart, 
'scientific research program', refers to the realm of knowledge rather than the object 
of that knowledge, the real world. Critical realism demonstrates that the Kuhnian / 
Lakatosian perspective must have a real world analogue in ontological 'emergence'. 
The recognition that reality is layered in successive emergent strata is in turn able to 
explain the development of new 'paradigms' noted by Kuhn and Lakatos. The 
development of a new paradigm may simply correspond to the uncovering of a 
hitherto unknown stratum. More generally the notion of emergence is tied to the 
critical realist notions of structures, mechanisms, tendencies and, for the social 
realm, the notions of social structure and of the emergence of mind, hence of human 
5 
agency. All these notions refer to the real world, are practically useful and are 
located at the level of generality of philosophy. They are entwined philosophical 
concepts, articulated by critical realism, yet absent from the philosophy and 
methodology that is most familiar to practitioners in the social (and indeed natural) 
sCiences. 
The intuitive appeal of the critical realist ontology, coupled with the absence of 
ontological considerations from the philosophy and methodology traditionally 
encountered by social scientific practitioners, goes some way towards explaining the 
breadth of the popularity of critical realism. Critical realism thematises salient and 
general features that practitioners actually encounter in research, salient features of 
the real world. Thereby critical realism demonstrates that concepts at such a high 
level of generality (the transhistorical level) need not be lifeless, sterile or without 
practical import. Armed with the critical realist ontology it is possible to critique 
both the 'traditional' philosophy of science and the varied quantitative and 
qualitative 'methodologies' encountered by researchers. Critical realism foregrounds 
the need to adapt the research methodology to the object. Quantitative methods of 
statistical inference can be assessed in terms of their applicability to the object. 
Qualitative methods can be assessed on the same basis. The object itself can be 
grasped as a natural or social structure with attendant mechanisms. As a result the 
most prevalent theories within disciplines can be interrogated on methodological 
grounds. For example many theories existing under the rubric of poststructuralism, 
postmodernism and social constructionism stand revealed as one-sided: such 
theories recognise the conceptual aspect but not the objective aspect of science 
(Bhaskar, 1986; 1989; 1993). The converse trend towards greater and greater 
mathematical sophistication within economics can likewise be recognised as one-
sided. Here the problem arises from recognition of the quantitative but not the 
crucial qualitative characteristics of the economy and human agency (Fleetwood, 
1999; Lawson, 1997). 
The critical realist argument would seem especially appealing for Marxism. As 
regards philosophy and method (1, above), it is useful to consider two well-known 
'alternatives' to critical realism, both explicitly Marxist philosophies. Firstly there is 
the case of Althusserianism. The initial promise and subsequent demise of 
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Althusserian Marxism fostered attacks on the very notion of Marxist philosophy 
(e.g. Thompson, 1978). Althusserian Marxism was, ultimately, perceived to fail to 
uphold successfully a mind-independent reality, fallibly knowable by human agents 
endowed with free will. Critical realism attempts to uphold that promise, and thus is 
argued by some proponents (Collier, 1989) to fill the specifically philosophical gap 
left by the demise of Althusserianism. 
Secondly there is the case of the many and varied strands of Hegel-influenced 
Marxism. The recent revival of such strands has prompted the coining of a new 
phrase, 'new dialectics' (Arthur, 1993a). New dialectics, in all its variety, does not 
stress, in the strident fashion of critical realism, a set of philosophical concepts that 
refer explicitly and clearly to a mind-independent reality. As a rough approximation, 
it is possible to characterise the varied strands of new dialectics as united by a 
rejection ofMarx's own philosophical remarks to the effect that Hegel is an idealist. 
This contrasts sharply with the strident critical realist (and dialectical critical realist) 
critique of He gel (Bhaskar, 1993; Creaven, 2000). Certainly it is critical realism, and 
not new dialectics, that articulates explicitly the key notions of the mind-
independence of objects, structural causality, tendencies, emergence, stratification, 
the emergence of social structure and the emergence of agency (amongst other 
important notions). 
The relevance of critical realism to the theory of value and to concrete studies of the 
global economy (2 and 3, above) is established, according to some proponents, by 
the assimilation of Marx's theory within the critical realist canon. Through critical 
realism, on this view, we can find 'the lost Marx' (Bhaskar, 1993; Collier, 1989; 
Marsden, 1998) -lost, that is, due to the hitherto unknown fact that Marx's method 
is implicitly that of critical realism. At the same time, the inadequacies of 
interpretations thrust upon Marx's theory of value in Capital by the predominant 
positivist or otherwise 'irrealist' (postmodemist, poststructuralist, post-Marxist, etc.) 
orientations can be exposed (Ehrbar, 2002; Fleetwood, 2002; Joseph, 2002). 
Moreover, a full blown Marxist framework for the theory of contemporary global 
capitalism, rooted in critical realism, is to be found in the Regulation Approach, as 
that approach is interpreted and developed by, for example, Jessop (e.g. 2002) and 
Peck and Tickell (e.g. 1992). Thus the Regulation Approach advances the terms 
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'Fordism' and 'Post-Fordism' in order to grasp post war capitalistic development. 
These 'middle-range' concepts build, so it is claimed, upon the abstract concepts 
contained within Marx's Capital in order to 'ground' concrete comprehension of 
contemporary global capitalism. 
Thesis Aim 
The striking claim of critical realism to remedy the perceived malaise within the 
contemporary social sciences and Marxism, and thus to provide the philosophical 
and methodological basis for comprehending the global economy, coupled with the 
growing popularity of critical realism, demands that critical realism be examined 
thoroughly from its philosophical essence to the implications it has for the theory of 
the global economy. Such an examination is carried out in this thesis. Despite the 
many appealing aspects of critical realism the thesis puts forward a negative critique 
of critical realism that is unique in its breadth and depth. The critical realist 
philosophy is argued to collapse to Humean scepticism; the critical realist method is 
argued to be incongruent with the critical realist transformational social ontology. 
Alongside the negative critique, the thesis contributes a positive statement of a 
Marxist alternative to critical realism that embraces the positive aspects of the latter. 
Regarding philosophy, the 'materialist dialectics' detailed by the little known 
Russian philosopher, E. V. Ilyenkov (1977; 1982; 1997), is argued to offer the basis 
for Marxist philosophy. As regards method, the Hegel-inspired 'systematic 
dialectics', once recast on the materialist basis provided by Ilyenkov, is argued to 
transcend the critical realist method. These positive alternatives to critical realism 
are developed and brought together through a novel interpretation of Marx' s theory 
of value and exploitation. Contrary to traditional interpretations, Marx's theory of 
surplus value does not rest upon Marx's labour theory of value. Rather the opposite 
is closer to the truth: the theory of surplus value is a key step in substantiating the 
labour theory of value. This interpretation is a contribution to the critique of various 
idealist theories of value, including those under the umbrella of 'value form theory'. 
The interpretation is argued to be a philosophical, methodological and theoretical 
'deepening' of certain existing interpretations of Marx's Capital that stress the 
importance of distinguishing between the 'organic composition of capital' and the 
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'value composition of capital' (Fine, 1983; Saad-Filho, 2002, ch. 6; Weeks, 1981, 
ch. 8). 
The thesis as a whole can be read as a sustained argument that philosophy and 
theory mutually should inform one another on the basis of materialist dialectics. 
Chapters 2 to 5 interrogate Marxist philosophy (and method) through the detailed 
examination and critique of critical realism, and presentation of materialist 
dialectics. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate how Marx's theory of value and surplus 
value can be better comprehended by drawing upon the philosophy of materialist 
dialectics. The failure to integrate philosophy and theory on the basis of materialist 
dialectics contributes to the stifling of the collective development of a Marxist 
theory of contemporary global capital. 
Synopsis 
The thesis proceeds, chapter by chapter, as follows. Chapter 2 serves as a 
preliminary to the critique of critical realism to be presented in the subsequent 
chapters. The origins of critical realism in the work of Roy Bhaskar (RTS; PON) are 
discussed, followed by an exposition of the broad features of the critical realist 
ontology and method. This exposition aims to capture the key features of critical 
realism as they are perceived by practising social scientists and used to interpret 
Marx. These features include the 'transformational model of social activity', social 
stratification, the method of'retroduction' and the notion of abstraction. The chapter 
draws upon Jessop's exposition of critical realism (1982; 1990; 2002), hitherto 
rather neglected in the economics literature on critical realism (Lawson, 1997, is the 
most prominent work within that literature). Finally, preliminary criticisms of 
critical realism are offered to set the scene for the detailed and immanent critique 
that follows. 
Chapter 3 argues that the conceptual essence of critical realism is the critical realist 
theory of mind, termed 'synchronic emergent powers materialism' [SEPMl 
According to the argument, the various strands of critical realism discussed in 
chapter 2 are tied together by this conceptual essence. The vexed question of the 
relationship between critical realism and Bhaskar's later development of 'dialectical 
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critical realism' (Dialectic; PE) is then taken up. Dialectical critical realism retains, 
indeed develops, the conceptual essence of critical realism and for this reason it is 
argued that dialectical critical realism both preserves and develops critical realism 
(this argument is consonant with Bhaskar's own view on the matter). The remainder 
of chapter 3 undertakes an immanent critique of critical realism and dialectical 
critical realism. SEPM establishes the mind-independence of reality in terms of a 
'non-isomorphic' and causal relationship between idea and object. Yet given such a 
relationship between idea and object there is no reason why objects should continue 
to follow the 'known laws' established by science, and hence no basis for rationally 
produced knowledge. This is no more than a recapitulation of Hume's (1975) 
famous sceptical argument. An alternative to SEPM must be sought if the appealing 
in sights of critical realism are to be salvaged. 
Chapter 4 presents E.Y. Ilyenkov's 'materialist dialectics' as an alternative to, 
indeed transcendence of, critical realism. The abstract basis of materialist dialectics 
is provided by Ilyenkov's interpretation of Spinoza. According to Spinoza adequate 
ideas are based upon an isomorphism between thinking bodily activity and the 
object of that activity; they are not causal upon human activity. In essence, adequate 
ideas arise from the ability of the thinking body to achieve self-awareness of its own 
outer bodily activity, where that activity accords with (is 'isomorphic' to) the object. 
Thereby the foundation of Humean scepticism, the causal and non-isomorphic 
relationship between idea and object, is removed. The chapter goes on to argue that 
the desirable features of critical realism (emergence, structural causality, etc.) are 
retained, but raised to a fundamentally new conceptual level, by Spinoza. However, 
Spinoza's philosophy is valid only at the most abstract level. Marx develops Spinoza 
fundamentally by stressing the transformative power of human labour: the labourer 
transforms the object of their activity as well that activity itself in the course of their 
labour. In the final section of the chapter it is argued that contemporary and Hegel-
inspired new dialectics fails to overcome Humean scepticism in the manner of 
Spinoza and hence is ultimately idealist in the same way that, on Ilyenkov's 
interpretation, Hegel is idealist. (No attempt is made to interpret Hegel himself in 
this chapter or in the thesis overall). 
.. 
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Chapter 5 moves from the level of philosophy to that of methodology. An immanent 
critique of the critical realist method is undertaken. The branch of new dialectics 
termed 'systematic dialectics', once recast on Ilyenkov's materialist basis, is then 
offered as an alternative to the method of critical realism. Once more the critique 
turns on the distinction between an idea and its object. The non-isomorphism 
between an idea and its object stressed by critical realism provides the fundamental 
rationale for the critical realist method of 'retroduction'. Yet, given this critical 
realist rationale, such a method is incapable of grasping the self-transformation of 
social structures. This is because the 'social forms' that are premises for retroduction 
cannot, given the non-isomorphism of idea and object, contain any information 
regarding social structural self-transformation. Systematic dialectics, by contrast, 
does not advocate retroduction. Instead systematic dialectics provides a method 
whereby the interconnection of social structures can be grasped in thought, in a step 
by step manner, beginning with the most abstract and simple concept and 
developing ever more concrete and complex concepts through identifying and 
overcoming contradictions in the more abstract and simple concepts. The example of 
the opening chapters in Marx's Capital is used to illustrate the method. However, 
this example ignores crucial issues in value theory that are the subject of chapters 6 
and 7 . 
Chapter 6, the first of two theoretical chapters, develops an interpretation ofMarx's 
labour theory of value based upon the materialist dialectics presented in the previous 
chapters. It is argued that this interpretation of Marx's labour theory of value 
provides the basis for recasting the contemporary social sciences. This chapter (and 
the· next) thereby illustrates the practical worth of materialist dialectics, and the 
errors of both critical realist and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectic interpretations 
of value. The premise, drawn from materialist dialectics, that common powers are 
tied to common material forms is argued to be sufficient for the validity of Marx' s 
opening arguments in Capital. The exchange relation of commodities implies that 
they have some material form in common but it is evident that there is no natural 
material property shared by commodities, and systematically related to exchange 
value. Their only remaining material quality is their social existence as products of 
human labour. Hence the substance of value must be human labour. The abstraction 
inherent in exchange must reflect the perversity that the labour that is the substance 
I .. 
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of value is lacking in all particularity and specificity; it differs from one commodity 
to another only in quantity, i.e. it is 'abstract' (and 'ghostly') labour. For this reason, 
the value of one commodity (the relative-form) must reflect itself in the use-value of 
another (the equivalent-form). Only once expressed in the 'universal equivalent', i.e. 
the money-form, is value expressed adequately. The lack of the aforementioned 
materialist premise within (contemporary and Hegel inspired) systematic dialectics 
explains the systematic dialecticians' view (and, more generally, the view of 'value 
form theory') that Marx's argument regarding labour is invalid and the resulting 
failure of systematic dialecticians to provide a consistent value theory. 
Chapter 7 argues, in contradistinction to traditional interpretations, that Marx's 
theory of surplus value is a crucial step in substantiating the labour theory of value; 
it is not a deduction resting upon the labour theory of value. Once again the 
materialist dialectics outlined in previous chapters proves crucial, in this case to the 
theory of surplus value. The labourer, according to materialist dialectics, is defined 
by the ability to creatively and purposefully transform both themselves and the 
object. What is paid for by the buyer of labour-power is this adaptive and creative 
ability. The quality and quantity of labour received on consumption of labour-power 
(some specific contribution of labour to the production process, i.e. new and fresh 
labour) is not predetermined on sale of labour-power. On the contrary, the quality 
and quantity of actual labour performed is to be determined (within certain 
important limits) by the buyer of labour-power. Surplus value is possible only 
because, in the case of labour-power, what IS paid for does not determine the 
contribution to the production process that IS received. It follows that unpaid 
('surplus') labour is the cause and substance of surplus value and therefore 
(ignoring realisation problems) it is the necessary and sufficient condition fof 
positive profit. The chapter goes on to iIlustrate how the interpretation of Marx 00. 
value and surplus value can be developed so as to tie in with Fine's (1983) and 
Saad-Filho's (l997b; 2002) exposition of the transformation of values into priceS-
The exposition highlights the distinction between the 'value composition of capital' 
and the 'organic composition of capital', and provides the kernel from which tbe 
more concrete work of Fine and others can be developed. 
.. 
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Chapter 8 concludes by revisiting the main arguments of the thesis now stressing the 
positive alternative to critical realism, 'materialist dialectics', that has been, in the 
main chapters of the thesis, introduced as transcending critical realism and then 
developed through the exposition of value and surplus value. The chapter argues that 
the comprehensive critique of critical realism, the critique of new dialectics at the 
level of method and of theory, and the distinctive interpretation of Marx's theories 
of value and surplus value provide worthy starting points for further developments at 
a range of levels. Furthermore it is argued that the thesis, by culminating in the 
novel exposition of value and surplus value, is a philosophical, methodological and 
theoretical deepening of a distinctive approach to global capitalism (and political 
economy more generally) pioneered by Fine (e.g. 1989) and Weeks (e.g. 1981). It is 
hoped that the thesis will thereby contribute towards taking Marxist theory forward, 
on the firm basis of materialist dialectics, revealing the power of Marxist theory 
across the social sciences and providing a platform for the true comprehension of the 
global economy. 
1 
... 
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Chapter 2. Critical Realism in Marxism and the Social Sciences 
Introduction 
This chapter serves as a preliminary to the critique of critical realism to be presented 
in the subsequent chapters. The chapter discusses the origins and development of 
critical realism within the social sciences and Marxism. A broad overview of, firstly, 
the ontology and, secondly, the method of critical realism is then provided. This 
overview aims to present critical realism in the form in which it has come to be 
known within the social sciences and within Marxism. It therefore draws upon the 
work of a number of critical realist social scientists and Marxists, with particular 
emphasis upon the methodological work of Bob Jessop, hitherto rather neglected 
within sections of the critical realist community. Finally, preliminary criticisms are put 
forward in order to set the scene for the detailed and immanent critique that follows. 
The Origins and Development of Critical Realism 
Critical realism can be located within a loose hierarchy of 'realisms': 'realism'; 
'scientific realism' and 'critical realism'. The terms are ordered by the generality of 
their meaning so realism includes but is not exhausted by scientific realism which in 
turn includes but is not exhausted by critical realism.l As used by philosophers, the 
term 'realism' does not refer to any particular school or position. Rather, it has a very 
broad meaning, connoting any philosophy that includes some significant degree of 
mind-independence of things.2 'Scientific Realism' is a term pertaining to the 
philosophy of science (both natural and social). It refers to all positions within this 
field that assert the independence of the objects of science from scientific practice. 
Often the criterion for the independence and reality of these objects is their causal 
1 Bhaskar looks at the varieties of realism in RR, pp.l90-l and more extensively in SRHE, pp.5-1O. 
His definitions will be compared with those offered here in the proceeding footnotes. See also 
Hausman (1998). 
2 This is the definition given, for example, in Honderich (1995, pp. 746-8). Bhaskar gives an even 
wider definition of 'realism', viz., 'any position ... which asserts the existence of some disputed kind 
of entity (universals, material objects, causal laws, numbers, probabilities, propositions, etc.' (SRHE, 
p.5). 
f 
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power: if a thing causes some effect then it is real. Important authors within this 
category, from the critical realist perspective, include Hanson (e.g. 1963), Harre (e.g. 
1970) and Hesse (e.g. 1974).3 The origins of 'critical realism', a subset of scientific 
realism, will be explained below.4 
The most prominent advocate of critical realism, and author responsible for its 
original systematisation (though not its sole creator), is Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar offers 
a particular realist account of natural science in RTS which he terms 'transcendental 
realism'. He views this account as a 'synthesis' (RTS, p.9) or 'systemisation' (PON, 
p.2) of two strands within the philosophy of science: a scientific 'realist' strand 
exemplified by the work of the authors mentioned in the previous paragraph and a 
strand, possibly more widely known, associated with such authors as Kuhn, Popper, 
Lakatos, Feyerband, etc., emphasising the social character of science and the process 
of scientific development5 (these strands are not intended as precise or exhaustive 
distinctions). He advocates a suitably qualified version of transcendental realism, 
labelled 'critical naturalism', to account for social science in his second key book, 
PON, drawing upon social theory literature; Althusser being an important influence. 6 
'Critical naturalism' and 'transcendental realism' are now usually drawn together as 
'critical realism' (RR, pp.190-1) which, in turn, has come to designate basic 'critical 
3 Bhaskar's definition (SRHE, p.5) is equivalent to that given here. He does not make the causal 
criterion explicit, though it is evident in his work, e.g., PON, p.12. 
4 Bhaskar presents his own view of the origin and basic meaning of the term 'critical realism' in 
RR, ch. 9. 
5 This is a very important element of Bhaskar. The first strand influences what he terms the 
'intransitive dimension' of science and the second strand the 'transitive dimension'. These terms are 
explained below. Bhaskar argues that the two strands must be united under one ontology - furnished 
by Bhaskar himself as the essence of 'transcendental realism' - if their respective insights are to be 
upheld and positivism overcome. 
6 There is no space to explore adequately the influence of Althusser on Bhaskar (indeed on the 
development of social theory in general since the sixties). On a purely textual level the link is shown 
by the reference to Althusser at the key stage of Bhaskar's discussion of the 'transformational 
model of human activity' and Marx's 'historical materialism' (see PON p.74, n. 43) as well as by 
numerous common terms and arguments. Bhaskar's own account of his relationship with Althusser 
and Marxist thought in general can be found in PIF, pp. 162-85 (see also RR, ch. 7). Collier (1989) 
brings out the relation of the authors very clearly suggesting that Bhaskar, in effect, solves the 
problems Althusser grappled with. Of course, interpretations of Althusser vary greatly even amongst 
critical realists (see below and Mepham and Ruben, 1979). Wal Suchting's uncompromising 
critique of critical realism is strongly influenced by a very different interpretation of Althusser to 
that underlying critical realism (Suchting, 1992; Albury, Payne and Suchting, 1981). 
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realist' ideas evident in Bhaskar's seminal texts, rather than all the detailed arguments 
of his seminal texts and of his subsequent work (see below). A group of critical 
realists can be discerned who share, to a greater or lesser extent, these ideas, some of 
whom may be characterised as directly 'following' Bhaskar (Archer, 1995; Collier, 
1994; Lawson, 1997), others at least clearly engaged in the same 'research 
programme' within which Bhaskar has become most prominent (Jessop, 1995; 
Outhwaite, 1987; Sayer, 1992). Some of the older members of each group are, or 
have been in the past, associated with the Radical Philosophy journal around which 
critical realism first came to prominence in the 1970s (the introduction to Mepham 
and Ruben, 1979, is a useful guide to the journal's discourse at the time). Younger 
critical realist researchers, who are spread across a number of different disciplines, do 
not share such a common heritage (see below). There is no hard and fast distinction 
between scientific realists who can be labelled 'critical realist' and those who cannot . 
Moreover there is not total agreement within the critical realist group. Rather, there 
is a continuum of opinion within critical realism that forms part of the wider 
continuum that is scientific realism.7 
Since the late 1980s there has been a remarkable rise to prominence of critical realism 
within 1) non-mainstream economics, especially within Post Keynesianism; 2) the 
sub-discipline of economic methodology (itself a burgeoning sub-discipline of 
economics). This has been largely been due to the efforts of Tony Lawson, and those 
of his early proteges, all originally based at Cambridge University (see Fleetwood, 
1999, for examples of their work and the reactions it has provoked). The list of 
speakers to the weekly Cambridge Realist Workshop, ongoing since 1990, reads as a 
Who's Who of the economic methodology sub-discipline, and attracts audiences of 
well over fifty. This development serves to emphasise how diverse critical realism has 
7 An author need not openly subscribe to the label 'critical realist' to be included within the 
characterisation of it presented here. For example, Sayer (1992) never uses the tenn 'critical realist' 
but can be usefully characterised as such (he emphasises the methodological and transitive elements 
of critical realism and adds a detailed analysis of abstraction, see below). Bhaskar in a similar 
manner characterises Issac (1987), and others, as 'critical realist'. See RR, ch. 9 - the reference to 
Issac is given in f.n. 30. The characterisation may best be regarded as one sympathetic to Bhaskar's 
own usage of the tenn; he too might characterise certain authors as critical realists who may 
themselves prefer the tenn 'scientific realist'. The definition is becoming more accepted; for 
example Sayer (1995) is happy to describe himself as a critical realist. 
.. 
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become. Such diversity can have negative consequences in that critical realists in 
distinct respective groups may not come into contact with each other's work. The 
example of the relative neglect of Bob Jessop's work is given, and countered, below. 
Simultaneous to the diverse developments of critical realism, Bhaskar's own work 
has developed from his seminal texts into what he terms 'dialectical critical realism' 
(Dialectic, PE). However, Bhaskar's development of critical realism has not been 
reflected within the work of the majority of critical realist social scientists. For 
example Lawson (1997) is based firmly on Bhaskar's earlier work, mentioning 
dialectics only rarely, and is highly influential within the economic methodology 
discipline. This serves to emphasise that it is only the basic ideas systematised in 
Bhaskar's seminal texts that define critical realism across the social sciences. It is 
these basic ideas that are presented in the exposition below. The vexed question of 
the relation between Bhaskar's own further work and these basic ideas is important 
but cannot be addressed in this preliminary chapter. The question will be taken up in 
chapter 3 below where the abstract philosophical principles that underlie critical 
realism will be unearthed. Chapter 2 simply aims to present the general ideas of 
critical realism as they are understood by critical realist social scientists and by 
Marxists. 
If dialectical critical realism has proved controversial, then Bhaskar's most recent 
development is considered little short of disastrous by most critical realists (Hartwig, 
2001; Hostettler and Norrie, 2000). FEW is supposedly a development of dialectical 
critical realism but involves new age philosophy, religion and reincarnation. Though 
an examination of this latest and bizarre turn in Bhaskar's thought would potentially 
be very interesting, such an examination will not be undertaken within this thesis. The 
critique within this thesis does suggest that the disintegration ofBhaskar's philosophy 
IS unsurpnsmg. 
Critical Realism jor Marxism and the Social Sciences 
The next two sections below will present the basic ideas of critical realism, as these 
ideas are understood by Marxists and social scientists. The sections will draw upon 
J 
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the varied writings of critical realist social scientists such as Bob Jessop, Andrew 
Sayer, Derek Sayer, Tony Lawson, Andrew Collier and John Lovering, alongside 
Bhaskar's seminal texts. A key reference is Jessop. He a prominent advocate of the 
'Regulation Approach' within political economy, which he has helped establish in the 
UK on critical realist foundations,8 yet he is not well know within all critical realist 
circles (for example Bhaskar has never referred to Jessop's work; Collier, 1994, does 
not mention Jessop; nor does Lawson, 1997). Jessop's terminology will be drawn 
upon, for the purpose, inter alia, of introducing Jessop's development of critical 
realism to a broader critical realist audience. Additional comments and footnotes fill 
in the broader differentiation of critical realism; in addition they serve to avoid 
misunderstandings due to the terminological similarity of critical realism and 
'systematic dialectics' (the subject of chapter 4 below). A basic overview will be 
provided in the paragraph immediately below. The next section will address the 
critical realist ontology. In the subsequent section the critical realist method is 
presented. The final section articulates some preliminary criticisms in order to set the 
scene for the critique that follows in the subsequent chapters. 
Prior to the detailed presentation below, the basic ideas of critical realism will first be 
presented in as clear and simple terms as possible. The starting point is the 
uncontroversial proposition that the world (natural and social objects and actions) is 
complex. Critical realism takes this proposition further, arguing that events only 
rarely have one single cause; instead, there are a number of causes giving rise to any 
one particular event. These causes are not neatly patterned or aligned; rather, they 
may be very different in origin and nature but they nevertheless all combine to 
produce the event. Take the example of writing a PhD thesis: this might be explained 
in terms of socio-biology, as (ultimately) caused by the genes; or psychology, as 
caused by the mental state of the author; or economics, as motivated by monetary 
considerations. While not all these proposed causes would be accepted by critical 
realism (see below), the important point is that no single cause fully determines the 
8 Through making Jessop's interpretation of critical realism and resulting 'method of articulation' 
explicit this chapter will, it is hoped, persuade readers already acquainted with Jessop's theoretical 
work of the essential role of critical realism within it. Peck and Tickell (1992) provide a good 
introduction to the critical realist inspired regulation theory Jessop has helped bring to prominence 
(especially within the discipline of human geography); see also Jessop (2002). 
.. 
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event and so no mono-causal explanation is adequate. Thus, a critical realist would 
accept as causes of a PhD thesis both the particular mental state and the level of 
income of the author but it is only the chance combination of these and other causes 
that produce the event (the writing of a PhD thesis). The methodological implication 
is that in order to make sense of the complex world it is necessary to combine 
different modes of analysis, e.g., in the case of writing a PhD thesis, economics and 
psychology (as well as others, e.g. a theory of institutions which caused the relevant 
academic structure).9 The next two sections will elaborate upon this overview in the 
formal terminology of Jessop and of critical realism more broadly. 
The Critical Realist Ontology for Social Science 
For Bhaskar, critical realism is fundamentally an attempted answer to the question 
'what must be the case for science to be possible?' under the basic assumption of the 
intelligibility of scientific activity (PON, ch. 1). In the hands of Jessop, Sayer (1992), 
Lawson (1997, especially part IV) and others the methodological aspect of critical 
realism is given prominence. Jessop offers the following summary: 
The Marxian ontology [ critical realism] 10 implies that the world is full of 
contingently realised natural 11 necessities. This world is triply complex: it is 
divided into different domains, each having its own causal powers and 
liabilities; these domains are involved in tangled hierarchies, with some 
domains emergent from others but reacting back on them; and each domain is 
itself stratified, comprising not only a level of real causal mechanisms and 
9 The emphasis on the need for different planes of analysis and upon the contingent relation of these 
planes may appear too strong to the reader who is familiar with critical realism. There are two 
reasons for this emphasis: firstly the main concern is with social science where, for reasons 
explained below, the multiplicity of planes is very apparent; secondly Jessop does emphasise the 
contingent relation of planes more than many other critical realists. Below it is shown that different 
structures and mechanisms can necessarily coexist (in this sense being internally related) while the 
form and outcome of their interaction is contingent, within certain limits (in this sense they are 
contingently related). Jessop emphasises the contingency of their interaction and accurately applies 
critical realism to political economy. 
10 The claim that critical realism accords with Marx's thought is rebutted in subsequent chapters 
below. 
11 In a later work the word 'natural' is replaced by 'interactive' (Jessop, 1990b, p.17, f.n. 9). 
.-. 
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liabilities but also the level on which such powers are actualised and I or can 
be empirically examined. (Jessop, 1990a, pp. 162-3) 
The starting point for understanding Jessop's summary must be the levels of the 
actual and empirical considered in general terms. The empirical level refers to direct 
empirical observation; the actual level includes the empirical level and in addition the 
ongoing flux of actual events that mayor may not be observed. 12 A crucial part of 
critical realism is its particular insistence on the theory-laden nature of the empirical 
implying an ever-present discursive element to human understanding. Thus humans 
can only have mediated contact with the actual world. Unlike Sayer, Bhaskar and 
other critical realists, Jessop draws heavily on the particular discourse theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985). This is an example ofJessop's willingness to borrow from 
controversial (non-realist, non-Marxist, or 'post-Marxist') sources that sometimes 
leads to the charge of eclecticism being levelled against him (see Bonefeld and 
Holloway, 1991). 
Within critical realism the world is conceived of as a 'unity of diverse 
deterrninations'13 which refers to the fact that any object or event within it has many 
different aspects. For example any particular person plays certain economic and 
political roles; is made up of physical, chemical and biological elements; has a certain 
gender, colour, religious position etc. Each of these aspects (or 'determinations') 
corresponds to a distinct domain existing in the world.1 4 The basis of a domain is a 
set of internal relations, otherwise termed necessary relations, as is explained below. 
12 See Jessop (1982, pp.21S-16); (1990a, p.207, n. 10). Jessop does not elaborate upon this aspect 
of critical realism immediately, referring to Bhaskar for more detail, though his later elaboration 
owes more, in fact, to the work of Sayer (e.g. 1992). Jessop includes 'agents' at the level of the 
actual but it is not clear that Bhaskar would concur with this view. Agents are sui generis real 
entities for Bhaskar, see below. 
13 This is a phrase found in Marx's Grundrisse (Marx, 1973, p,100). Chapter S below suggests that 
systematic dialectics gives the phrase a very different meaning to that of critical realism. 
14 Jessop uses the term 'domain' to refer to what critical realists would usually call 'stratum'. 
'Domain' more usually refers to the ontological levels of 'real', 'actual', and 'empirical' (RTS, 
p.13). Jessop is not alone in his usage of the term; indeed Bhaskar sometimes employs this usage in 
PON, ch. 2, and subsequent work. 
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An internal relation is said to exist whenever a relationship confers new properties 
onto its elements (natural objects or social 'positioned-practices'),15 so altering their 
nature. For example a molecule is a combination of internally related atoms; in· the 
social world, internal relationships include the marriage relation, where the social 
position-practice 'husband' necessarily entails the position-practice 'wife'; a landlord 
/ tenant relation, in a similar manner, entails that the landlord exists as such only 
given the tenant and vice versa. These relationships contrast with an external or 
contingent relation where the nature of elements is unaltered by their relationship, 
e.g. the relationship of passers by on the street. A relation is symmetrically internal if 
the essential nature of both relata depends on the relation; it is asymmetrically 
internal if the nature of only one of the relata depends on the relation. Internal 
relations often come in sets - such a set is termed a structure. 16 
The critical realist conception of internal relations and structures raises important 
social theoretic issues including the question of the relationship between social 
structures and human agency. The precise specification of this relationship is perhaps 
a matter upon which no two theorists agree, even where there is general agreement 
as to the basic structure / agency duality within critical realism (see, for example, the 
exchange between Joseph, 1999, and Choudos and Hay, 1998). In general terms 
critical realism does have a common conception, although it is striking that it is nearly 
always presented in a negative way, viz., social structures do not automatically self-
reproduce regardless of human agency so critical realism is not structuralist and, in 
turn, is not functionalist. Two aspects can be picked out here: (i) social structures 
endure only through agency, though rarely by direct intent, thus Bhaskar writes: 
[P]eople do not marry to reproduce nuclear family or work to reproduce the 
capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and 
inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity. 
15 Sayer (1992, ch. 3) employs the term 'practice' to denote the basic elements of social relations. 
Bhaskar's 'positioned-practice' (PON, ch. 2) is sometimes a more helpful term. 
16 An important point that Sayer and Jessop do not make is that different structures can themselves 
be internally related. That is to say the relation between relations can be internal. See PON, pp.42-
4. 
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(PON, p.35) 
(ii) social structures need not endure at all; agents may change their relevant actions 
which, themselves, may be complex. Sayer writes: 
Actors are not mere 'dupes', 'automata' or 'bearers of roles', unalterably 
programmed to reproduce. The very fact that social structures are historically 
specific ... ought to remind us of the contingent status of social structures. 
(Sayer, 1992, pp.96-7) 
Thus agency has the capability to transform as well as to reproduce social structures. 
It can be added that some natural phenomena will be internally related to the essential 
positioned-practices, due for example to biological necessities for food and shelter. 
Also groups and institutions will be internally related to the essential positioned-
practices; the specification of these is a matter for substantive theoretical work (PON, 
ch. 2; SRHE, ch. 2; Dialectic, pp. 152-72). 
Part of the appeal of Bhaskar's seminal text on social science, PON, lies in his 
provision of a set of concepts to encapsulate and indeed clarify what has become the 
basic critical realist conception of structure and agency. His conception rests on 
reciprocal dualities: (1) the duality of structure states that society is both the 
condition and continually reproduced (or transformed) outcome of intentional human 
activity; (2) the duality of praxis states that agents activity should be considered as 
(normally conscious) production and (normally unconscious) reproduction (or 
transformation) of the conditions of production, i.e. of society. The emphasis on the 
reproductive and / or transformative aspects of social activity lead Bhaskar to call this 
model the transformational model of social activity (PON, ch. 2).17 
17 An important feature of Bhaskar's elaboration of this model is the notion of explanatory critique 
that is developed in SRHE and later work. According to this notion, the comprehension 
(explanation) of a social structure may reveal that structure to be undesirable, such that the 'fact / 
value dichotomy' is broken. 
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In the critical realist analysis of causation the sui generis properties conferred by a 
structure are understood as mechanisms, i.e. 'ways-oJ-acting' or causal powers and 
liabilities. They are possessed by objects as a necessary result of their underlying 
structures. Thus, on a critical realist conception, objects necessarily behave in certain 
ways in certain situations because of their structure. For example, an aeroplane has 
the causal power of flight due to a structure that it possesses. This power mayor 
may not be activated, depending upon contingent conditions such as the weather, the 
presence of a pilot, the existence of a runway, etc. Following the fundamental tenet 
of scientific realism, critical realism asserts that structures and mechanisms are real, 
they really exist, because they give rise to actual behaviour of things, 18 even though 
they are abstract and may be unobservable. Hence a distinct ontological realm 
consisting of abstract but real structures and mechanisms is established, where these 
structures and mechanisms combine to generate the flux of the actual world. 19 
Returning to the concept of a domain, which was loosely defined above as 
corresponding to different objects, it can now be defined more precisely as referring 
to particular real structures and their corresponding mechanisms. 
A causal chain of mechanisms within a domain can be analysed. Marx's analysis of 
capital is interpreted by some critical realists in this way. His references to tendencies 
and counter-tendencies (e.g. for the falling rate of profit) being understood as 
referring to different mechanisms along the causal chain of capital (Jessop, 1982, 
pp.96-7; Joseph, 2002; Marsden, 1998). A very significant additional point made 
only by Jessop is that counter-tendencies are typically located at lower 'levels of 
abstraction' reflecting his position that real structures are themselves stratified along 
levels of abstraction. This is seductive language, reminiscent of the method termed 
'systematic dialectics' but the meaning that J essop attaches to his statement will, in 
chapter 5 below, be argued to be very different to 'systematic dialectics' . 
18 The precise conceptualisation presented here follows PON, p.170. Fine (2001b) notes that the 
relationships between structures and mechanisms and other key facets of critical realism are left 
rather vague in the critical realist literature. Fleetwood (2001) attempts to clarify these relationships. 
19 Jessop tends to use the term 'real' solely to apply to structures and mechanisms. However, as 
Bhaskar makes plain (RTS, 56-8), events and empirical observations are just as real as structures 
and mechanisms. The point is that the latter constitute a realm ontologically distinct from the 
former. The main thread of the text will continue to employ Jessop's usage in order to maintain 
consistency with his terminology. 
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In considering the 'unity of diverse determinations' it is clear that the combination of 
different domains at the concrete level must be addressed. This brings into view a key 
aspect of critical realist ontology that Jessop terms contingent necessity.20 An object 
necessarily possesses causal powers from a given structure but this does not mean the 
object always does the same thing. The actual effect of a given power depends on the 
specific concrete situation, for anyone power may be counter-acted, modified or not 
brought into play at all, by other powers from different domains (or indeed, counter-
tendencies within the domain). It is the specific conjuncture, i.e. the contingent 
relation of different causal chains, at the actual level that determines the event. Events 
are thus said to be overdeterminedl l by multiple causal chains. Any domain yields 
necessary powers but these powers have contingent effects: hence the notion of 
'contingent necessity'. 
An important aspect of critical realism concerns Jessop's reference to 'tangled 
hierarchies' of domains. 22 The sui generis properties conferred by an internal relation 
are termed, in this context, emergent powers. Their importance lies in their anti-
reductionist implications: it is not illuminating to reduce an internal relation to its 
elements because that would eliminate emergent properties23 and deprive science of 
its main object of enquiry, viz., real structures. This provides a justification for the 
boundaries of natural scientific disciplines: crudely, physics studies atoms and sub-
atomic phenomena; chemistry studies the emergent powers of molecules; biology the 
emergent powers of cells. Thus there is stratification along different domains. It is a 
tangled hierarchy because higher strata such as the human domain can effect lower 
strata such as the biological domain (e.g. through pesticides). In the social realm 
structures tend to be more interrelated than in the natural realm hence J essop' s stress 
on the contingent relation of domains. 24 
20 Jessop (1982, pp.2l3-20; 1990a, pp.l62~; 1990b, pp.l0-l3). 
21 Jessop often employs this term (which was, of course, made prominent by Althusser) but Bhaskar 
frowns upon it (RR, p.l87). 
22 An important aspect of critical realism that Jessop has not elaborated in any detail. 
23 Thus reductionist sociobiological explanations of behaviour, such as the one referred to in the 
example of writing a PhD thesis, are ruled out. 
24 See Sayer (1992, ch. 4); RTS, 163ff.; Collier (1989) and Collier (1994, ch. 4). 
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At this stage the fundamental propositions forcefully elaborated within Bhaskar's 
seminal texts can be revealed. Bhaskar argues that the concepts of necessity and 
causality in the real world - structures and mechanisms - are sustained by critical 
realism while at the same time theoretical indeterminacy holds at the actual level. This 
is particularly important to him because he sees it as a refutation of the positivism of 
the Anglo-American philosophical tradition which he considers to be logically implicit 
in much of the philosophy of science, both natural and social, and in many theories of 
society.25 Bhaskar characterises positivism as the basically Humean view that causal 
laws are constituted by constant conjunctions amongst self-contained 'atomistic' 
entities (events) and that scientific enquiry therefore aims to seek out these empirical 
regularities in the world. However, once it is accepted that real structures and 
mechanisms exist it can readily be seen that regularities are unlikely to occur, except 
through experiment, because of the overdetermination of the actual world (this 
argument runs through RTS). In short, positivism is completely, and fatally, oblivious 
of the real stratum according to critical realism. 26 
The exposition of the basic features of the critical realist ontology relevant to method 
in social science is now complete. Before moving to the method and its critique an 
important feature of critical realism should be briefly noted: in the 'hard sciences' of 
physics and chemistry scientific experiment performs the function of isolating 
25 The implicit positivist ontology is usually manifested in the view that constant event regularities 
are at least necessary to scientific laws, as in the well-known 'covering law' model of explanation. 
Lawson (1997, ch. 7) critiques econometrics for its adherence (whether implicit or explicit) to such 
an ontology. According to Bhaskar, Lawson and other critical realists, the implicit positivism 
reflects a neglect of ontology in favour of epistemology that, in turn, is due to what Bhaskar calls the 
'epistemic fallacy'; the fallacy that epistemological enquiry is sufficient to answer ontological 
questions. A consequence is that explicit philosophical and social theories contradict their own 
implicit ontology, a situation Bhaskar describes as an 'ontological tension'. Bhaskar's RTS 
elaborates all these themes (see ch. 3 and ch. 5 below). 
26 The thrust of Jessop and, to an extent, Sayer emphasises this aspect of the critique of positivism. 
There is another related aspect of the critique running through RTS: positivism fails to consistently 
distinguish empirical observation from the actual world. 
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structures and mechanisms for their identification.27 As indicated in the next section, 
an (acknowledged) problem for critical realist social science is that its object 
precludes experiment. 
The Development of a Critical Realist Method for Marxism and Social Science 
The critical realist ontology has been built upon by Bhaskar, social scientists and 
Marxists in order to provide a general method for social science, one that is argued 
by some proponents to be Marx's implicit method. This method is presented below. 
Firstly the basic distinction between the abstract and concrete, common to both 
natural and social scientific method, is presented; secondly the peculiarities of social 
structural stratification are described and shown to underlie the critical realist 
understanding of both individual social sciences and of sociology (or political 
economy) as a 'totalising' social science; thirdly the 'transcendental' procedure for 
appropriating social structures in thought is explained and illustrated by the critical 
realist interpretation ofMarx's Capital. A number of preliminary criticisms are raised 
in the final section in preparation for the immanent critique that follows in subsequent 
chapters. 
The Critical Realist Distinction Between the Abstract and the Concrete 
The critical realist method in social science stems from specific differences of social 
structure from natural structure to be discussed below. Before examining these 
peculiarities of social structure the basic distinction between the abstract and the 
concrete, which serves as a general guide to all critical realist method, will be 
27 The relevant critical realist tenninology, systematised in RTS and PON, is as follows: natural and 
social events normally involve the interaction of diverse mechanisms. Given this diversity and 
complexity, it is rare for a (scientifically interesting) constant conjunction of events to obtain. The 
world may therefore be described as an 'open system', a term most easily defined as referring to any 
situation where no (scientifically interesting) constant conjunction of events obtains. In a scientific 
experiment one single mechanism is isolated by eliminating, holding constant or otherwise 
controlling for, interaction with other mechanisms. In this manner a constant conjunction of events 
is obtained corresponding to a single mechanism. Such a constant conjunction of events defines a 
'closed system'. 
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explained - the applicability of this distinction to the social world being the reason 
why the study of society can aspire to be 'scientific'. 28 
The social world is not a mass of separate events, nor is it one homogenous structure, 
rather, for critical realism, it is constituted by diverse structures whose resultant 
mechanisms combine to generate the flux of actual events. Each structure (and its 
resultant mechanisms) must be individually analysed since it is sui generiS, requiring 
unique terms and concepts adequate to its nature. Individual social sciences have the 
task of abstracting from the social world concepts of the specific social structures 
underlying their particular object. In this sense they move from the concrete actual 
world to the abstract (but nevertheless real) structures and mechanisms generating 
their explananda. Once adequate theorisation of specific social structures and 
mechanisms has been obtained then these separate analyses can be combined in order 
to explain concrete phenomena. Such a procedure is necessary since events will 
usually involve more than one underlying structure. Jessop aptly characterises this as 
the 'method of articulation' since different social structures and mechanisms must be 
articulated in order to provide concrete explanation. Applications of the method often 
specify economy, state and civil society as basic social structures. Explanations of, 
for example, Thatcherism (Jessop, Bonnet, Brornley and Ling, 1988) articulate the 
identified mechanisms of these structures (,value theory', theories of state 
bureaucracy and theories of ideology might supply these mechanisms) . 
Thus the method stipulates a concrete to abstract movement to isolate individual 
structures and mechanisms followed by an abstract to concrete movement to provide 
explanation. Marx's comments on the abstract and concrete in the Grundrisse and 
elsewhere are interpreted to refer the above outlined critical realist procedure. Marx 
writes that from 'a chaotic conception of the whole ... I would then, by means of 
further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts, from the 
imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest 
determinations' (Marx, 1973, p.l00). Critical realists interpret these comments to 
refer to the procedure of abstracting real structures and mechanisms from the 
28 In Bhaskar's terms, there is the 'possibility of naturalism' (PON, ch. 1) . 
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concrete actual world (e.g. Jessop, 2002; Collier, 1994; Joseph, 2002). Having 
arrived at the 'simplest determinations', Marx continues: 'From there the journey 
would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the [concrete], but this time 
not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations 
and relations' (ibid.). For critical realists, this corresponds to the abstract to concrete 
stage of critical realist method: the articulation of abstract structures and mechanisms 
in order explain concrete actuality (ibid.). An extraordinary feature of the relation of 
critical realism and systematic dialectics, explored in chapter 5 below, is that the 
latter emphasises precisely these same quotes yet gives them very different meaning. 
Social Stratification, the Social Totality and Sociology 
It was explained above how, for critical realism, social structures differ from natural 
structures because of the dualities in terms of which they must be conceptualised 
(they are both condition and outcome of human praxis). As a result, the nature of 
stratification of social structures is distinct - a distinctness which has methodological 
import. For natural science, stratification is exemplified by the vertical29 explanation 
of a molecule as a structure of atoms; in turn these atoms are explained by sub-
atomic entities. Vertical explanation in the social world differs as follows: (i) unlike 
natural structures, social structures are explained, if only at a very general level, by 
entities of their own kind - instead of descending from one type of entity to another, 
as in natural science (e.g. from molecule to atom), there is, in social science, 
essentially a movement from one set of positioned-practices to another set of 
positioned-practices. 30 Marx's references to 'economic base' and ideological 
29 Collier stresses the useful distinction between 'vertical' and 'horizontal' explanation. The former 
refers to the way in which one strata is 'explained' by that immediately below it (e.g. molecules by 
atoms); the latter refers to the explanation of an event by specification of the mechanism, or 
combination of mechanisms, that generated it (Collier, 1994, p.l09). 
30 It is in this sense that the current author believes Bhaskar to be right to sharply distinguish 
natural and social structures in PON, ch. 2 ('right' in the sense of being consistent with the critical 
realist conceptual essence). The distinction has been subject to continuing criticism (e.g. Collier, 
1994, ch. 8; Lawson, 1997, ch. 15) but in the general form presented above the distinction appears 
to be sound. This is not to deny that society, taken as a whole, is emergent from the natural world. 
Nor is it to deny that the various specific and concrete social products and practices are each of a sui 
generis nature. It is to affirm that there remains a fundamental level of discourse whereby social 
structures lose their sui generis status, in that they are all essentially positioned-practice relations. 
No equivalent statement can be made regarding the natural realm, according to critical realism. 
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'superstructure' are interpreted by critical realists to be postulated exemplars of such 
social stratification (Collier, 1989; SRHE, pp,158-9); (ii) conceptualisations of such 
interconnected social structures must be combined with a study of conscious agents' 
activity, seen as reproductive and transformative of social structure, in order to 
provide complete explanation of social structures (Jessop, 1995; Lawson, 1997, Part 
IV; PON, ch. 2). 
Thus the individual social structures studied by specific social sciences are ultimately 
internally related to one another. Seen as a whole, working through the 
interconnections of social structures, these are likely to be symmetrical internal 
relations. For example 'economy', 'state' and 'civil society' may, to a greater or 
lesser degree, be necessary to one another's very existence31 32. Because of the 
internal relatedness of social structures, and their transformational character, a single 
totalising study of society is required, in addition to specific social sciences. It has the 
task of grasping the totality of internal relations that constitute society and the 
reproduction and transformation of that society. This science should thus embrace 
individual social sciences and social psychology (SRHE, ch. 2) and is, for Bhaskar, 
sociology (Jessop and others claim a similar status for 'political economy'), The 
broad scope envisaged for sociology is' matched, in actuality, by at least one single 
body of social thought, Marxism, so that 'sociology must either presuppose or usurp 
the place of just such a totalizing and historical science of society as Marxism has 
claimed to be' (PON, p.44). 
31 It is important to note that this necessary coexistence of structures and mechanisms (making 
them internally related, in this sense) does not fix, though it may limit, the nature and form of their 
concrete interaction (so their relation is, in this sense, contingent). For example the mechanisms 
conferred by state structure on citizens remain distinct from the economic imperatives people face 
even though the economy and the state may be in a mutually functional relation. Sayer's distinction 
between necessary and contingent relations of structures (Sayer, 1992, ch. 3) and Jessop's 
'contingent necessity' (see the previous section, above) refer to this latter meaning of 'contingency' 
(indeed Jessop's phrase attempts to capture both aspects of the relation). Bhaskar's totality of 
internally related social structures refers to the former meaning of 'contingency'. 
32 Regulation theory, especially in the form championed by Jessop, can be seen in this light: 
regimes of accumulation correspond to historical periods where there is a high degree of mutual 
functionality, as in the regulationists' characterisation of Fordism. Where mutual functionality 
breaks down there is socio-economic crisis, as in the demise of Fordism (see Tickell and Peck, 
1992). 
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The Appropriation of Social Structures in Thought: 'Transcendental Deduction' 
So far two general features of the critical realist method have been outlined: firstly 
the basic distinction between abstract and concrete and, secondly, the distinctness and 
methodological import of social structural stratification. It remains to detail precisely 
how, within a critical realist framework, adequate concepts of individual social 
structures are to be obtained. This will be detailed below, completing the exposition 
of the method and leading to the immanent critique. 
Critical realism takes very seriously the well-known limitation that experiment is, in 
general, unavailable to the social scientist. This is because experiment is at the heart 
of critical realist methodology for natural science (RTS). As in the case of the general 
methodology for social science, explained above, the specific method for theorising 
social structure stems from a difference between natural and social structure. 
Whereas, above, this difference lay in the nature of stratification, the relevant 
difference here concerns the relation of science to its object of study. Now natural 
scientific knowledge is, by definition, knowledge of non-social phenomena. So 
natural scientific knowledge is not itself part of the natural world, its object of study . 
By contrast social scientific knowledge is, by definition, knowledge of social 
phenomena. So, as a social phenomenon itself, social science, including the 
knowledge it produces, must be considered part of its own object. In this sense social 
science is internal to its object in a way which natural science is not. Many 
implications flow from this feature of social science; there is space only to draw out 
the main methodological implication. 
The internal relation of social science to its object implies that the social scientist has 
privileged access to her object unavailable to the natural scientist. The sources of this 
access can be divided into two: (1) as a social agent the social scientist will have prior 
conceptualisations of her own social activity; (2) the social scientist will be able to 
draw upon accounts of the prior conceptualisations of other social agents of their 
activities (e.g. through formal interviews). And, of course, in general terms the social 
scientist has much more intimate knowledge of her object than can the natural 
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scientist ever achieve. The question for the social scientist is, then, how are prior 
conceptualisations of social activities to be used in order to generate adequate 
concepts of social structure. Here, as previously, the duality of structure is vital 
because it ensures a stronger link: between social structures and the activities they 
govern than is the case for natural structures. Social activities reproduce and 
transform social structure even as they are governed (partly) by it. The social scientist 
is therefore able to make an informed hypothesis as to what positioned-practice 
system underlies a given set of activities (Collier, 1994; Lawson, 1997; PON, ch.2). 
Bhaskar calls this critical realist procedure 'transcendental deduction'. According to 
Bhaskar transcendental deductions, or arguments, are species of retroductive ones 
where 'a retroductive argument moves from a description of some phenomenon to a 
description of something which produces it or is a condition for it' (SRHE, p.11). 
The distinguishing feature of the transcendental species is that its premises are social 
activities as conceptualised in experience (PON, p.SO). They lie at the heart of critical 
realism because philosophy, as well as social theory, is constituted by them (PON, ch. 
1). Bhaskar initially derived the notion from that of Kant but sees it as overcoming 
Kant's individualism and idealism and later characterises 'dialectical arguments' as 
species of transcendental ones (Dialectic, pp. 107-8 and p.396) . 
Thus the social scientist must hypothesise ('non-actual') social structures and 
mechanisms from (,actual') pre-conceptualised social activities and social forms. This 
is a move from a perceptible effect to its imperceptible structural cause or condition. 
The scientist does not make this move purely through individual inspiration. Rather, 
for critical realists, the scientist is a social being and science is a social process, as 
understood through the transformational model of social activity (see above). 
Accordingly, the scientist is understood as drawing upon material and conceptual 
tools and forms in order to produce hypotheses. The conception, then, is of a vast 
social stock of knowledge, ideas, tools, etc. being drawn upon and developed by 
scientists. In particular, attention is paid by critical realists to a process of conceptual 
model building and development as an aid to producing hypotheses. Where new 
phenomena are encountered analogies and metaphors with previously established 
models and concepts are made so that 'something like a logic of analogy and 
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metaphor' (PON, p.12; Lewis, 1996) is employed. The crucial critical realist proviso 
being that science aims to establish the reality of what the models depict. 33 In social 
science, the process of hypothesising structures and mechanisms is specifically guided 
by the duality of structure that is unique to social science. The above outlined view of 
the 'transitive dimension' of science, and of the logic of analogy and metaphor, 
serves as a general background to this specificity of social science. 
The Critical Realist Interpretation of Marx 's Method 
Further elucidation of the method is best achieved through the example of Marx's 
method in Capital, as interpreted by critical realists. This illustration is the one most 
often given by critical realists themselves (eg. PON, ch. 2; Brown et. aI., 2002a, 
various contributions; Marsden, 1998; Pratten, 1993; Sayer, 1992, ch. 4).34 
According to Bhaskar: 
Capital may most plausibly be viewed as an attempt to establish what must be 
the case for the experiences grasped by the phenomenal forms of capitalist life 
to be possible. (PON, p.51) 
The phrase 'phenomenal forms' is interpreted by Bhaskar to correspond to the 
critical realist notion of 'social forms' or pre-conceptualised social activities. In order 
for an individual to undertake a social activity they must have some concept of what 
that activity is. For example 'commodity', 'exchange value', 'money', 'capital', 
'wages', 'profit', etc. are economic concepts used necessarily by all economic actors. 
They represent social agents' prior conceptualisations of the social world. The social 
33 The distinction between the 'transitive' and 'intransitive' dimensions of science introduced by, 
and essential to, Bhaskar's work can now be understood. The transitive dimension refers to the 
. socially produced and developing array of scientific practices, ideas, models, concepts etc. that 
produces and constitutes scientific knowledge; the intransitive dimension is the world of real objects 
which scientific knowledge attempts to capture. 
34 This aspect of critical realist method can be traced back to an initial article by Geras (reproduced 
in Geras, 1986, ch. 3). John Mepham (in Mepharn and Ruben, 1979, Vol. 3, ch. 5) developed Geras' 
work and Derek Sayer consolidates and further develops the ideas in his Marx's Method (1983), a 
book which must be considered one of the most extensive realist accounts of the topic; Jessop (e.g. 
1982), A. Sayer (1992, ch. 4), Bhaskar (e.g. PON, p.108), Marsden (1998), Fleetwood (2002) and 
other critical realists refer to it. 
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scientist is able to use such concepts (actual 'forms') as premises for the deduction of 
the underlying ('non-actual') economic structures and mechanisms that are their 
causes or conditions. 35 Consider the 'value form' and 'wage form'. On this 
interpretation Marx takes the prior conceptualisation of 'value' as the premise for the 
deduction of the 'law of value'. A specific social structure, where isolated commodity 
producers produce for market exchange, is hypothesised to underlie value and then a 
mechanism whereby exchange values are regulated by labour time is deduced from 
this structure. Similarly, the concept of 'wage' is premise for the hypothesis of a 
social structure where workers are divorced from the means of production (so that 
labour is 'doubly free'). From this social structure the mechanisms of labour power 
and its production of surplus value when put to use by the capitalist are deduced.36 
Once competing hypotheses of underlying structures have been made they must be 
tested empirically. Critical realists take seriously the high difficulty of experiment in 
social science relative to natural science. In the absence of experiment hypotheses are 
tested, for the most part, by their relative degrees of explanatory power regarding 
specific social phenomena (SRHE, p.l 07). 
The critical realist interpretation of Marx's well known statement that 'all science 
would be superfluous if the outer appearances of things coincided with their inner 
essence' (Marx, 1998, p.l 095) is provided by the movement from phenomenal forms 
to their underlying structures and mechanisms. Thus in the example of the wage 
form, the outward appearance of equal exchange, registered in the well known 
phrase, 'a fair days work for a fair days pay', masks the underlying inequality of 
surplus value production. Critical realists usually make a distinction between the 
35 Lawson (1997, ch. 15) argues that not just mere pre-conceptualisations, but partial event 
regularities, or 'contrastive social demi-regularities', such as the consistently poor relative economic 
growth rate of the UK,provide the crucial premises for transcendental deduction in social science. 
He explains such 'demi-regs' as analogues of experiments involving a primary group and a control 
group (e.g. randomised control trials). The key features of transcendental deduction are retained. 
36 Sayer (1987) emphasises the historical nature of the phenomenal forms, in that they are not 
present throughout history. Accordingly the structures and mechanisms derived from them are 
historically specific and are themselves explananda for detailed historical research. Sayer's 
emphasis on historical work rather than on structures and mechanisms sets him apart many critical 
realists. His rejection of the structure / agency dichotomy and of any form of Althusserian 'historical 
materialism' also have this effect (1983, postscript to second edition). 
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Marx's method of enquiry and his method of presentation. Again this is an 
interpretation of Marx' s methodological comments. According to this interpretation 
the method of inquiry is, as explained above, a movement from appearance to 
essence. However, the method of presentation should move in the opposite direction, 
from essence to the explanation of appearances (Brown et. aI., 2002a, various 
contributions) . 
For completeness, it should be noted that a minor disagreement can be discerned, 
amongst critical realists, regarding the precise route the deduction of structures and 
mechanisms from phenomenal forms should take. As shown above Bhaskar 
recommends the movement from prior conceptualisations (in this case of phenomenal 
forms) straight to social structures. Mechanisms can then be derived from these 
structures. Sayer (1979) recommends the realist procedure in natural science, of 
hypothesising mechanisms first and derivatively providing social structures. 
Preliminary Criticisms 
Before the immanent critique a number of preliminary criticisms will be raised. Some 
of these can be seen as developments and extensions of the very important critique of 
Sayer (1983) made by Patrick Murray, a 'new dialectician' (Murray, 1983).37 
Murray's work shares significant themes with that of Banaji (1979), who is also 
drawn upon below. The criticisms presented are considered preliminary either 
because they raise problems that can be resolved through development of critical 
realism's conceptual essence, or because, however damaging they appear to be, they 
fail to identifY, and deal explicitly with, the critical realist essence, making them 
unpersuasive to critical realists themselves - i.e. they are not immanent criticisms.38 
Such an immanent critique will be proffered in subsequent chapters below. In the 
light of this immanent critique, the preliminary criticisms can be understood in a new 
37 Sayer now fully accepts Murray's criticisms. See Sayer (1983, postscript to the second edition). 
38 Suchting (1992) and Albury et. al. (1981) provide a range of criticisms of critical realism, of 
variable substance, which have had little impact partly, it might be suggested, due to their being 
'preliminary' in the sense outlined. 
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light, as developments of the underlying critique, and, in this way, as aspects of a 
whole. 
An accurate account of Capital, induding its first chapters, will find that the 
movement of the analysis, and the location of concepts such as value, cannot be fitted 
into the critical realist framework. Three possible critical realist interpretations will be 
considered and then rejected: firstly, there is the standard critical realist view that the 
presentation should move from essence to appearance; secondly, it might be 
considered that Marx does not separate inquiry and presentation and so presents his 
analysis as a transcendental deduction from appearance to essence; thirdly it might be 
considered that Capital employs more than one transcendental deduction, each 
deduction being presented in turn, either from essence to appearance or from 
appearance to essence. 
To evaluate these interpretations the actual presentation in Capital will be examined. 
The analysis starts at the commodity, moves to value, then oscillates back to the 
commodity, now termed the 'commodity-form', whose full development is the 
'money-form'. There is then a movement to the concepts of surplus value and capital. 
Profit, interest, etc. are later developments still. Now, both one-way interpretations 
of this analysis can immediately be ruled out; for a linear essence to appearance 
interpretation would make the commodity the most essential concept and surplus 
value and capital inessential; the appearance to essence interpretation would make 
value the appearance form of money and capital the appearance form of profit. Thus 
both linear interpretations are unacceptable. This leaves the third view that there are 
several transcendental deductions presented sequentially. A number of difficulties 
count against this interpretation. The interpretation makes it difficult to comprehend 
the oscillation from commodity (appearance) to value (essence?) and back to the 
commodity-form, or money (appearance). Banaji (1979) takes to task Colletti, Della 
Volpe, Althusser and other theorists, who laid the foundations of the critical realist 
understanding of Capital (PIF, pp.162-85), on account of this failure to distinguish 
'commodity' and 'commodity-form'. Further difficulties with the interpretation stem 
from the relation between the supposedly separate transcendental deductions. 
Concepts such as value recur, in different guises, throughout Capital implying that 
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there is some development of concepts between deductions; this suggests 
interrelations of deductions that are unaccounted for by the interpretation. More 
damagingly still, the actual examples of transcendental deductions in Capital cited by 
critical realists are incompatible. The concept of 'value' is a phenomenal form in the 
example of the value form, whereas, in the example of the wage form, it must be 
placed, in its development to surplus value, at the level of essence because surplus 
value is not immediately apparent in the wage or profit form (see previous 
paragraph). 
More generally the concept of 'form' is used in a very loose and wide-ranging way by 
critical realists, denoting anything with social content. In addition to examples given 
so far, Bhaskar at one stage refers to the 'fact form' (RR, p.9) - such examples 
stretch the meaning of the term to the limit. Relatedly there is a question as to the 
ontological status of phenomenal forms: while it is clear that social activities are 
actual events, and that social structures are real entities, it is not clear what the 
ontological status of value, money, profit, etc. is. The problem is compounded by the 
fact that the entire capitalist mode of production is sometimes called by critical 
realists, following Marx, the 'value-form', or 'capital'. These two terms then acquire 
a double meaning since, as well as defining the capitalist mode of production, they 
are, as phenomenal forms, distinct elements within it, along with positioned-practice 
relations and other social products. More generally it can be noted that phenomenal 
forms and other social products are, for critical realism, products of society yet at the 
same time internal elements of that society - thus there is the peculiarity of an object 
that includes elements that it is supposed to produce. 
Another general observation is that the method gives no indication as to precisely 
how structures are to be articulated. In practice this proves to be problematic so for 
example Stuart Hall comments that he is not an economist so finds it difficult to 
integrate detailed economic material into his analysis (see the exchange between Hall 
and Jessop in Jessop et. aI., 1988, pp.99-122). The problem holds for the articulation 
of structure and agency, implicated in structural transformation, as well as in 
everyday events. Jessop employs the concept of 'strategy' as a mediating term in 
order to try and solve this problem (e.g. Jessop, 1983). Part of the difficulty lies in 
J 
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the absence of any ordering principle for the articulation of mechanisms -
stratification is complex, and resultant mechanisms may be, in any case, of equal 
weight. It is easy, therefore, for the analysis to become either too complex, or 
conversely, if analysis concentrates on only one or two mechanisms, too simple. It 
seems, then, that a 'middle way' must be found, not too many (over-complexity) nor 
too few (over-simplicity) mechanisms must be articulated. This requirement is, 
however, purely an artefact of the method, weakening its credibility. 
Critical realism is clearly not a finished product. Many of the problems raised above 
have provided the impetus for theorists to develop the basis of critical realism, e.g. 
Jessop's 'strategic-relational' analysis, indicated above. The crucial issue then 
becomes whether the preliminary criticisms can indeed be overcome by such 
development, or whether, on the other hand, they are manifestations of an irrevocably 
flawed essence. Below an immanent critique is presented that, if accepted, means that 
the latter is the case. 
I 
~ 
I 
~ .. 
37 
Chapter 3. A Philosophical Critique of Critical Realism 
Introduction 
The various aspects that constitute critical realism, as this philosophy is perceived by 
practising social scientists and Marxists, have been set forth in chapter 2 above. It 
remains to unravel the thread that ties these aspects together, to unearth as it were 
the 'conceptual essence' of critical realism, the essential philosophical principle upon 
which the various facets of critical realism are based (to establish, indeed, whether 
any such essence exists). It was noted in chapter 2 above that the question of the 
relationship between critical realism and Bhaskar's later development of 'dialectical 
critical realism' (Dialectic, PE) is vexed and that this is no more true than since the 
publication of Bhaskar's FEW (Hartwig, 2001; Hostettler and Norrie, 2000). The 
ability to locate the conceptual essence of critical realism will help to answer that 
question and thereby serve to give focus to the critique of critical realism and of 
dialectical critical realism. This chapter will uncover the conceptual essence of critical 
realism and argue that dialectical critical realism is a development of this conceptual 
essence (this argument resonates with Bhaskar's view on the matter, though Bhaskar 
would not refer to a common 'conceptual essence' of critical realism and dialectical 
critical realism). On this basis an immanent critique of critical realism and dialectical 
critical realism alike will be presented. 
The first section of the chapter will argue that the critical realist theory of mind is the 
conceptual essence of critical realism. Having uncovered this essence, the next 
section of the chapter addresses the question of the relationship between critical 
realism and dialectical crit;.cal realism, arguing that dialectical critical realism is the 
deepening and enrichment of critical realism that Bhaskar declares it to be. This sets 
the scene for the penultimate section of this chapter that provides an immanent 
critique of critical realism and of dialectical critical realism. The critique is argued to 
be no more than a recapitulation of Hume's infamous sceptical argument. A final 
section concludes. 
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The Conceptual Essence of Critical Realism 
According to Bhaskar (PON, pp. 80-119), there exists some, as yet little understood, 
structure emergent from the brain and central nervous system (hereafter eNS) that 
'generates' thought. Humans and other thinking beings possess the emergent power 
of thought because they possess this structure, a structure that could be labelled 
'mind'. Thought is a real and emergent power generated by some complex structure 
emergent from the brain and eNS. Without the brain and eNS, mind (and hence the 
power that it generates, thought) would not exist but, at the same time, the brain and 
eNS are not identical to mind. Rather, there is an (as yet unknown) structure that 
emerges from the brain and eNS; this structure is the 'real essence' of mind. The 
existence of this structure is confirmed by the power that it generates, viz., 'thought' . 
In critical realist terminology the emergent structure defines a new 'stratum' of 
reality. The stratum of 'mind' is emergent from the (presumably) neurological 
stratum below it, and yet 'rooted in' that stratum. Bhaskar (PON, ch.3) dubs this 
theory of mind 'synchronic emergent powers materialism' (hereafter SEPM). 
The notions of stratification and emergence can be applied to any two adjacent 
'strata', such as mind and brain, atom and molecule, molecule and cell, and so on, 
This does not imply, however, that all strata are of equal importance conceptually, 
Rather, the mind / brain relation is the most abstract and simple relation in the sense 
that the 'mind' is the very medium of thought, the very medium through which the 
conceptualisation of any strata, indeed of anything at all, takes place, Any 
conclusions reached about the mind as such, including conclusions reached about the 
relation between ideas (generated by the mind) and their objects (outside of the 
mind), must delimit all other concepts and conclusions. The implications of the 
critical realist articulation of the mind / brain relation will be developed below . 
SEPM and the Key Themes of Bhaskar 's Critical Realism 
SEPM entails the notion that thoughts and sensations are sui generis causal powers 
causing a correspondingly distinct activity (intentional activity) and emerging from a 
distinct structure (a 'real essence' that might be called the 'mind') which, should it 
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ever be uncovered by science, will be uruque. This analysis gIves substance to 
important critical realist themes. Firstly the analysis substantiates the critical realist 
notion of a real world, of objects and actual events, external to, and independent of, 
but in a causal relationship with, human ideas and observation (Bhaskar calls this 
view 'ontological realism'). Secondly the analysis defines the theory-laden nature of 
observation by substantiating the notion that the idea and sensory perception of the 
object are very different to the object itself An idea and its real object are in a 'non-
isomorphic' relationship, i.e. SEPM defines the critical realist view that humans 
cannot 'step out' of all theory in order to 'map' concepts to objects as they 'really' 
are outside of human theory (Bhaskar calls this 'epistemic relativism'). Thirdly the 
irreducible 'theory-Iadeness' of observation defined by SEPM ensures that, even 
where there is experimental control, it is ultimately a question of judgement as to 
whether, and to what extent, observations are 'in phase' with the real world 
(Bhaskar's 'judgmental rationalism'). 
Fourthly SEPM explains an important negative tenet of critical realism, termed the 
'epistemic fallacy'. Bhaskar claims that, in general, Western philosophy has tacitly, or 
otherwise, considered statements about reality to be identical with, or at least 
reducible to, statements about knowledge of reality. I SEPM establishes, however, 
that the 'real essence' generating thought is some (as yet little known) structure 
emergent from the brain and eNS. This is an essence very different to that of the 
objects of thought such as electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. According to SEPM, 
thought causes intentional human activity. Such activity impacts upon real objects, 
which, in turn, causally impact upon thought. Only through such causal interaction is 
knowledge acquired. Given this view, it is clear that an object may be essentially 
independent of the process by which thought attempts to grasp that object. Hence 
statements referring to real objects (ontological statements) are not always reducible 
to statements referring to the process of knowledge acquisition (epistemological 
statements). It is an 'epistemic fallacy' to consider otherwise, and to focus upon 
epistemology at the expense of ontology. 
1 The clause 'tacitly, or othenvise' is important.. Bhaskar is not claiming that all philosophers 
intentionally commit the fallacy. 
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Fifthly SEPM explains the precise critical realist specification of stratification and 
emergence. Accordingly, the notions of stratification and emergence are revisited 
below, in light of the discussion of SEPM. This will result in an enhanced 
understanding of critical realism that points towards dialectical critical realism, as will 
be argued subsequently. 
SEPM and the 'External' Relation of Strata 
On the basic critical realist conception a lower stratum provides the condition of 
existence of the stratum above it. As such the higher or emergent stratum is 
necessarily related to the root stratum. On the other hand, the root stratum can exist 
without the higher stratum; it is not necessary for the entities at the lower stratum to 
combine so as to constitute the higher stratum - the constituents of neurons do not 
necessarily come together to produce mind; equally, hydrogen and oxygen do not 
always combine to produce water. Thus, from this perspective, the relation between 
an emergent and a root stratum is asymmetrically internal. The higher stratum is 
necessarily (internally) related to the lower stratum but the lower stratum is only 
contingently (externally) related to the higher stratum. In fact, a move beyond this 
basic critical realist understanding of stratification reveals that the relationships 
between critical realist strata are subtle and complex. Collier, for example, 
distinguishes three different types of possible relationship (' ontological 
presupposition', 'vertical explanation' and 'composition'; see Collier, 1994, pp.130-
4). Below, a sense in which a higher stratum can be considered external to the 
stratum from which it emerges will be developed, drawing upon the perspective 
opened up by SEPM. Clearly this is a different sense of 'external' to that employed 
above. The two senses of the term 'external' are complementary to one another in 
this case, despite the apparent contradiction between them. This subtle development . 
of the critical realist conception opens the way for the subsequent presentation of 
dialectical critical realism, and of the relationship between dialectical critical realism 
and critical realism. 
I \. 
--~ 
i { 
I 
--4 
I-+-" 
41 
It is helpful to start from a familiar type of relationship, as exemplified by the landlord 
/ tenant relationship. In this type of relationship one pole of the relation 'implies' the 
other pole: thus the notion of a landlord implies the notion of a tenant and the 
existence of a landlord implies the existence of a tenant. Note that the 'implication' 
holds for both thought and reality. It is possible to consider the notion of 'landlord' 
without explicitly recognising the necessary relation to a tenant but that notion must 
be at least implicit. In other words, it is impossible to grasp adequately one pole of 
this type of relationship without grasping the other pole adequately. 
The critical realist conception of the relationship between strata (most clearly natural 
strata) can be understood in contrast to the type of relationship just outlined. SEPM 
establishes that the relationship between the mental realm (including ideas and 
observations) and that of real objects is non-isomorphic and causal. Accordingly, real 
structures can only be known through their effects on the senses (through direct 
perception, or through their effect on observable objects), where these effects are 
non-isomorphic to their structural cause. Given this view, then current knowledge of 
strata cannot, in isolation, yield knowledge of new strata. Any pure extrapolation 
from current to new knowledge would be an attempt to grasp a structure before its 
unique effects have been detected. It would be pure speculation rather than 
empirically grounded science. Conversely, on the critical realist view, a set of powers 
revealed at a higher stratum, such as, for example, the powers of water (e.g. boiling 
at 100 degrees, transparency, ability to quench a thirst, etc.) can be understood 
adequately without any knowledge - implicit or explicit - of the structure, at the 
stratum below, that generates these powers (H20 as it turns out, in the case of 
water). Thus the notion of a molecular structure, such as H20, is, initially, no more 
than a scientific hypothesis competing with other hypotheses to explain observed 
powers such as those of water. 'Water', its powers (transparency, boiling point, etc.), 
is first grasped adequately at the level of the known, higher stratum, before the 
stratum below is uncovered (before H20 is brought to light). There is nothing explicit 
or implicit in the adequate notion of powers at the higher stratum that enables the 
scientist to single out a unique underlying structure defining a new stratum. Instead, it 
is the task, ultimately, of scientific experiment to evaluate alternative hypotheses; 
~ ... 
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hypotheses that may, without experiment, remain equally plausible. In this specific 
sense the higher stratum can be said to be 'external' to its root. 2 
The Relationship between Critical Realism and Dialectical Critical Realism 
The subtlety of the critical realist notion of stratification is well captured and 
developed by dialectical critical realism; or so it is argued below.3 The sense in which 
the relation between a higher (emergent) and lower (root) stratum is external gains 
suitably nuanced recognition through the following closely related features of 
dialectical critical realism (all recurrent themes in Dialectic): the emphasis on 
difference over unity; the stress on totalities which are 'subordinate', 'partial', 'open' 
or 'incomplete'; the non-linearity of the critical realist dialectic; the corresponding 
polemic against Hegel and 'cognitive triumphialism'; more generally, the notion of 
'real absence' as the keystone of dialectical critical realism. These related features are 
considered in turn below. 
It is well known that the relation between 'unity' and 'difference' is granted some 
considerable importance within the dialectical tradition. The critical realist 'stratified' 
ontology provides a particular slant on this aspect of dialectics. The notion of 
stratification gives substance to the dialectical notions of unity and difference. On the 
one hand, as equal members of the same hierarchy, strata have an aspect of unity 
(dualism or pluralism is rejected). On the other hand, the strata are not the same as, 
nor reducible to, one another; they have an aspect of difference (reductionism is 
rejected). The question then arises: is unity or difference of greater weight or 
significance? The discussion above emphasised that there is nothing explicitly or 
implicitly present in an adequate conception of the emergent stratum that connects it 
uniquely to the conception of the root stratum. Each stratum is constituted by a 
unique type of structure (generating sui generis causal powers and liabilities) which 
2 This sense is implicit in the critical realist literature but has not previously been made explicit to 
the author's knowledge. 
3 The presentation below attempts to strip the relationship between critical realism and dialectical 
critical realism down to its bare essence. At no point does Bhaskar (Dialectic; PE) offer such a 
presentation. 
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is, as detailed above, adequately conceptualised in isolation from any concept of the 
root stratum. This is a matter of ontological significance. For, if an adequate concept 
of the emergent stratum does not require the presence of a concept of the root 
stratum, then, in reality, there is nothing present in the emergent stratum connecting 
it to the root stratum.4 Because of this, then, it is the aspect of difference that 
requires emphasis within the critical realist ontology. At the same time it is clear that 
the dialectical critical realist emphasis on difference is just that: an emphasis rather 
than an absolute dichotomy. This stress upon difference is counterposed by Bhaskar 
to Begel's alleged overemphasis on unity arising (according to the interpretation of 
Bhaskar offered here) from Begel's failure to recognise that different respective 
strata can be comprehended adequately in relative isolation. 
A second well-known and much contested theme within the dialectical tradition, 
closely related to that of unity and difference, is that of 'totality'. Once again the 
critical realist stratified ontology lends itself to a particular slant on this issue. 
Whereas Begel allegedly champions a notion of one single, all-encompassing and 
'complete' totality, Bhaskar argues for a conception of 'multiple' totalities which 
may be 'subordinate', 'partial', 'open' or 'incomplete'. The critical realist conception 
of stratification contributes to Bhaskar's argument in at least two ways. Firstly the 
sense in which a higher stratum is externally related to a lower stratum entails that 
there could, in principle, be an infinite number of strata below any given strata; these 
strata could be related in all manner of different ways and there is no reason why their 
character should be shaped primarily by the totality of their relations. Indeed, given 
that they can be grasped adequately in relative isolation then an all-encompassing 
totality must be of secondary significance. Secondly the point that a lower stratum is 
externally related to a higher stratum ensures that there is always the possibility, 
indeed likelihood, of newly emergent strata (most importantly, the possibility of new 
social structures brought about by human agency), so that the real totality is forever 
incomplete and open . 
4 Note, firstly, that the lower stratum is 'absent' from the higher stratum and that this absence is a 
facet of reality according to dialectical critical realism, as will be explained below. Secondly it is 
important to stress that the status of a concept as 'adequate' has, for critical realism, ontological 
connotations. Hence ontological conclusions can be drawn from the status of a concept as 'adequate' 
without committing the epistemic fallacy. 
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The question of the 'linearity' or otherwise of the dialectic is most easily grasped in 
terms of epistemological issues regarding the nature of the development of 
knowledge. Does knowledge display a single line of development or is it inherently 
multifaceted and uneven? Such epistemological considerations are addressed below. 
It is specifically ontological notions that are under consideration here. In ontological 
terms, the critical realist and dialectical critiool realist stress on difference - the sense 
in which a stratum is such that it can be grasped in relative isolation - lends itself to 
the view that the relation between strata is not that of a linear development of one 
single thing or 'substance', rather it is non-linear; it is a 'leap' from one thing to 
another, reflected in the leap from a concept of a higher stratum to the concept of its 
root. 
Finally the keystone of dialectical critical realism, the notion of 'real absence', 
expresses with precision the subtle nature of the relation between strata within critical 
realism as elaborated above. The term 'absence' is germane because it expresses 
precisely (and in contradistinction to Hegel) that there is, or need be, nothing 
explicitly or implicitly present in a given stratum that is intrinsically connected to the 
lower stratum. The complementary sense in which a higher stratum is necessarily 
related to its root, despite the emphasis on difference, is expressed through the 
dialectical critical realist view that the absence of lower or higher strata is itself a 
matter of ontology; absences are real. Bhaskar expresses this idea most succinctly -
if apparently contradictorily - in the view that the absence from a given stratum of 
the lower and higher stratum is a case of the 'presence' of an 'absence'. As in the 
case of linearity, the motivation for the notion of 'real absence' can best be 
understood from the perspective of the critical realist epistemology. This is because 
the move to epistemology entails consideration of the process of scientific 
development and the notion of 'real absence' is key to the dialectical critical realist 
understanding of any process (in terms of dialectical critical realism, the move from a 
focus on the notion of stratification to a focus upon the notion of process is a move 
from the 'first moment' of dialectical critical realism to the 'second edge' of 
dialectical critical realism). Once epistemology has been considered it will be possible 
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to present the broader features of Bhaskar' s polemic against Hegel and to summarise 
critical realism and dialectical critical realism. 
The Critical Realist and Dialectical Critical Realist Epistemology 
The critical realist notion of stratification yields a conception of the nature of science 
and scientific progress (a conception first developed in RTS). On the critical realist 
conception, the process of scientific development consists in the theoretical move 
from an effect, at one stratum, to its cause at the stratum below. The sharp distinction 
between each stratum entails that new knowledge is not intrinsic to current 
knowledge; instead, new knowledge requires the effects of new strata to be 
perceived, at first indirectly. It is the task of scientific experiment to isolate these 
effects (creating a 'closure'). Once isolated, then 'old' knowledge does become 
important. It is not the intrinsic meaning of old knowledge that is of use. Rather, old 
knowledge provides the scientist with analogies and metaphors and the like. In the 
face of unexplained phenomena, scientists 'borrow' concepts and models from 
established fields and 'stretch', 'distanciate' or distort their meaning in order to 
produce 'hypotheses' of fundamentally new strata to be, in turn, empirically tested. 
This process is 'retroduction' in critical realist terminology (see chapter 2 above). 
Dialectical critical realism retains the critical realist conception of scientific method 
and progress (see especially Dialectic, ch. 1). The dialectical critical realist 
'epistemological dialectic' is little more, in this case, than a gloss on the critical realist 
analysis. The dialectical critical realist notion of 'absence', highly flexible in its 
meaning, is introduced to stand in for both the absence from knowledge (explicit or 
implicit), and for the corresponding absence from actual events and the perception of 
those events, of deeper strata. It is thereby possible to view the process of science as 
driven by absence. Scientists are driven to overcome ('to absent') the anomalies, 
surprises and the like that arise at a particular level of stratification - these anomalies 
must themselves be conceived of as absences from knowledge, and from actuality, of 
deeper strata. The process of science thus provides one instance of the general 
dialectical critical realist comprehension of process in terms of 'absence' and of, in 
particular, human development as the 'absenting of absence'. The crucial point 
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Bhaskar makes is that, given this view, 'absences' must have ontological status and 
not just epistemological status, i.e. absences must be real; any other way, the reality 
of processes in general would have to be denied and they would have to be 
considered as no more than constructions of the mind. 
Scientific development provides also an example of the 'non-linearity' of the 
dialectical critical realist dialectic. The non-linearity of the 'epistemological dialectic' 
is reflected in the continual 'distanciation' and 'stretching' of old concepts and 
models indicating that the development of new knowledge is by no means a smooth 
and intrinsic development of old knowledge. 
Summary 
Critical realism and dialectical critical realism are usefully summarised through 
Bhaskar's critique of Hegel. Bhaskar (in Dialectic) finds a catalogue of philosophical 
errors in the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel is alleged to overemphasise unity; absolutise 
totality; linearise the dialectic; identify thought and being; and ultimately to deny the 
reality of absence. Hege1 is further castigated by Bhaskar for his alleged 
'anthropomorphic' view that totality of strata are known or fully knowable. Such 
'cognitive triumphialism' must, according to critical realism, be scotched: the non-
identity of subject and object ensures that there is no reason why all being must be 
conceivable being, let alone why all being must be conceived of already; the 'open 
totality' ensures that there is always the possibility, indeed likelihood, of newly 
emergent strata (most importantly, the possibility of new social structures brought 
about by human agency), so that reality is forever incomplete and inherently 
impossible to grasp fully. 
What then of dialectical critical realism? Is it a development of critical realism, as 
Bhaskar maintains, or does it step outside of the limits imposed by critical realist 
tenets, as Joseph and others argue? The exposition above (and, also, the critique 
below) supports the view that the critical realist theory of mind should be viewed as 
the 'conceptual essence' of both critical realism and dialectical realism alike. As 
Bhaskar makes clear, 'old' critical realism abstracted from the fundamental 
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philosophical issues bound up in the notions of change and development: issues of 
space, time and process central to the dialectical tradition of thought. 5 Given its 
increasing stress on the transformation and development of natural as well as social 
structures, 'old' critical realism was ripe for 'dialecticisation'.6 So, while the move to 
dialectical critical realism required the embracing of an immense literature on 
dialectics hitherto absent from critical realism, the move was a logical development of 
critical realism. The presentation has shown that critical realism is robust enough to 
survive 'dialecticisation': the critical realist theory of mind (SEPM) remains centraL 
The critical realist notions of stratification and emergence, along with the related 
critical realist concepts, are further developed by dialectical critical realism in line 
with this conceptual essence. The reasons underlying the mixed reception given to 
dialecticisation within the critical realist community are suggested below. 
Three substantive reasons can be given for the mixed reaction to the dialectical 
development of critical realism (in addition to obvious point that the literature on 
dialectics inherently tends to be difficult, Bhaskar's work especially so). Firstly any 
large literature, newly incorporated into critical realism, would naturally take time to 
be assimilated into wider critical realist discourse, whatever the nature of the new 
literature. Secondly there is an 'anti-dialectics' hegemony within much of Western 
academia. Thirdly, though dialectical critical realism embraces the critical realist 
tenets, for the most part, within its so-called 'first moment', it is the novel dialectical 
notion of 'absence' - rather than the notions of stratification and emergence - that 
predominates within dialectical critical realism. Thus the 'old' critical realist themes 
5 Dialectic, p.8. 
6 Thus Bhaskar's first book, RTS, unequivocally states, at one point, that 'changes in things, I have 
argued, are explained in tenns of unchanging things' (RTS, p.208). His second book, PON, 
concentrates much more closely on immanent structural change because the subject matter is social 
rather than natural structures. However, the postscript to second edition of PON makes explicit that 
natural structures, as well as social structures, are only relatively enduring. As soon as this fact of 
immanent structural change is focused upon then 'old' critical realism (the 'first moment' of 
dialectical critical realism) is found wanting conceptually; for, in this case, it is the underlying 
structures that are in flux as well as the events that they generate. Dialectical critical realism is 
borne, in part, as a response to this lacuna. As Bhaskar puts it at one point, 'at 2E [the 'second edge' 
of dialectical critical realism which contains the key notion of absence] the course of the deep 
structure of nature may indeed change, but to this backgammon is hardly an appropriate response' 
(Dialectic, p.36). In characteristically awkward fashion, Bhaskar is pointing out that dialectical 
critical realism is needed in order to conceptualise immanent structural change. 
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appear to lose their centrality. However, the presentation suggests that the critical 
realist tenets, most fundamentally the emergence theory of mind, can indeed be 
considered to be the conceptual essence of dialectical critical realism, despite 
Bhaskar's stress upon absence. This is because the presentation has attempted to 
show that the stress on 'absence' is, in fact, a logical development of the emergence 
theory of mind. The stress on 'absence' within dialectical critical realism illustrates 
that the most abstract and simple concept (the emergence theory of mind), and in 
this sense the conceptual essence, of dialectical critical realism, is not the most 
fundamental concept of dialectical critical realism (the concept of absence). Below, 
critical realism and dialectical critical realism will be subjected to an immanent 
critique that is simple and yet, it will be argued, fundamental. 
Immanent Critique of Critical Realism and Dialectical Critical Realism 
One simple possibility serves to lead the critical realist 'open' stratified ontology into 
contradiction.7 The ontology must embrace the possible existence of a structure (or 
force) which will cause, at some future date, the characteristic behaviour, or defining 
tendencies, of other structures to change. In other words the ontology opens up the 
possibility ofa structure (or force) that will cause present scientific 'laws' to cease to 
exist. This possible structure can be termed, metaphorically, a 'time bomb'. The 'time 
bomb' structure envisaged here does not destroy objects in accordance with the 
'known laws' of nature as would a literal 'time bomb', rather it destroys the world as 
'known' to science, by ending the 'laws' of nature 'known' by science. Though not 
yet discovered, the 'time bomb' could be located at a deeper stratum than hitherto 
uncovered by science; or it could be newly emergent; or it could be simply an isolated 
and, as yet, undetected entity. Bhaskar's entire polemical argument for an 'open' 
totality and his stress on difference collapses in the face of the sceptical consequences 
of the 'time bomb' possibility, or so it will be argued below. 
7 The critique in this section can be seen as a recapitulation of Hume's infamous sceptical argument 
as, for example, contained in Hume (1975, sections II-IV). 
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Firstly, it should be stressed just why the time bomb8 cannot be ruled out. As detailed 
above, critical realism and dialectical critical realism articulate a particular notion of 
the mind-independence of the objects of thought. An object, its nature and existence, 
need not depend upon the conception of that object. The human process of gaining 
knowledge of the object is irrelevant to the nature of the object itself. In particular, 
the nature of the object may be such that it is inherently out of bounds of human 
cognition. The object could, for example, be akin to a non-spatial entity, such as a 
force, but one that has no effect upon spatial entities, nor on any other entities that 
are detectable by humanity. This indeed is the key point of the notion of 'mind-
independence', as envisaged within critical realism, dialectical critical realism, and 
many other forms of realism. The world could exist without humanity and there could 
be things that exist without humanity ever being able to detect them, even in 
principle, regardless of spatio-temporal constraints. It is from this basic (at first sight 
incontrovertible) premise which, so it would seem, only an idle philosopher would 
have the effrontery to deny, that the notion of a metaphorical time bomb flows. For, 
once inherently undetectable entities are allowed for in this way, then it is equally 
valid to allow that entities exist that are currently undetectable but, in the future, will 
take effect. And this effect will be determined by the nature of the object, not by, for 
example, the nature of mind. Hence, the drastic effect of completely changing some 
or all 'known laws' must be considered a possibility, if the critical realist and 
dialectical critical realist (amongst other realisms) articulation of the notion of mind-
independence is not to be contradicted . 
Secondly, the nature of this 'possibility' of a time bomb must be examined. An 
intuitive critical realist view might be to argue that a time bomb entity is possible but 
unlikely (indeed this is a view that many who are not critical realists would endorse). 
For, the existence of such a peculiar entity would seem a remote possibility given that 
all fundamental laws have, apparently, not changed in the past,9 and no structure 
8 For the sake of readability, the tenn 'time bomb' will not be placed within quotation marks for the 
remainder of this section of the chapter. 
9 Thus, the fundamental laws of physics and chemistry are ordinarily presumed to be universal 
through time and space. Of course, the nature and extent of scientific knowledge of them has 
changed and will continue to do so. Note, firstly, that the 'time bomb' envisaged above could 
possibly change all of the 'known laws' fundamentally and within a negligible (practically 
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likely to bring about such change has ever been discovered. Now, it should be 
stressed that the validity of this basic response as such is not what is at issue. Rather, 
the question concerns what the critical realist (or dialectical critical realist) notions of 
mind-independence and stratification truly validate as a response. It should be clear 
that the apparent lack oftotal change of all 'known laws' so far provides no evidence 
one way or the other as regards the likelihood of the existence of the time bomb. For, 
the time bomb is precisely an entity that, should it exist, will not and cannot be 
detected until it 'goes off' (at which point human life may cease, such that the bomb 
is never, in fact, detected by humanity). So the evidence shows, at best, that a time 
bomb has not yet gone off but the evidence reveals nothing about whether a time 
bomb exists or not. The evidence is equally compatible both with the view that the 
time bomb does not exist and with the view that the time bomb does exist. It must be 
concluded that, on critical realist and dialectical critical realist premises, it is 
inherently impossible to attach any possibility to the two eventualities in question. 
Science simply does not and cannot know at all whether or not a time bomb exists. 
The probability of a time bomb existing is inherently unknowable; it is fundamentally 
uncertain. 
Exactly the same considerations apply to the question of just when the time bomb 
will go off, if it does exist. That is to say, if the time bomb exists, then humans must 
be fundamentally uncertain about when it will go off. Indeed, the bomb, if it exists, 
may go off any second now. Humans must be fundamentally uncertain as to whether 
or not it will do this. Let it be stressed, once more, that what is at stake here is not 
the question of whether or not it is truly the case that humans are fundamentally 
uncertain regarding this esoteric, if not downright ridiculous, notion of a 
metaphorical time bomb going off, any second. This seems patently not to be the case 
and, indeed, a materialist philosophy will be put forward below that is compatible 
with such basic intuition. Rather, the argument here is attempting to draw out the 
logical implications of the critical realist and dialectical critical realist ontology, 
instantaneous) time period, or the time bomb could change just a few of them over time. The 
problem is that humans have no way of knowing either of its existence or of its impending effect. 
Secondly the 'time bomb' critique presented in this section demonstrates that the attempt made by 
dialectical critical realism to accommodate immanent structural change (see f.n. 6 above) fails 
precisely because dialectical critical realism retains the critical realist essence, viz. SEPM. 
\ 
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based, as this ontology is, upon a particular notion of mind-independence (a notion 
common to many realisms). 
What, then, are the implications for the status of current knowledge? There are two 
relevant possibilities between which humans cannot discriminate. On the first 
possibility, there exists a time bomb that will go off any second now. If this is true 
then some, or all, 'known laws' will cease to exist, any second now. On the second 
possibility such a time bomb does not exist. Humans are inherently incapable of 
having any clue as regards which of these two possibilities is the truth. It is a matter 
of fundamental uncertainty. Note that this fundamental uncertainty regarding the time 
bomb entails fundamental uncertainty regarding the existence of the 'known laws': if 
the time bomb exists then some or all of them are about to cease; if it does not exist 
then they will remain. In short, given critical realist premises, humans are inherently, 
eternally and fundamentally uncertain about whether or not some or all 'known laws' 
are about to cease to exist. A very stark conclusion. 
Even so, is it not the case that, as a matter of practicality, scientists, and humans in 
general, just 'get on' with life, anyway? Do humans not, effectively and quite 
reasonably, just plump for the second of the two possibilities, viz. that there is no 
time bomb? Hume stresses that this behaviour cannot be considered 'reasonable' if 
the notion of mind-independence (as, in this case, articulated by critical realism, and 
in Hume's time argued by Locke and others)1O is upheld. This is so because such a 
view of mind-independence leads, as argued above, to fundamental uncertainty rather 
than to some mere 'nagging doubt', which could reasonably be 'lived with'. Reason 
cannot lead to any action where it leads to total uncertainty; where there is not even a 
small inkling of which of the two key possibilities will occur. One response might be 
to accept only the view that carries a chance of survival. Certainly, this is a 
reasonable dictum but it does not help in the case under consideration simply because 
there is no way of working out which possibility carries the greatest chance of 
survival. For, the real outcome may entail that acting according to previously 'known 
10 From the inception of critical realism, Bhaskar makes explicit the Lockean heritage of the critical 
realist notion of 'real essences' (e.g. PON, p.13). 
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laws' would lead to death, whereas acting according to some other set of laws, 
generated by the metaphorical time bomb, will lead to survival. Thus, it is equally as 
likely that acting in accordance with currently 'known laws' will lead to death, as it 
will not. The consequences of being inherently ignorant about the laws of nature that 
will exist a second from now are severe but this is precisely the implication of 
ignorance regarding the time bomb. 
Consider an analogy. The assertion that a time bomb does not exist, on the grounds 
that the non-existence of a time bomb ensures my future survival, is partially 
analogous to the assertion that I will win the lottery, on the grounds that I want to 
win it. The difference is that at least with the lottery there is a definite and known 
chance of winning, albeit a slim one. So, though I would expect to lose, it would be 
worth making plans for the event of winning the lottery, if this eventuality were my 
only hope of survival. The metaphor of the time bomb, however, indicates a situation 
where I do not know anything at all about the nature of the world (the laws of 
nature) in the immediate future; I do not know anything so specific as that there is a 
lottery going ahead, so I cannot make any plans at all. 
Consider also the practical consequences. To argue that humans can reasonably 
plump for the second (non-time bomb) option, is to argue that a scientist, without 
any evidence on competing hypotheses, can plump for one of them, just because they 
happen to like it. If they do that for the case of the time bomb, if moreover they base 
their entire 'science' upon such an arbitrary move, then science does not have 
foundation in reason at all. Indeed, a 'scientist' could not coherently rule out the 
analogous form of 'reasoning' (arbitrarily plumping for a preferred hypothesis 
without a shred of evidence) for any set of hypotheses, if such a form of 'reasoning' 
has been allowed in the time bomb case. That is to say the mode of 'argument' in 
question is the very antithesis of science; to adopt it, is to make science an 
unintelligible activity, to collapse critical realism by removing its cornerstone, the 
intelligibility of science. Thus these apparently esoteric philosophical concerns turn 
out to impinge directly upon concrete and practical matters. The practising scientist, 
given the critical realist articulation of mind-independence, cannot in fact practice at 
all. For, that scientist would have to face the question of the time bomb, and would 
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have to admit that it cannot be satisfactorily answered. The scientist would have to 
admit to ignorance regarding what things will be in the immediate future. Despite 
what appeared to be a wealth of knowledge regarding the essential structure of 
things, the scientist would have to admit to being ignorant of the 'essential structure' 
of anything because they would not have any clue as to what the laws of nature, in 
the immediate future, will be. 
What if, despite all that has been argued above, the reader should feel that the idea of 
a time bomb is simply too ridiculous to worry about? And that anyone who does 
worry about it should just go and get medical help! Undoubtedly such a view is quite 
correct. But the point of the argument has not been to convince anyone that a time 
bomb really exists, far from it. Rather, the point has been to demonstrate that critical 
realism and dialectical critical realism (indeed, many other forms of realism) collapse 
due to the failure to rule out, in anyway whatsoever, the evident nonsense of a time 
bomb. The critical realist articulation of 'mind-independent' reality (in terms of a 
'non-isomorphic' and causal relation between thought and its object) leads to the 
self-contradictory notion that a time bomb structure could exist somewhere in the 
universe. Any attempt to rule out the time bomb structure, on the ground that it leads 
to scepticism, would flatly contradict this articulation of the mind-independence of 
reality. There is, quite simply, no way out for critical realism and dialectical critical 
realism. If the deep insights of critical realism and dialectical critical realism are to be 
salvaged, then a fundamental reworking of the notion of 'realism' must be 
undertaken. A reworking which is able to cope with the evident nonsense of the time 
bomb possibility. Before embarking upon just such a reworking, the basis upon which 
it will be made is clarified below, by way of summary and conclusion. 
Conclusion 
In effect, the argument of this chapter provides a set of criteria for any coherent 
philosophy. Firstly the articulation of 'mind-independence' in terms of a non-
isomorphic and causal relationship between thought and its object has turned out to 
be self-contradictory because it leads to scepticism. So in one way or another it must 
be replaced. Secondly the critical realist articulation of mind-independence represents 
I~ 
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an attempt to uphold evident facts about reality. Thus critical realism appears to be 
difficult to deny without taking a position which is in flat and disingenuous 
contradiction with the practicalities of everyday life. The critical realist conception of 
mind (SEPM) is tied to a definite conception of ontological 'emergence' without 
which, as critical realism shows, it is very difficult to maintain a coherent philosophy. 
Furthermore there is, quite evidently, a big ontological difference between thought 
and the objects of thought. This difference would seem to entail a notion of 'mind-
independence' along precisely the lines critical realism suggests. For, it seems quite 
evident that a 'thought' does not possess the same structure as its object; that, quite 
to the contrary, a thought is emergent from a very different structure than its object. 
Any attempt, against critical realism, to uphold an isomorphism of thought and its 
object, must deal with the evident ontological difference between the two. It must 
also deal with the evident practical, active nature of humanity and the process of 
gaining knowledge. How can the process of science, and indeed any human act at all, 
be grasped, if the critical realist attempt to do so fails? The causal theory of mind put 
forward by critical realism attempts to capture the active nature of science and 
humanity. What place for such activity in a non-causal theory of mind, and / or in a 
theory which takes object and concept to be identical? What place for Marx's famous 
dictum that practice is fundamental to knowledge, if practice cannot be articulated in 
terms of the causality of mind? These are the fundamental questions raised by this 
chapter. They are addressed below. 
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Chapter 4. From Critical Realism to Materialist Dialectics 
Introduction 
This chapter draws upon Ilyenkov's interpretation of Spinoza and Marx (Ilyenkov, 
1977; 1997) in order to transcend Bhaskar's philosophy. Ilyenkov's philosophy is not 
well known. Though a 'materialism', Ilyenkov's philosophy does not embrace the 
reductionist identity theory of mind labelled 'materialism' and adopted by mainstream 
philosophy (see PON, ch. 3; Bums, 2000; Searle, 1993). Though a 'materialist 
dialectics' the philosophy has nothing to do with, indeed is utterly hostile towards, 
the Stalinist orthodox philosophy that served to give the term 'dialectical materialism' 
a very bad name. Ilyenkov's ideas are little known because he draws upon distinct 
and isolated debates amongst post-war East European philosophers, debates that 
flourished under the temporarily relaxed regime ofKruschev only to be choked when 
orthodoxy reasserted its rule (Bakhurst, 1991; Banaji, 1979; Pilling, 1980). The few 
Western philosophers, or Marxists, who have grappled with Ilyenkov's work 
(Bakhurst, 1991; Chitty, 2000; Saad-Filho, 2002) each have very different 
interpretations of him, both with respect to one another, and to that presented in this 
chapter. 
The very broad aim of the chapter necessitates that a range of philosophical themes 
are covered each of which deserve a great deal more space than can be afforded here. 
In view of this, the strategy of exposition adopted below focuses on two specific 
objectives. Firstly the exposition attempts to explore the relationship between 
Ilyenkov's materialist dialectics and critical realism. Secondly the exposition attempts 
to establish, against other contemporary interpretations of Ilyenkov (Bakhurst, 1991; 
Chitty, 2000; Saad-Filho, 2002), that Spinoza is central to Ilyenkov's philosophy. 
Ilyenkov argues that an isomorphism between human bodily activity and the object of 
that activity lies at the heart of Spinoza's philosophy but this argument is ignored by 
Ilyenkov's contemporary interpreters. 
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The opening section of this chapter provides an overview of the essence of Spinoza' s 
philosophy and of the relationship between that philosophy and critical realism. This 
overview is presented in as clear and simple terms as possible, without being 
cluttered with citations. On Ilyenkov's interpretation, Spinoza provides a materialist 
theory of the identity, as well as the opposition, of thought and being. Thereby the 
foundation for Humean scepticism, as articulated in terms of a 'time bomb' notion in 
chapter 3 above, is overcome. The next section develops in greater detail, with 
numerous citations, Spinoza's revolutionary philosophy and the relationship of this 
philosophy with critical realism and dialectical critical realism. It is argued that the 
various appealing themes that critical realism tries to uphold, such as natural 
necessity, emergence and stratification are preserved and raised to a new conceptual 
level by Spinoza (this is a fundamental development, 'supersession' or 
'transcendence' of critical realism). At the very least this section demonstrates, 
contra other contemporary interpretations, the importance of Spinoza to Ilyenkov's 
philosophy and the idiosyncratic - if illuminating - nature of Ilyenkov' s interpretation 
of him.l The following section, again drawing upon Ilyenkov, assesses some of the 
limitations of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza does not recognise fully the fact that 
thinking beings transform the object as well as themselves through their labour. 
Marx:, on Ilyenkov's interpretation, recognises the transformative power of labour 
and is thereby able to 'turn Hegel right side up' and develop a materialist dialectics. 
The implications of this argument for contemporary debates regarding Hegel and 
Marx: are discussed briefly. The section suggests that Ilyenkov's critique of Hegel is 
applicable to contemporary 'new dialecticians'. (The question of the correct 
interpretation of He gel himself is not addressed). A final section concludes. 
Spinoza's Transcendence of Critical Realism and Dialectical Critical Realism 
This section draws upon Ilyenkov's interpretation ofSpinoza (Ilyenkov 1977, pp. 11-
74; 1997) in order to provide an overview, in as clear and simple terms as possible, of 
1 Though this chapter addresses contemporary interpretations of J/yenkov, it does not attempt to 
engage in any detail with contemporary interpretations of Spinoza. It will simply be suggested that 
Ilyenkov's interpretation of Spinoza may be essentially different to what might very crudely be 
termed the 'new Spinozist Marxism' (e.g. Negri, 1994; Balibar, 1994; Montag, 1998; 1999, esp. 
pp.xiii-xxi). A separate study would be required to explore this avenue. 
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Spinoza's transcendence of Bhaskar's philosophy. Spinoza bases his theory upon a 
critique of Des cartes, and it is with Descartes that the exposition below begins. 
As is well known, Descartes was acutely aware of the dangers of scepticism as 
captured in the notion of 'Cartesian doubt' (there are some similarities between 
Descartes' 'evil demon' and the 'time bomb' invoked above). Hence, amongst other 
things, Descartes aimed to avoid the pitfalls of scepticism. Descartes developed a 
materialist principle that can be seen, in the terms of the critique of chapter 3 above, 
as an attempt to exclude the possibility of a 'time bomb' from the material world. 
According to Descartes, the material world is constituted by definite structures. A 
common principle underlies these structures, such that to know anyone structure is 
enough to know the principle common to all structures. This common principle, 
necessarily possessed by any object, is not possessed by a 'time bomb'. The 'time 
bomb' is thereby ruled out. In other words all individual and particular objects 
instantiate a universal, such that knowledge of any object assures knowledge of the 
universal. The 'time bomb' is defined as an entity that does not possess the universal 
and hence cannot exist. 
The problem, for Descartes, lay in his grasp of just what the common principle 
comprises. More specifically, it lay in his inability to square the principle, as he 
understood it, with thinking beings (a category which, for Descartes, excluded 
animals). For, Descartes grasped the principle in 'mechanistic' terms closely 
analogous to the pioneering conceptions of the natural science of his day (to which 
Descartes made, himself, major contributions).2 According to this conception, all 
material structures of matter behave according to a simple 'stimulus-response' 
schema. Any impulse (stimulus) to a structure will set in play a chain of movement 
within the structure producing a definite response of that structure; a response 
predetermined by the particular structural configuration involved. More complex 
behaviour, on this view, is nothing but the result of a more complex structural 
configuration and, whatever the apparent complexity, is thereby fixed and 
2 It is a mechanistic conception analogous, also, to the mechanistic division of labour already 
present in early capitalism and to the machinery that later arises as capitalism becomes more 
developed. 
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predetermined such that the same stimulus, to the same structure, will always 
produce the same response. 
Descartes well recognised that such a schema of action does not fit the behaviour of 
thinking bodies. For, as Descartes carefully described, the behaviour of thinking 
bodies is characterised by a break between stimulus and response. Thinking bodies 
reflect before acting in response to a stimulus such that their behaviour in the face of 
the same stimulus may change and adapt through time. Descartes noted the 
consequential characteristic trait of the thinking body. The activity of the thinking 
body is not fixed to a limited range of objects. Rather, the thinking body continually 
and fluidly strives to embrace any object that it may come into contact with. The 
activity of the thinking body thus has a universal character in contradistinction to the 
particular activities of non-thinking bodies. This meant, for Descartes, that the search 
for some structural configuration constituting thought must be fiuitless because the 
associated activity is, precisely, not fixed and so can have no fixed structural 
'determination' (limitation). Any structure constituting thought would have to 
contain equivalent structural complexity to all other structures - a structure 
equivalent, in the limit, to the universe, packed somewhere within one thinking body; 
a structure that would, in other words, contradict the very principle of structural 
determination. 
It was the impossibility of any structural constitution that led Descartes (on 
Ilyenkov's interpretation) to argue that thought instead belongs to a separate 
'substance', viz. 'mind'. As is well known, Descartes could not explain how two 
things without anything essential in common, mind and matter, interact and accord 
with one another. So in the final analysis Descartes could not provide an account of 
mind and body any more rational than SEPM. He ultimately took refuge in 'God' to 
connect what cannot conceivably be connected. On Ilyenkov's interpretation it was 
Spinoza who first overcame rationally the contradiction of SEPM and of Cartesian 
dualism. 
Spinoza by no means discards in toto the reasoning behind Descartes' system. This 
has the relevant implication that Spinoza develops the resolution of the problem of 
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scepticism contained in Descartes' philosophy. For Spinoza, as for Descartes, 
material structures constitute the universe, and the principle that is universally tied to 
structures rules out scepticism (in the terms set out above, it excludes the possibility 
of a 'time bomb' from material reality). Where Descartes had gone astray was in his 
conception of this common principle. Spinoza transcends Descartes' system 
fundamentally through recognising the true materialist principle constituting objects, 
a principle that encompasses thinking bodies. 
Spinoza recognises that matter is not limited solely to the mechanistic principle 
recognised by Descartes. Rather, with greater structural complexity, the mechanistic 
form of motion is superseded. In other words the basic material principle that would 
today be described as emergence is recognised by Spinoza. However, this notion of 
emergence is not precisely the same as that of critical realism. Spinoza stresses that 
the totality of matter (,substance') constitutes the identity of all objects. The 
'attributes' of this totality of matter are, for Spinoza, preserved and developed 
through all of its transformations. They thereby constitute universal laws of matter. 
As in the case of Des cartes, elementary aspects of these laws are grasped (in a way to 
be outlined below) once any specific object is grasped and, as for Descartes, these 
aspects exclude any possibility of a 'time bomb'. For, this 'time bomb' is defined 
precisely as that which can completely change all laws, whereas the elementary 
attributes of the totality of matter are both known and eternally unchanging. 
In effect, and in terms of the critique in chapter 3 above, Spinoza excludes a 'time 
bomb' from his philosophy. The presentation above demonstrates that Spinoza must 
provide an account of knowledge that is able to justify this exclusion. Furthermore 
this account must embrace the manifest phenomena of scientific practice and of 
human activity in general. Spinoza's articulation of both knowledge and practice 
arises out of a revolutionary account of thought and body as will be outlined below. 
The fundamental breakthrough made by Spinoza lies in his re-conceptualisation of the 
relation between knowledge (thought), human practical activity and the material 
objects towards which that thought and activity are addressed. Instead of holding that 
thought causes intentional human activity (as does critical realism), Spinoza argues 
. 
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that thought is inseparable from that activity. What is the nature of this 
inseparability? Well, to focus on the crucial feature of thought, viz. knowledge, or 
'adequate' ideas, Spinoza holds that such ideas consist in awareness of the spatio-
temporal form of the thinking body; in other words they consist in self-awareness. 
Self-awareness not of the inner structure and motion of the thinking body but of the 
outer movement of that body; self-awareness of the movement of the hands, arms, 
legs, head, etc., of the thinking body amongst the other bodies of the universe. 
Bhaskar (PON, and elsewhere) notes, as must any enqulrer into this issue, that 
thinking beings continually self-monitor their external activity; self-awareness being 
an emergent property of thinking bodies. What Bhaskar does not recognise, however, 
and what is not readily apparent to any enquirer into the issue, is the characterisation 
of adequate ideas as consisting in self-awareness of outer bodily activity. In particular 
an adequate idea of an object, on Spinoza's view, is nothing but self-awareness of the 
form of the thinking body, where that body is isomorphic to, i.e. in correspondence 
to, or moving in accordance with, the object. This is a subtle and strange twist, or 
reworking, of the relationship between knowledge, human activity and object on 
Spinoza's part. Intentional human activity is still associated with thought, inseparable 
from it, but not in terms of a causal relationship. Rather, the relationship is one of 
self-awareness; a different kind of inseparability to that entailed in a causal 
relationship. 
The beauty of this conception is that it makes human practice vital to knowledge, 
inseparable from it, whilst being able to resist the sceptical consequences of the 
causal and non-isomorphic conception of critical realism. Thus the critical realist 
analysis of experiment can be re-conceptualised in terms of Spinoza's reworking of 
the relationship between knowledge, practical activity and object. On Spinoza's 
conception, practice is indeed necessary in order for the thinking body to achieve 
accordance with, or correspondence to, the objects that it comes into contact with. 
Through continual and fluid spatial activity, and through the revision of the schema of 
that activity in response to the reciprocal impact of the object of activity, the thinking 
body achieves spatio-temporal correspondence with the object. There is a 'mirroring' 
of the thinking body's activity with its object. The actions of the thinking body 
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correspond to, or map, the form of the object, such that the object is brought under 
the control of the thinking body. In an experiment, therefore, the object under study 
is isolated and its characteristic activity induced, at will, by the scientist, once the 
scientist has fathomed the requisite activity to yield this desired result. Technically 
speaking, the body achieves a (spatio-temporal) isomorphism, or identity (iso-) of 
shape (morph), with the object. Simultaneously as it does this, the thinking body 
achieves an adequate idea of the object, since such ideas consist in self-awareness of 
the isomorphism. 
Thinking bodies are able to reflect and accordingly self-transform their inner bodily 
structure, hence their outer bodily activity, so as to act in accordance with, and 
comprehend, the material world. The development of human spatial activity within 
the objective material environment is simultaneously expressed for humans in the 
form of their ideas (their knowledge). Conversely, this practice is the objective, outer, 
expression of their developing knowledge. Crucially, knowledge is not determined 
(delimited) by the thinking body. Rather, knowledge is determined by the objects of 
thought. The thinking body must subordinate its will and consciousness to the 
dictates of the object, in ongoing material practice.3 In this way an adequate idea of 
an object is determined independently of the consciousness and will of the thinking 
body. Knowledge is guided, not by the thinking individual's consciousness and will, 
but by the material objects of practice, which forever serve to correct mistakes and to 
provide new puzzles, as actions run up against the palpable material barrier of 
objects, in unexpected ways. Thus Spinoza's philosophy cogently sustains the mind-
independence of the objects of thought. The thinking body is progressively able to 
improve its grasp of these mind-independent objects, through ongoing practical 
engagement with them. 
3 This statement is likely to strike a Marxist as neglectful of the transfonnative power of the subject 
(the labourer). See below for Ilyenkov's Marxist critique of Spinoza along just such lines. Crucially, 
the critique retains and develops the key features of Spinoza's conception, such that Marxist 
philosophy, on Ilyenkov's interpretation, cannot be grasped except as a fundamental development of 
Spinoza's conception, a development that retains Spinoza's notions of 'thought' and 'substance', 
and so resists Humean scepticism. 
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The 'time bomb', invoked in chapter 3 above that proved so damaging to critical 
realism, cannot exist because, by definition, it lacks the elementary and universal 
attributes of matter. These attributes are present (not 'absent', as in dialectical critical 
realism) in all objects, hence grasped by all thinking bodies (a grasp implicit in their 
ongoing activity, even if denied explicitly). However, it is one thing to have certainty 
regarding aspects common to all material objects, so ruling out the idle concoction of 
a 'time bomb', but it is quite another to grasp the specific developing forms of matter 
that constitute the specificity of objects encountered in everyday life. In other words, 
the knowledge that there is a developing and interconnected material universe, not a 
universe inhabited by 'time bombs', knowledge which is obvious to a small child 
(though not explicitly articulated by a small child), is hardly sufficient to grasp the 
specific material forms that constitute objects. It is in no way a full conception of 
matter. Such a full conception of the totality of matter ('substance'), hence of all 
possible specific objects that may be encountered in everyday life, is a far cry from 
the knowledge that humanity will ever possess. Only through ongoing practical 
engagement with the world is the partial knowledge that humans do possess 
developed further. Thus Spinoza refutes scepticism whilst upholding practice, 
through a materialistic reworking of the relation of thought, practice and object. 
Development of the Relationship between Spinoza and Critical Realism 
This section develops further, and in more detail, the nature of Spinoza's philosophy 
(as that philosophy is interpreted by Ilyenkov) and its relationship with critical 
realism. As noted above, the interpretation of Ilyenkov presented within this chapter 
is essentially different to other contemporary interpretations (Bakhurst, 1991; Chitty, 
2000; Saad-Filho, 2002). None of the aforementioned interpretations so much as 
mentions Ilyenkov's revolutionary characterisation of an isomorphism between 
human bodily activity and the object of that activity.4 Nor do they highlight the 
central importance of Spinoza's philosophy to that of Ilyenkov; nor, finally, do they 
4 Ilyenkov's argument that Spinoza's philosophy rests upon an isomorphism between human bodily 
activity and the object of that activity may well distinguish Ilyenkov's interpretation from what 
might crudely be termed the 'new Spinozist Marxism' (e.g. Negri, 1994; Balibar, 1994; Montag, 
1998; 1999). Such an argument is absent, for example, from Montag (1999) and Balibar (1998). 
However, a separate study to this chapter would be required to explore this issue. 
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engage with Spinoza's notion of an 'all embracing totality' termed 'substance'. This 
is despite that fact that, for differing reasons, these interpretations of Ilyenkov's 
philosophy attempt to comprehend Ilyenkov's conception of mind and matter for 
which the above mentioned themes are indispensable on the interpretation of 
Ilyenkov offered within this chapter. 5 For this reason numerous citations from 
Ilyenkov (1977; 1997) will be made backing up the interpretation offered and thereby 
establishing the case for a fundamental reworking of contemporary interpretations of 
Ilyenkov's philosophy. 
Ilyenkov's exposition of Spinoza translates the salient features of Spinoza's 
philosophy into contemporary terminology: 
Our job then cannot be once more to paraphrase the theoretical foundations 
on which Spinoza built his main work, the Ethics, and conclusions that he 
drew from them by means of his famous 'geometric modus'. In that case it 
would be more proper simply to copy out the text of the Ethics once again. 
Our job is to help the reader understand the 'real inner structure' of his 
system, which far from coincides with its formal exposition, i.e. to see the real 
'cornerstone' of his reflections and to show what real conclusions were drawn 
from them, or could be drawn from them, that still preserve their full 
topicality. (Ilyenkov, 1977, pp.29-30) 
The exposition below is an attempt to develop Ilyenkov's account and to present it in 
terms of critical realist notions such as that of 'stratification'. In this process of 
5 Saad-Filho (2002, ch. 2) develops an interpretation of Ilyenkov's view of mind and matter in order 
to characterise contemporary new dialecticians as idealist. The argument below supports Saad-
Filho's conclusions but not his interpretation of Ilyenkov's notion of mind (and hence of matter). 
Saad-Filho draws heavily upon Ilyenkov's early work (Ilyenkov, 1982) which was first published in 
the early 1960s, when Ilyenkov had not yet developed fully his interpretation of Spinoza. Chitty 
(2000) and Bakhurst (1991) engage directly with Ilyenkov's philosophy of mind. Chitty (2000) 
never once mentions Spinoza. Bakhurst (1991, pp. 149-50, p.155, pp.250-1) recognises that Spinoza 
influenced Ilyenkov greatly but does not engage in any critical discussion of Spinoza or of 
Ilyenkov's interpretation of Spinoza. These scholarly contemporary works are very welcome 
exceptions to the general rule that Ilyenkov is little known amongst Anglo-American academics. 
The lack of any engagement with the themes highlighted in this chapter may reflect an implicit 
judgement - shared by Saad-Filho, Chitty and Bakhurst but disputed within this chapter - that 
Ilyenkov's arguments regarding these themes are weak. 
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translation it is possible that Spinoza's view is developed beyond Spinoza's own 
position but this is a minor price to pay if the content and critique below are of any 
merit at all. 
The Universal Character of Thought 
As outlined above 'thought' is, for Spinoza, a fully material mode of activity that 
accords with, in the limit, all objects in the universe. Though human thought is, of 
course, a very long way from reaching this limit and according adequately to the 
whole universe (it is 'imperfect' in Spinoza's terminology)6 it consists, nevertheless, 
in a continual striving towards this limit and embraces fluidly any object which it may 
come across. Thought has, then, a universal character or potential; a 'universalising' 
drive: 
The proper, specific form of the activity of a thinking body consists In 
universality. (Ilyenkov, 1977, p.46) 
This distinguishing feature of thought presupposes that the diverse objects of nature, 
according to which the thinking body acts, must have a universal and essential aspect. 
If it is true that the thinking body acts in accordance with any object, and also 
according to a unified schema, then all objects must have an underlying unity; a unity 
that is manifested, or exists, in their very diversity and plurality. For, it is only if 
objects have an essential unity that thought as such (thought as a single 
'universalising' mode of activity as opposed to merely a set of different activities or a 
single, isolated mode of activity like any other) is possible at all. Notice that, without 
a universal aspect to objects, thought could not display the flexibility and fluidity that 
it does in fact display. The explanation of the structural constitution of thought as 
self-transforming would fail and Cartesian dualism would indeed be impossible to 
overcome. For, this explanation requires that the thinking body moulds or transforms 
its current mode of activity in order to accommodate new objects; the thinking body 
6 'The attribute of thought was ... only realised in him [real earthly man] in a very limited and 
'imperfect' (finite) form [according to Spinoza]' (Ilyenkov, 1977, p.59). 
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does not 'start from scratch' every time a new object is encountered, rather it adapts 
the modes of activity that it has already learnt: 
Its [the thinking body's] mode of action has a clearly expressed universal 
character, i.e. it is constantly being extended, embracing ever newer and 
newer things and forms of things, and actively and plastically adapting itself to 
them. (ibid., p.53) 
The universal principles of thought can, then, be nothing but the reflections of the 
universal essence (called 'substance' by Spinoza) of the diverse objects of nature (the 
'universe') (ibid., p.53). 
This raises the following question: how are the manifestly diverse objects of the 
universe somehow united? The self-transformation of thought can only be understood 
to reflect nature if unity exists in nature; but does such unity exist and in what does it 
consist? Spinoza's answer to this question can be grasped by further development of 
his overcoming of the Humean critique of 'natural necessity' (a critique which, it was 
argued above, Bhaskar fails to overcome). It is to natural necessity, and a little 
known or understood basis for, and conception of, the notion of stratification that the 
argument below turns. 
Natural Necessity 
Critical realism makes the correct and profound observation that the objects of 
science are (stratified) structures and their corresponding modes of activity. 
Accordingly, critical realism goes on, apparently quite plausibly, to identify necessity 
(natural necessity) with each individual structure (and corresponding mode of 
activity), or more generally, with each stratum. Necessity, on this View, IS 
comprehended once the underlying structure and mechanism is uncovered and 
defined. Yet, as argued in chapter 3 above, this conception is ultimately derailed in 
Humean fashion. For, to argue that necessity resides in a specific structure is to beg 
the question of how the structure itself arises; to fail, in fact, to show that the 
structure necessarily exists at all and to leave out of view any necessary development 
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further to its necessary process of formation. It is to leave the scientist as merely 
describing structures and modes of activity rather than explaining them; their 
necessary origins, development and demise. 7 The critique above demonstrated, 
through the invocation of the 'time bomb' possibility, that the result of this lack of 
necessity turns out to be no knowledge of the immediate future and so no 'natural 
necessity' of the sort accessible to human knowledge at all. 
But wherein can necessary existence be conferred on an object or strata? Can Hume 
be overcome? Critical realism recognises but fails to uphold the principle of 
'structural mode of activity'. This is the principle that different respective material 
structures are tied to definite respective tendencies or propensities (in essence the 
principle of 'matter-in-motion'). Given this principle, then the greater the scope of 
extension in space and time that is taken into consideration, the greater is the 
likelihood of definite strata existing within that scope of extension. Given that matter 
is infinite in space and time, this suggests that definite strata must exist, with absolute 
necessity, not everywhere, nor for all periods of time, but somewhere, at sometime. 
Take, for example, the key issue of the existence of thought. Any given thinking body 
has, quite clearly, arisen from masses of chains of cause and effect that could equally 
have produced, say, a tree or a stone. Thus each thinking human being, indeed, the 
human species as a whole, has no necessity to arise; its origin was, in fact, determined 
step by step but this is just a chance occurrence that may just as well not have 
happened and need never happen again: 
The individual body possessed thought only by virtue of chance or 
coincidence [on Spinoza' s view]. The crossing and combination of masses of 
chains of cause and effect could lead in one case to the appearance of a 
thinking body and in another case simply to a body, a stone, a tree, etc. So 
7 For example, 'to explain the event we call "thinking", to disclose its effective cause, it is necessary 
to include it in the chain of events within which it arises of necessity and not fortuitously. The 
"beginnings" and "ends" of this chain are clearly not located within the thinking body at all, but far 
outside it ... The explanation must consequently ... include those relations of cause and effect that of 
necessity generate our own physical organisation capable (unlike a stone) of thinking.' (ibid., pp.37-
8). 
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that the individual body, even the human body, did not possess thought [with] 
one whit of necessity. (ibid., pp.53-4) 
However, though it is true that any particular person, or indeed human thought in 
general, does not of necessity arise, it would seem reasonable to assume that thought 
as such, rather than the specific form of human thought, is necessarily produced by 
the infinite real totality: 
Spinoza ... defined thought as an attribute of substance, and not as its modus, 
not as a partial case. Thus he affirmed, in the language of his day, that the 
single system, within which thought was found of necessity and not 
fortuitously (which it mayor may not be), was not a single body or even as 
wide a range of bodies as you wished, but only and solely nature as a whole. 
(ibid. p.53) 
It is not necessary, given the complexity of thought, that thinking bodies take the 
precise form (structural constitution) of humanity, 8 but it is necessary that, through 
some or other structural constitution, a thinking body - a body capable of reflection 
to the same or to a greater degree than humans - will occur. Thus necessity, absolute 
necessity, resides in the fact that space and time are infinite. Formally, and 
conceptually, the probability of strata existing somewhere, at sometime, in the infinite 
universe is, precisely, one. This is because probability is properly defined as a 
(mathematical) limit as a number of 'trials' or 'experiments' approaches infinity. For 
this reason, 'real infinite nature' is the notion upon which Spinoza's concept of 
necessity hinges: 
[O]nly Nature as a whole, understood as an infinite whole in space and time, 
generating its own partial forms from itself, possesses at any moment of time, 
though not at any point of space, all the wealth of its attributes, i.e. those 
8 'Spinoza said more than once that it was impermissible to represent thought as an attribute in the 
image and likeness of human thought ... To represent thought in general in the image and likeness 
of existing human thought, of its modus, or 'particular case', meant simply to represent it 
incorrectly' (ibid., p.57). 
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properties that are reproduced of necessity and not by chance, miraculous 
coincidence that might just as well not have happened. (ibid. pp.54-55)9 
Spinoza calls this all embracing totality 'substance' or 'God' and the finite things 
within it, 'forms of matter' (see below). 
The Relationship Between Strata 
Spinoza's recognition of 'substance' entails a different concept of the relationship 
that holds between different strata to that of critical realism. In contrast to the critical 
realist view, strata are unambiguously (and symmetrically) internally related; they are 
necessary developments or transformations of one another. A higher stratum is a 
necessary development of a lower stratum. A lower stratum necessarily develops into 
a higher stratum. Though it is quite clearly not necessary that a lower stratum should 
always and everywhere develop the structures at the higher stratum, it is absolutely 
necessary that somewhere, sometime, in the infinity of the universe, a lower stratum 
will develop to form the higher stratum. So, taking three broad ranges of strata, it can 
be said that the structures and modes of behaviour of inanimate bodies will 
necessarily, somewhere, sometime, develop into the structure and modes of 
behaviour of living bodies; furthermore, these emergent bodies - their structures and 
modes of behaviour - will necessarily develop into thinking bodies; not everywhere 
but somewhere at some time: 
[W]ith the same iron necessity that it [ matter] will exterminate on earth its 
highest creation, the thinking mind, it must somewhere else and at another 
time again produce it. (Engels, 1940, p.25, cited in Ilyenkov, op. cit., p.55) 
With Spinoza, as with critical realism, there is a clear distinction of real structures, 
together with their characteristic modes of behaviour (mechanisms), from any actual 
9 Similarly: '[o]nly nature as a whole was that system which possessed all its perfections, including 
thought, of absolute necessity, although it did not realise this perfection in any single body and at 
any moment of time, or in any of its "modi".' (ibid, p.54). 
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and conjuncturally determined object or event. In turn, there is a clear distinction of 
actual events from their observation by humans. The chasm between critical realism 
and Spinoza's conception lies in their distinct respective views of natural necessity 
and the corresponding understanding of stratification. Critical realism and dialectical 
critical realism stress 'multiple essences', 'anti-foundationalism', 'open', 
'incomplete', 'partial' and 'subordinate' totalities, and stress difference over unity 
(see chapter 3 above). All this is counterposed by Bhaskar to Hegel's alleged closure 
and over emphasis on unity. Yet Bhaskar's position collapses to Humean scepticism 
(if the critique above is accepted). Moreover this collapse occurs, it can now be seen, 
just because of the failure to recognise one single infinite reality of matter i.e. to 
recognise what Spinoza calls 'substance'. If, somehow, space and time are finite 
(which, in fact, is inconceivable), or if reality has no necessary strata despite being 
infinite in space and time, or if just any 'possible world' / 'partial totality' is possible, 
then there can be no basis to argue against the possibility of a 'time bomb'. As argued 
in chapter 3 above, such a 'time bomb' entails fundamental uncertainty regarding the 
nature of things, i.e. Humean scepticism. So the failure to uphold knowledge of 
absolute necessity does not simply lead to some sort of 'nagging doubt'. Rather it 
leads to fundamental uncertainty i.e. it entails the very opposite of knowledge of 
absolute necessity. Hence with every word of his critique of the notion of all 
encompassing totality, Bhaskar simply hammers another nail into the coffin of (his 
notion of) natural necessity and so (his attempt to sustain) rationality: 
Only by proceeding from the idea of substance could the thinking body 
understand both itself and the reality with and within which it operated and 
about which it thought; any other way it could not understand either the one 
or the other and was forced to resort to the idea of an outside power, a 
theologically interpreted 'God', to a miracle. (ibid., p.60) 
Spinoza's notion of stratification overcomes both Humean scepticism and Bhaskar's 
(in any case self-contradictory) critique of the notion of an all-encompassing unity. 
Just as Bhaskar recognises that objects and events are contingent conjunctures of 
strata, so does Spinoza. Only, Spinoza is able to sustain his philosophy without 
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collapsing to Humean scepticism because, unlike Bhaskar, he recognises that strata 
are necessary developments of one another and, as such, eternal potentia (attributes) 
of a single unified totality ( substance): 
[According to Spinoza] substance, i.e. the universal world matter, did not 
possess just the single attribute of 'being extended' but also possessed many 
other attributes as inalienable from it (inseparable from it though separable 
from any finite body). (ibid. p.S6) 
Any object is a contingent conjuncture of necessarily related strata and, as such, must 
be comprehended as a 'specific form of matter'. As 'matter' objects are identical, 
united; as specific forms of matter they are different. Unity and difference are 
inseparably bound up in any object such that unity and difference require equal 
emphasis in contradistinction to dialectical critical realism: any object is, then, 
precisely a 'unity of unity and difference': 
Individual bodies of the same nature ... are as real as the unity (identity) of 
their 'nature' expressed by the definition in the 'attribute of thought' and by 
real diversity in the 'attribute of extension'. Variety and plurality are clearly 
understood here as modes of realisation of their own opposition, i.e. of the 
identity and unity of their 'nature '. (ibid. pp.62)lO 
What does the above imply for the dialectical critical realist notion of 'absence'? It 
has been argued above that, unlike dialectical critical realism, Spinoza understands 
objects, and their concepts, as having an implicit aspect of unity, as being internally 
related to the real infinite totality. Thus the infinite totality is not completely absent 
from a given stratum. Neither the critical realist view that a stratum can be grasped in 
10 Similarly: 'For him [Spinoza] the "general", "idenitical", "united" were by no means illusions 
created by our speech ... but primarily the real general nature of things' (ibid. p.64); 
'For Spinoza "relations and plurality" were not "illusory" (as Russell described them) and "identity 
and unity" were not illusions created by the "subject-predicate structure" (as Russell himself 
thought). Both the one and the other were wholly real, and both existed in "God", i.e. in the very 
nature of things, quite irrespective of whatever the verbal structures of the so-called "language of 
science" were' (ibid. p.65). 
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isolation from the stratum below nor the alternative view that the existence of one 
stratum must everywhere imply the existence of the emergent stratum (as the 
existence of a landlord must everywhere imply the existence of a tenant), is entailed 
in Spinoza's conception. Spinoza recognises that a lower stratum can exist without 
developing into a higher stratum as does Bhaskar but, unlike Bhaskar, Spinoza also 
recognises that the lower stratum must develop into the higher stratum somewhere, 
at sometime. In this sense, the higher stratum is implicit in the lower stratum, both 
conceptually and in reality. Thus strata are always inherent potentia of the present; 
they are implicit in the present and not absent from it. The dialectical critical realist 
notion of real absence would destroy the crucial features of Spinoza's view, the 
implicit and eternal presence of all attributes of substance (strata): 
Matter remains eternally the same in all its transformations, ... none of its 
attributes can ever be lost. (Engels, 1940, p.25, cited in Ilyenkov, op. cit., 
p.55) 
Epistemology 
Spinoza's epistemology can usefully be presented in terms of the 'litmus test' for 
philosophy proposed by critical realism. From RTS onwards, Bhaskar and many other 
critical realists have staked the worth of their view on its ability to sustain an 
intelligible conception of science (Lawson, 1997, provides a particularly clear 
statement to this effect). The challenge for alternative views has always been to better 
the critical realist conception of the ontology presupposed by scientific practice (an 
ontology that Bhaskar claims in Dialectic to be presupposed by any human act 
whatsoever). And, while modestly holding out the possibility, indeed likelihood, that 
critical realism may one day be superseded, critical realists remain convinced that at 
least 'something like' the basic critical realist stratified ontology must be true, given 
the nature of scientific practice. If the foregoing shows the critical realist ontology to 
be untenable so failing the 'litmus test', and that Spinoza's philosophy is on an 
altogether higher level, then it still remains to be demonstrated that Spinoza can pass 
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the 'litmus test' and uphold scientific practice. This demonstration is carried out 
below. 
As detailed in chapter 3 above, critical realism conceives of scientific progress in 
terms of the process of 'retroduction'. Scientists 'borrow' models from established 
fields elsewhere and 'stretch', 'distanciate' or distort their meaning in order to 
produce 'hypotheses' of fundamentally new strata to be empirically tested. Spinoza's 
conception does not deny that a process such as retroduction is highly evident in 
science and that analogy, metaphor, etc., is a ubiquitous scientific phenomenon. The 
success of critical realism lies in part, no doubt, on its detailed description of these 
surface features of science. However, the notion of dialectical logic opened up by 
Spinoza's view is most emphatically not merely a 'logic of analogy and metaphor'; it 
is a mistake to view scientists as being led by such a logic - however they themselves 
understand their activities (as Bhaskar often points out, the best of scientists often 
misconstrue the methodology implicit in their own work). Dialectical logic penetrates 
beneath these surface features of science in order to provide a relatively unknown yet 
challenging comprehension of epistemology and so of scientific practice. 
The isomorphism of thought and object upheld by Spinoza means that knowledge is 
not reliant on (tested against) the effects of objects where those effects are non-
isomorphic to their cause. On the contrary, even before scientific practice begins, the 
scientist has learnt to act in accordance with a great many objects (actions 
'mirroring', or 'isomorphic to', objects); her ideas are thereby inner expressions of an 
isomorphism of human spatial bodily activity with the activity of a great many 
objects: 
[A]n adequate idea is only the conscious state of our body identical in form 
with the thing outside the body. This can be represented quite clearly. When I 
describe a circle with my hand on a piece of paper (in real space), my body, 
according to Spinoza, comes into a state fully identical with the form of the 
circle outside my body, into a state of real action in the form of a circle. My 
body (my hand) really describes a circle, and the awareness of this state (i.e. 
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of the form of my own action in the form of the thing) is also the idea, which 
is, moreover, 'adequate'. (ibid. p.69) 
And through the practical activity of SCience, practical intervention to trigger 
mechanisms (to create closure), the scientist learns to further develop their mode of 
activity to accord with the specialised objects of science (strata): 
[T]he more individual things our activity embraces and the deeper and more 
comprehensively we determine our body to act along the shape of the external 
bodies themselves, and the more we become an active component in the 
endless chain of causal relations of the natural whole, the greater is the extent 
to which the power of our thinking is increased, and the less there is of the 
'specific constitution' of our body and brain mixed into the 'ideas' making 
them 'vague and inadequate' (ideas of the imagination and not of the 
'intellect'). The more active our body is, the more universal it is, the less it 
introduces· 'from itself, and the more purely it discloses the real nature of 
things. And the more passive it is, the more the constitution and arrangement 
of the organs within it (brain, nervous system, sense organs, etc.) affect ideas. 
(ibid., p.72) 
In Spinoza's terms, 'he who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind of 
which the greater part is eternal' (Spinoza, 1952, p.357, cited in Ilyenkov, op. cit., 
p.72). 
Furthermore the ontology outlined above demonstrates that strata are unambiguously 
internally related to one another, and to strata yet to be discovered by science. 
Specifically, known or unknown strata are necessary developments of one another. A 
higher stratum is a necessary development of a lower stratum. A lower stratum 
necessarily develops into a higher stratum. Thus the fundamental task for the 
scientist is not to take old knowledge, externally related to unknown strata, and 
stretch, distort or 'distanciate' its meaning to reach a new, externally related model or 
hypothesis. Rather, the task is to interconnect the given strata, to fathom their 
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relation in a hierarchy of necessary development. Only within such a hierarchy can 
either the unity or the difference of any stratum be grasped. 
Of course, only a small portion of the universe is open to scrutiny by humans so that 
that the process of fathoming interconnection in terms of necessary development 
must entail an attempt at comprehension that (however imperfectly) goes way beyond 
the actually encountered strata; an attempt to achieve knowledge of what is common 
to all strata. From this follows the Spinozist understanding of the nature of human 
error; the manifest and high degree of 'imperfection' of finite, human thought as 
Spinoza puts it. Error does not lie fundamentally in a failed analogy, with respect to 
effects non-isomorphic to their cause. That is to say, error does not lie in a lack of 
objectivity. This is because concepts are isomorphic to their object and therefore 
quite objective. Instead, error lies in a lack of interconnection, a lack of recognition 
of the true necessary development of strata, rooted in a failure to grasp the truly 
universal aspects of given objects (and their concepts) and a corresponding over-
extension of partial truths: 
Error ... only began when a mode of action that was limitedly true was given 
universal significance, when the relative was taken for the absolute. (ibid. 
p.58) 
Error is, then, an elevation of a merely contingent object (aspect) into a universal 
attribute of substance (a universal truth). On this view, all concepts are true 
(isomorphic) to their object - the crucial question concerns just what the object (or 
aspect) is - is it a truly universal aspect or merely a contingent occurrence? 
The erring man also acted in strict accordance with a thing's form, but the 
question was what the thing was. If it were 'trivial', 'imperfect' in itself, i.e. 
fortuitous, the mode of action adapted to it would also be imperfect. And if a 
person transferred this mode of action to another thing, he would slip up. 
(ibid., p.58) 
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Of vital importance, and in contrast to critical realism (and other well known 
philosophies) is Spinoza's recognition that objects do have a universal aspect, and 
that this aspect consists in their being a specific form and conjunction of strata (form 
of matter), where strata constitute a single hierarchy of necessary development. Thus 
the task to fathom this universal aspect, hence the aspect of difference also, is a 
difficult but not impossible task. It follows that the fundamental advances in science 
entail a reworking, or reconstruction, of the necessary development of given concepts 
according to a principle that had previously remained implicit but had not been 
explicitly comprehended. To illustrate this view, consider the 'time bomb' scenario, 
shown above to be so damaging to critical realism. For Spinoza, such a scenario is 
easy to dismiss because, quite simply, the invocation of a 'time bomb' - an entity or 
force that will at some future date abolish the laws of nature - is an invocation of 
something that is not an intrinsic development of current knowledge or currently 
encountered (known) strata. Unlike the critical realist view, the scientist is not at 
liberty to concoct just whatever notion of new strata that the scientist pleases; still 
less to concoct a self-contradictory notion of a time bomb; rather, the task is to 
fathom the inner connection of phenomena more and more deeply and adequately. As 
more and more objects are embraced by thought (so spatial body activity), then a 
more and more deep and adequate grasp of the inner development of things is 
achieved (see ibid., p.72, cited above). 'Jumps' of thought are intrinsic developments 
of 'old' knowledge to reveal new strata, new laws etc. The development of 
knowledge is, in this sense, 'linear' in contradistinction to the critical realist view. 
It is worth referring back to what created the whole difficulty for critical realism 
regarding the notion of a 'time bomb' and the resulting collapse to scepticism: the 
conception of the relation of thought and being. It was shown above that critical 
realism is absolutely precluded from ruling out a 'time bomb' structure due to the 
non-isomorphism of thought and object (non-identity of thought and being) 
generated by SEPM. Yet, no self-contradiction is entailed in ruling out a 'time bomb' 
given the isomorphism of thought and object upheld by Spinoza's reworking of 
SEPM. From this flows the more general point that, at the heart of any philosophy, 
must lie some conception of the relation of thought and being, and an argument that 
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only a materialist theory of the identity-in-opposition of thought and being IS, 
ultimately, rational. 
Illustration 
The move which can loosely be referred to as a development from a 'Newtonian' to 
an 'Einsteinian' conception of the universe appears to provide an illustration of the 
above themes. ll Most obviously, the view of error is illustrated, firstly, on a 
quantitative basis, by the approximation to a 'Newtonian' world by Einstein's 
equations at a limited range of magnitudes of relevant variables. The Newtonian 
world view thus incorrectly takes a limited, partial truth (an equation that is 
approximately true within a given range of magnitudes) as holding universally (as 
holding outside the given range of magnitudes). On a qualitative basis, it is also clear 
that Newton's notions of absolute space and time, and so the law that a body remains 
at rest or in constant motion unless acted upon by an external force, has no place in 
Spinoza's conception. Again, Newton reflects how the world partially appears, rather 
than its truly infinite nature (of course, Spinoza and Einstein were very far from being 
the first to argue this case against absolute time and space). Even more significantly, 
Einstein is led to supersede Newton's notion of the 'force' of 'gravity'. The notion of 
this force as existing externally to matter and being causal upon it (a notion that has 
more than once been used to criticise Spinoza's view)12 is superseded by the view 
that gravity is no more than a reflection of the curvature of space-time. For Spinoza, 
the notion of 'force' must refer to a mode of activity of matter and cannot be 
considered as existing externally to matter. To label a recognised mode of activity as 
'caused by' an external 'force' is not to explain that activity at all. Rather, as argued 
above, explanation lies in interconnecting the structures and modes of activity of 
nature; revealing their inner development and unity. From this perspective, the 
development within the physical sciences towards a unification of the recognised 
physical 'forces' into one single force is unsurprising. 
11 Ilyenkov does not use this illustration and I am not a natural scientist, let alone and expert on 
Einstein, hence the illustration is best viewed as an attempt to make clear the interpretation of 
Spinoza's philosophy, rather than a true account of either Newton or Einstein. 
12 Bhaskar himself makes just such a criticism of Spinoza. See PON, chapter 3, pp. 103-4. 
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Spinoza, Hegel and Marx 
The presentation of Spinoza's position above, as that position is interpreted by 
Ilyenkov, is remarkable in that Spinoza's work appears as the fundamental basis for 
materialist dialectics; a view of Spinoza that is little recognised. At least two 
questions are raised by this presentation. Firstly Spinoza's view has been presented in 
a purely positive light yet Hegel and Marx are much more than mere Spinozists, 
hence the question of where they find fault with Spinoza. Secondly if Spinoza does 
indeed provide the basis for materialist dialectics then his view should speak to the 
vexed question of the nature of the Marx / Hegel connection. In answer to these 
questions it should be made clear that Spinoza's view can provide only the most 
abstract facet of philosophy, it being left to Hegel, Marx and Engels to elaborate 
dialectics. Furthermore both the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic does contain, on 
Ilyenkov's interpretation, a profound development of Spinoza's position that reveals 
its great limitations at anything but the most abstract of levels. Hegel's critique of 
Spinoza is summarised by Smith (1993) and need not be presented below. Instead, 
Marx's (related) critique is presented. Given this context, an argument is put forward 
that Spinoza's quite correct conception of substance at an abstract level, despite its 
failings at more concrete levels, sheds new light (relative to the still ongoing debate) 
on the sense in which Marx legitimately accuses Hegel of idealism. 
Marx 's Development from Substance to Labour 
Marx, on Ilyenkov's interpretation, goes beyond Spinoza by noting that the mode of 
human activity is not merely one of accordance with the object; humans transform 
not only themselves but also the object in the course of their labour i.e. in the process 
of social production. According to Marx's view, the social individual varies 
according to a historical process, labour, where that individual is equally as important 
as the totality (which Spinoza had termed 'substance') of which the individual is part. 
On Marx's conception, it is through labour that nature (substance) transforms itself, 
given that humans are as much part of nature as are the objects of their labour: 
I 
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According to him [Marx] , only nature of necessity thinks, nature that has 
achieved the stage of man socially producing his own life, nature changing 
and knowing itself in the person of man or of some other creature like him in 
this respect, universally altering nature, both outside him and his own. A body 
of smaller scale and less 'structural complexity' will not think. Labour is the 
process of changing nature by the action of social man, and is the' subject' to 
which thought belongs as 'predicate'. But nature, the universal matter of 
nature, is also its substance. Substance, having become the subject of all its 
changes in man, the cause of itself (cuisa sui). (ibid., p.74) 
The exposition of Spinoza remains very important because it reveals clearly the true 
significance of Marx's well-known remarks on labour and nature. Most importantly, 
it reveals that the notion of labour incorporates an isomorphism of thought (the mode 
of activity of thinking beings) and the object of thought. Note that critical realism is 
also able to uphold a notion of labour, or 'social production', through the so-called 
'transformational model of social activity' . Yet the critical realist notion is 
fundamentally different to that of Ilyenkov since it is based on SEPM (so on a non-
isomorphism of thought and the object of thought). 
The Marx-Hegel Connection 
The precise relation of Marx and Hegel has been a perennial source of debate within 
Marxism. The debate shows no signs of letting up. To take an important recent 
example, Rosenthal (1998) provides a vehemently anti-Hegelian reading of Marx, 
including an attack of current trend towards a 'new dialectical' reading of Marx and 
Hegel. Various 'new dialecticians' have responded strongly to Rosenthal (Williams, 
2000; Smith, 2000a; Arthur, 1999). Within this debate the range of interpretations of 
Hegel are spread from outright and mistaken idealism (Rosenthal) to basic and 
correct materialism (Smith, 1999; see also Fraser, 1998). It can also be noted that 
none of the prevailing interpretations actually sustains Marx's own well-known 
statements to the effect that Hegel must be 'turned right side up' so as to reveal the 
'rational kernel' in the 'mystical shell' of the Hegelian dialectic (Bhaskar too denies 
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the metaphor of inversion). What, then, does the above interpretation of Spinoza 
contribute to the debate? Firstly the interpretation defends Hegel, as well as Marx, 
against the charge of idealism on a great many counts. For it shows, as argued 
above, that there is nothing idealist or 'anthropomorphic' about a linear dialectic and 
related themes (contra Rosenthal and Bhaskar). Indeed I1yenkov's interpretation is 
congruent with the cogent defence of Hege\ against such criticisms made by Tony 
Smith and others (see I1yenkov's very similar, though little known, interpretation and 
defence of Hegel made in Ilyenkov, 1977, Essay 5). Secondly the interpretation 
reveals a sense in which Hegel is an idealist and must be turned 'right side up' just as 
Marx recommends; this is discussed below. 
The basic point made against Hegel by Ilyenkov, a point which holds against even the 
most robust of defenders of He gel such as Tony Smith and Ian Fraser,13 is that Hegel 
does not make fully explicit the materialist identity theory worked out by Spinoza. 
To be specific, Hegel is ultimately silent on the precise specification of the mind / 
body relationship and so on the emergence of thought from matter. In consequence 
and despite the great gains of the Hegelian dialectic, Hegel is, in the last instance, 
idealist, because he cannot specify the origin of thought in matter. Hence, for Hegel, 
'thought', not labour, determines human activity: 
In reality man thinks because that is his real life activity. Hege\ said the 
contrary, that real human life activity was such because man thought in 
accordance with a definite schema. All determinations of human life activity 
... appeared as the result of thought. (ibid., 233) 
Hence the isomorphism of human activity with objects cannot be interpreted as a 
material identity of subject and object, for it does not have its origin in the activity of 
matter: 
13 The question of whether Ilyenkov's critique of Hegel is a valid critique of Hegel himself, and not 
just of his 'new dialectical' interpreters, is far beyond the scope of this chapter, and the thesis 
overall. This chapter does not affirm any interpretation of Hegel; it does not address the question of 
whether Ilyenkov, Bhaskar, or the 'new dialecticians' have the 'correct' interpretation. 
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Thought was thus transformed [within Hegel's field of view] into the only 
active and creative force, and the external world into its field of application. 
Naturally, if the sensuously objective activity (practice) of social man was 
represented as the consequence, as the external objectification of ideas, 
plans, and concepts created by thought (i.e. by persons occupied in mental 
work), it became in principle impossible to say either what was the source of 
thought in the head of theoreticians or how it arose. (ibid., p.237) 
For this reason, according to Ilyenkov, ideas ultimately dominate matter in Hegel's 
philosophy (note that this is intrinsic to Hegel's philosophy and not simply a mistaken 
application of that philosophy as in Tony Smith's interpretation): 
He [Hegel] idolised the logical forms and laws of human thought, i.e. 
declared them absolute, without even allowing the problem of their origin to 
be posed. (Ilyenkov, op. cit., p.238). 
Thus, for Marx, it is necessary to retain the Hegelian dialectic but turn it right side up 
by basing it on a materialist rather than idealist identity (in opposition) of subject and 
object. This means stripping the Hegelian dialectic of all the idealist tendencies it 
inherits from the idealist identity theory upon which it is based. The chapters below 
attempt, amongst other things, to contribute towards this task by recasting 
contemporary and Hegel inspired systematic dialectics on the basis of Ilyenkov's 
materialist dialectics. 
Conclusion 
The key argument of this chapter drawn, for the most part, from Ilyenkov's 
interpretation of Spinoza, can be summarised succinctly. Building his philosophy 
upon the sharp distinction between thought and its object, Bhaskar claims to offer a 
'third way': he condemns any 'fundamentalist' notion of a single essence, or totality, 
underlying all phenomena, for its alleged blotting out of difference, and he condemns 
the anti-essentialism of empiricism for its failure to comprehend the real world of 
'multiple essences'. Yet (i) the non-identity of thought and object leads his 'third 
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way' to collapse into the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume; (ii) Spinoza's notion of 
an all-encompassing substance overcomes empiricism whilst giving equal emphasis to 
unity and difference, based upon a materialist identity-in-opposition of thought and 
being. There is, in other words, no 'third way' but, instead, as Ilyenkov puts it: 
two polar and mutually exclusive solutions of one and the same problem - the 
problem of the relation of 'the world in consciousness' ... to the 'world 
outside consciousness' ... For here a choice must be made: either nature, 
including man as part of it, must be understood through the logic of the 
'concept of substance', or it must be interpreted as a complex of one's 
sensations. (Ilyenkov, 1977, p.66) 
The lessons of Ilyenkov's argument, on the interpretation of the argument offered 
above in contrast to other cantemporary interpretations (Bakhurst, 1991; Chitty, 
2000; Saad-Filho, 2002), aw twofold. Firstly the argument suggests that scepticism is 
a harder nut to crack than either critical realism and its development into dialectical 
critical realism or contemporary Hegelian Marxist thought recognises. To point out 
the self-contradictory nature of scepticism, as d0es Bhaskar, is, of course, easy. 
Hume never once claimed to overcome the self-contradictory nature of his 
philosophy. Just because of this Hume reiegCit~d 'reason' to a secondary role in 
human affairs and held that custom, habit and the passions h0ld ultimate sway over 
human thought and action (Brown, 2001; Dow, 1999). From Ilyenk0v's perspective, 
it does not appear that Hume would have had great difficulty in refuting either 
Bhaskar or contemporary Hegelian Marxists. Critical realism cannot overcome the 
non-isomorphism of idea and object at its very heart. Hegelian Marxism cannot 
justify an identity of thought and being. In neither case is a rational warrant provided 
for rationality itself, i.e. self-contradiction is not, finally, overcome. The paramount 
importance of Spinoza's notion of substance (as interpreted by Ilyenkov) and related 
notions lies, it has been argued, in the upholding of a materialist identity-in-
opposition of thought and being and, hence, of rationality itself 
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Secondly the argument suggests that it is impossible to understate the philosophical 
damage wrought by (i) the so called 'dialectical materialism' of Stalinist orthodoxy; 
(ii) those who can see only Stalinist orthodox philosophy, or some equal crudity, as 
soon as the term 'dialectical materialism' is invoked (and the term is very little 
invoked in contemporary Western academia). Criticisms along the lines of 'the 
idealism of matter'; the conflation of intension and extension; technological 
determinism; reification ofuniversals or of some mystical 'absolute'; the dismissal of 
any form of teleology; and many other such criticisms do not remotely grasp the 
arguments above. If Ilyenkov' s argument is to be promoted and developed, then it is 
vital that the argument receives genuine criticism. Accordingly the ultimate aim of 
this chapter is to foster debate regarding the nature, significance and potential for 
further development of Ilyenkov's philosophy; a philosophy that is admittedly 
difficult but also rewarding and, it has been argued, robust. 
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Chapter 5. Developing Realistic Methodology: How Systematic Dialectics 
Surpasses the Critical Realist Method for Social Science 
Introduction 
This chapter draws upon the philosophical critique of the previous chapters in order 
to develop a methodological critique of critical realism. The negative aspect of the 
critique is presented in the first section. In the second section of the chapter, the 
method of 'systematic dialectics' (a specific branch of 'new dialectics') is presented 
as a superior alternative to the critical realist method, despite the Hegelian 
shortcomings of systematic dialectics. This second section of the chapter stresses the 
positive features of contemporary and Hegel inspired systematic dialectics. 
Subsequent chapters draw out the idealist limitations of this method and recast the 
method on Ilyenkov's materialist basis (see chapter 4 above), in the specific context 
of the theory of value and capital. 
Immanent Critique of the Critical Realist Method 
The backdrop to the critique below is Bhaskar's own critique of orthodox 
philosophy. Bhaskar argues that orthodoxy fails to sustain the distinction between 
ontology and epistemology. The critique below - if it is accepted - demonstrates that 
Bhaskar and critical realism has gone too far in the opposite direction. Critical realism 
neglects the intrinsic links between ontology and epistemology due in large part to its 
account of the relation between thought and the objects of thought. When these links 
are examined then it becomes clear that the method of critical realism cannot sustain 
the critical realist social ontology. I Firstly the critical realist method for social science 
is shown to preclude any theoretical anticipation of novel change despite its extreme 
generality (it is compatible with many specific methods). Secondly the restrictive 
nature of the method is suggested to follow from the 'non-isomorphic' and causal 
I To state the same thing in critical realist tenns (from Dialectic, p.I07 and p.204; see also PON, 
ch. I): the critical realist 'philosophical ontology' is fundamentally at odds with the 'scientific 
ontology' to which the critical realist method necessarily gives rise. 
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error been made that is inessential and so remedied easily or is something 
fundamental at stake? The characterisation of critical realism made in previous 
chapters suggest that the reasons lie at the very foundations of critical realism, and 
will be summarised below. 
Non-Isomorphism of Thought and its Object 
The prevIous chapters have attempted to establish the following relevant 
propositions. 'Critical realism' was born as a specific form of 'scientific realism' 
which asserts independence of the objects of science from scientific practice. 
Furthermore the philosophical term 'realism' applies, more broadly still, to any view 
that asserts some significant degree of mind-independence of things (see chapter 2 
above). Once the obvious distinction is made the question arises as to the precise 
relation between a real object and its concept. It was emphasised above (chapter 3) 
that Bhaskar insists that object and concept are entirely different. He states precisely 
that thought is never 'isomorphic' to the objects of thought nor indeed does it 
resemble them in any way (RTS, p.249; SRHE, pp.50-56; see also Dialectic's 
sustained polemic against subject-object identity theory). As noted in chapter 3 
above, the term 'isomorphism' ('iso' = same; 'morph' = shape) can be taken broadly 
to refer to a situation where relata have some essential feature in common; without 
any such feature there is no essential link, and so no rationally discernible connection 
or 'mapping' between them. The non-isomorphism is underlined by Bhaskar's 
emergence theory of the mind-body relation, dubbed 'synchronic emergent powers 
materialism' (SEPM), whereby thought is a power, sui generis, that emerges from 
the complex structure of (parts of) the body (PaN, ch. 3), a structure that may be 
termed 'mind'. His theory entails that the relation of thought and object is causal; 
specifically, that reasons cause intentional human activities. Chapter 3, above, argued 
that SEPM can be considered to be the 'conceptual essence' of critical realism. 
Inability to Theorise Structural Transformation 
It can now be seen just why transcendental deduction is advocated. Despite the 
apparently close relation of a social form to its underlying social structure the case 
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remains that the social form as a concept, and the social structure as a real object 
generating the form, are, like all concepts and objects, in a non-isomorphic relation 
according to the most basic and general premise of critical realism. The immediate 
and inevitably corollary must be that there can be no rationally discernible connection 
or 'mapping' between social form and social structure. It is vital to note that thought 
and object are utterly different in principle. So there can be no recourse to the view 
that they have some rationally discernible connection, however weak. This is the 
force of the term 'non-isomorphism'. Now, in the absence of any rationally 
discernible link, the form that serves as premise can tell the scientist one thing and 
one thing only: some underlying structure has produced it. It cannot reveal just what 
this structure is nor can it provide any further structural information. Therefore the 
given form does not provide any clue as to what novel forms and structural 
developments are likely to occur and the scientist, given the premise of the form only, 
is forced to hypothesise static structures that generate the form and only the form. 
Consider, by way of analogy, a familiar case of structural transformation in biological 
science, the process whereby a chicken's egg transforms into a chicken. The position 
faced by the critical realist social scientist is analogous to that of a biologist observing 
the egg but unable to examine its inner structure or to observe the transformation of 
the egg into a chicken. In such circumstances it will be difficult enough for the 
scientist to hypothesise a structure and mechanisms compatible with the 'egg form'. 
It would be sheer fantasy for the scientist to hypothesise a structure capable of 
immanent transformation into a chicken; any such posited structure must arise from 
outside the transcendental premise of the 'egg form' - it cannot be transcendentally 
deduced. This ensures that transcendental deduction must seriously misrepresent its 
object by wrongly attributing stasis to it. Any attempt to include self-change is a 
matter for speculation and not social science so hypothesised structures will be 
unduly static in opposition to the transformational social ontology. 
It is true that the transformational model of social activity seemingly implies a closer 
link between structure and form than that between, in the analogy, the 'egg form' and 
its underlying structure and mechanisms. Unlike the biologist, the social scientist 
knows that her premises (social forms) are, as Bhaskar puts it at one stage, ' ... not 
~. 
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externally related and contingently conjoined to what happens in the human sphere, 
but internally related to and [partly] constitutive of it' (SRHE, pp.160-61; emphasis 
in original). However, the analogy between egg shell (fonn) and its contents 
(structure) is precise in the crucial respect of their non-isomorphic relation. So to 
deny it would be, quite simply, to deny the fundamental premise of critical realism. 
The analogy also denies the scientist direct empirical observation of the egg's 
transfonnation into a chicken. This denial would be arbitrary if the example was being 
considered for its own sake or, indeed, if an analogy was being made with some other 
non-social structure. But the example is here being used by way of analogy with 
social structures. The reproduction and transfonnation of social structures constitutes 
human history. A distinctive feature of this history is that it is unidirectional; human 
history does not repeat itself in the manner of the continual cycle of chicken and egg. 
This is precisely a feature that the 'transfonnational model of social activity' is 
supposed to incorporate. At any point in time there are a unique set of fonns and 
structures whose evolution will be correspondingly unique. Therefore reference to 
past fonns and structures will not overcome the problem, in the way that reference to 
past chickens is possible in the analogy of chicken and egg. 
Significantly, in his account of natural science, Bhaskar recognises structural stasis as 
the corollary of concept / object non-isomorphism - thus he writes' changes in things, 
I have argued, are explained in tenns of unchanging things' (RTS, p.208). It is in his 
social ontology that Bhaskar first introduces transfonnation of underlying structures. 
He accepts the ontological point that social structures transfonn but does not 
recognise the methodological contradiction elaborated above.3 
The above considerations lead to an apparent terminological inversion by critical 
realism which, once corrected for, will allow the contradiction between the critical 
realist social ontology and method to be stated in fonnal tenns below. Prior to this 
3 This indicates, once more, that Bhaskar's philosophy collapses in the face of the problem of 
theorising change. It was noted in chapter 3 above that dialectical critical realism attempts to face 
up to this problem and in chapter 4 that this attempt fails. In this chapter the method, as opposed to 
the philosophy, of critical realism is shown to suffer from the same essential flaw. The method of 
dialectical critical realism is considered explicitly below. 
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statement, two points can be noted. Firstly the discussion above explains key features 
of transcendental deduction (this explanation for transcendental deduction was 
elaborated upon in previous chapters). In the absence of an isomorphism of form and 
underlying structure how can hypotheses be generated? By analogy and metaphor; 
the adaptation of models and concepts 'borrowed' from existing theories. Given this 
same absence, how can the relative merits of competing hypotheses be appraised? By 
empirical test - in the social sciences mainly tests of explanatory power. Secondly a 
corollary of the argument above is that 'transcendental deduction' is highly counter-
intuitive, entailing, as it does, the implausible view that there is no discernible link 
between a social form such as 'exchange value' and underlying social structure such 
as private production for exchange. Once the argument for a contradiction between 
the critical realist ontology and method is formally stated the counter-intuitive nature 
of transcendental deduction will be confirmed against possible critical realist 
objections. 
Inversion of Form and (Fixed) Essence 
Collier (1989), endorsed by Bhaskar (Dialectic, p.50), distinguishes between 
structural type and specific 'tokens' or 'structurata' of the type. An essential 
structure that has been hypothesised to underlie a social form may be instantiated (i.e. 
may exist in) a number of different ways, these different ways are its tokens or 
structurata. For example capitalism as it existed in the 1950s (which might be termed 
a period of 'Fordism') and capitalism as it exists now (which might be termed a 
'post-Fordist' period) are two possible tokens of the same structural type, viz. 
capitalism. At the same time, and as shown above, a transcendentally deduced 
structure cannot be rationally anticipated to produce a novel form; its essential 
feature is that it produces the specific form that served as premise for its deduction. 
For example, if the capitalist structure was, somehow, 'transcendentally deduced' 
from the premise of the 'wage form' then all possible tokens of the capitalist 
structure - so including the 'Fordist' and or 'post-Fordist' periods of its existence -
must generate the wage form. This has the peculiar result that Bhaskar's 'forms' 
must remain fixed while his 'essences' (social structures) can have various 
specifications (different tokens or 'structurata'). Now, on the commonly understood 
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meaning of the terms 'form' and 'essence' the essence remains the same and the 
specific form can vary; this is what is usually meant by the term 'transformation'. 
Thus Bhaskar inverts the usual meaning of the terms 'form' and 'essence'. 
Undoubtedly the inversion is of great significance as regards the critical realist 
interpretation of Mane When Marx referred to 'phenomenal forms' did he make the 
same peculiar inversion or is he not a critical realist after all? This issue will not be 
explored directly below though section three will present an interpretation of Marx 
which does not commit him to the inversion. Instead the argument will focus upon 
the deficiencies of the commonly understood model of essence itself 
To avoid the terminological inversion referred to above it may be better to call the 
'form' a 'pre-conceptualisation'. The essence of a transcendentally deduced structure 
(its 'type') is then that it produces a particular pre-conceptualisation (that from which 
it was hypothesised). This essence must remain fixed through the many different 
tokens (structurata) through which it is instantiated. Thus in the example above both 
capitalism in the 1950s (the 'Fordist' period) and now (the 'post-Fordist' period) 
must generate the pre-conceptualisation of the wage. The problem with this is that 
the key difference between the social and natural realms is supposed, on the critical 
realist view, to be that in the social realm, unlike the natural realm, the essential 
structural level is not fixed. On the contrary essential social structures (and not 
merely 'structurata') are supposed to be reproduced and transformed through the 
medium of social agency. For critical realism, it is precisely such essential structural 
transformation (summarised in the term 'development' and analogous to biological 
examples such as that of chicken and egg employed above) that constitutes the 
significant aspect of human history. Critical realism promises to sustain development 
but this is precisely what the fixed essence structures generated by the critical realist 
method are incapable of The only significant change of social structures that can 
occur is their complete abolition. So, for example, any move from one period of 
capitalism (e.g. Fordism) to another (e.g. post-Fordism) (from any 'token' of 
capitalism to another 'token') would have to be considered entirely inessential and 
correspondingly insignificant. In other words the critical realist method results in a 
conception of essential structures as rigid. Essential structural transformation or 
development through the medium of agency cannot be sustained. Whereas the critical 
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realist social ontology requires that social structures are reproduced or transformed 
by social agency, the critical realist method ensures that all theorised social structures 
are essentially reproduced or abolished through that medium. 
(Dialectical) Critical Realist Objections 
The account of transcendental deduction above shows it to be not only restrictive but 
counter-intuitive. For the relation between exchange value ('social form') and private 
commodity production ('hypothesised structure') is not plausibly understood as that 
between hypothesis and form. Rather the one would seem inconceivable without the 
other prior to any empirical 'test'. Similarly for the relation of the wage form to 
underlying 'doubly free' labour - though this case is less clear cut. The same 
considerations apply to typical examples of social structure, such as the marriage 
relation or that between landlord and tenant. No empirical test would seem to be 
required to establish these underlying social structures; they are conceptually 
necessary prior to any such test. Only the Marxian invocation of 'socially necessary 
labour time' bears any close resemblance to the notion of a hypothesis to be tested.4 
One reason for the enduring appeal of critical realism is that both Bhaskar himself and 
other prominent critical realists such as Andrew Sayer do appear to accommodate 
the observations made above. The constraints of transcendental deduction are 
sometimes either obscured or even denied. Sayer and Bhaskar will be considered in 
turn below. Both authors, it will be argued, do adhere to the account of 
transcendental deduction presented above but fail to recognise the stasis generated by 
the method. This will strengthen and clarify the general argument that the critical 
realist social ontology is necessarily incompatible with the critical realist method. 
Sayer (1992, ch. 3 and ch. 4) recommends that the internal relations that define social 
structure should be worked through prior to empirical work and so appears to break 
free from the constraint of transcendental deduction as described above. Sayer's 
recommendation is based on the recognition that there must be implicit knowledge of 
4 Hausman (1998) makes a similar point, though in a different context, but fails to note that the key 
critical realist 'non-observables' to be hypothesised are social structures understood as sets of 
internally related positioned-practices. 
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internal relations; knowledge not immediately explicit to the mind. However, the 
appearance that Sayer has broken free of transcendental deduction is illusory. Sayer 
fully subscribes to the critical realist view that there is no intrinsic link (isomorphism) 
of thought and its object but that they causally interact (ibid., pp.65-71 and p.162). 
The fact that the working through of internal relations prior to empirical work 
provides a grasp of real objects therefore becomes almost inexplicable. The only 
explanation can be that the internal relations are the result of prior transcendental 
deductions (this is made clear by Sayer, ibid., pp.160-62).5 So the critique above, 
demonstrating that the procedure of transcendental deduction, based on a non-
isomorphism of concept and object, precludes any theory of transformation and is 
highly counter-intuitive, applies to Sayer after all. The worth of Sayer's insights on 
the implicit knowledge of internal relations can only be sustained (and, indeed, will be 
developed fundamentally) by the transcendence of critical realism. 
Bhaskar's notion of 'judgmental rationality' (e.g. PON, ch. 2) entails that it is, and 
must be, possible to adjudicate rationally between competing theories despite the 
sharp distinction between concept and object. Does this notion undermine the 
contention made above that there can be no rationally discernible link between a form 
and underlying structure? By no means. The above exposition does not deny that 
judgements between theories are possible given a critical realist ontology and 
method; on the contrary it emphasises that critical realists root such judgements, 
ultimately, on empirical criteria. It is true that the difficulty of experiment 
acknowledged by critical realists serves to weaken significantly the ability of the 
social scientist to discriminate between theories. In this aspect the account above 
resonates with Collier's (1989) view that critical realists should be pessimistic as to 
the critical potential of social science - but the central argument does not rest on this 
point. 6 
5 Lawson (1997, ch. 16) recognises the importance of the process of 'abstraction' in a manner close 
to Sayer's stress on working through internal relations. Lawson's discussion makes it immediately 
clear that the process of abstraction is an aid to transcendental deduction rather than an alternative 
to it. 
6 The fact that argument of this chapter does not rest on a critique of judgemental relativity does not 
imply that the argument implicitly rests on the assumption that the notion is sound. 
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Bhaskar's more recent development of 'dialectical critical realism' (Dialectic, PE) 
contains many elements that would suggest, at first sight, that the critique above is 
obsolete at least as regards Bhaskar's own work. For example, Bhaskarexplicitly 
accepts that critical realism 'abstracts from' issues such as time and space which are 
central to transformation. It is precisely the aim of dialectical critical realism to 
reincorporate that from which was initially abstracted (Dialectic, p.8; see chapter 3 
above). No stronger impression could be given that Bhaskar has, through his 
appropriation of dialectics, overcome the original limitations of his notion of 
transcendental deduction and so made the argument of this chapter obsolete than his 
explicit endorsement, in two footnotes (ibid., p.184 and p.245), of Tony Smith's The 
Logic of Marx's Capital (1990). Smith elaborates a procedure, to be presented 
below, which is solely a reconstruction of a given set of categories making their 
implicit internal relations explicit and eschewing any recourse to transcendental 
deduction. 
Bhaskar (op. cit.) qualifies his endorsement of Smith in two respects. Firstly he 
objects to the 'linearity' of the dialectic that Smith elaborates. Given that this 
'linearity' is absolutely fundamental to Smith's entire project, Bhaskar's qualification 
suggests a misunderstanding of that project. Secondly, and what is crucial to the 
argument here, Bhaskar criticises Smith's omission of 'ontological' dialectic (and 
other forms of dialectic) on the supposition that they underlie Smith's own 
'presentational' dialectic. In one sense Bhaskar makes a good point. It is true that 
Smith does not face directly fundamental 'philosophical' issues such as the mind-
body relation, as argued in chapter 4 above. However the sense that Bhaskar has in 
mind is based on his (Bhaskar' s) own treatment of such philosophical issues. The 
'ontological' dialectics that Bhaskar advocates incorporate his polemic against 
subject-object identity (so non-isomorphism of thought and its object) and retain his 
emergence theory of mind. In consequence, dialectical critical realism does not 
identify the contradiction between the transformational ontology and the method of 
transcendental deduction as elaborated above. On the contrary transcendental 
deduction is retained and 'dialectical arguments' are subsumed as species of 
transcendental ones (ibid., pp.l07-8 and p.396). So Bhaskar falls prey to essentially 
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the same argument as does Sayer, though it must be couched in more elaborate 
terms, as follows. 
In terms of dialectical critical realism, transformation entails 'absence'. It is the 
'presence of an absence' that provides the continuity amid change that is 
characteristic of transformation (the theme of 'absence' and its connection to time 
and space runs throughout Dialectic - see chapter 3, above). The first stage of the 
argument above - showing that novel structural change or transformation cannot be 
theorised before its occurrence - translates into the argument that the 'absence' 
implicated in a novel structural transformation cannot, in general, be identified until 
after its occurrence - this is explicitly acknowledged within dialectical critical realism 
(for the case of the transformation of knowledge see DialectiC, ch. 1, especially, 
p.24, p.31 and p.34). Such identification entails essentially the same procedure of 
transcendental deduction, now expanded to include dialectical arguments, as that 
elaborated above. The next stage of the critique above translates into the position 
that, because of the non-identity of object and concept, underlain by Bhaskar's 
emergence theory of mind (SEPM), the 'absence' implicated in structural 
transformation can no more be 'discovered' ex post than prior to the occurrence of 
the transformation. Thus the continuity of essence that would be provided by the 
ability to discover an absence is denied and, as above, the only significant change of 
structure that can be theorised through the (dialectical) critical realist method is its 
complete abolition rather than transformation. Bhaskar enriches his ontology through 
dialectics and the notion of absence but does not and cannot, given the fundamental 
tenets of critical realism and dialectical critical realism alike, recognise and amend the 
inability of his method to theorise absence and so transformation. 
The Practical Consequences of Critical Realism 
The critique above suggests that much critical realist inspired practice is likely to take 
place unaware of the hidden restrictiveness, indeed basic implausibility, of 
transcendental deduction. For example, the necessary link between a social form such 
as exchange value and the social structure of generalised commodity production will 
be taken for granted by the theorist; the link will not somehow be 'transcendentally 
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deduced'. This raises the question of the practical consequences of critical realism. In 
important respects critical realism is useful. For one thing critical realism provides a 
healthy antidote to some of the more extreme yet widespread 'applied methods' in 
social science and economics. Lawson's (1997) methodological critique of orthodox 
economics and Sayer's (1992) related discussion of the limited place of quantitative 
methodology are prime examples. Also critical realism provides useful positive guides 
to social scientists. Examples include the relational conception of social structure; 
Sayer's recognition of the need to make implicit internal relations explicit based on 
the critical realist conception of causality; and some of Lawson's methodological 
recommendations. Furthermore a great debt is owed to Bhaskar not least for his 
introduction of the notion of 'dialectics' into social scientific debate. However it 
remains the case immense problems face critical realist practitioners. 
A number of authors have commented that it is inherently very difficult to 
interconnect the many social structures, conceived in critical realist terms, implicated 
in social life (Jessop, 1995; Jones, 1997; Joseph, 1999). Given the variety of social 
relations, e.g. employer / employee, teacher / student, husband / wife, citizen / state, 
landlord / tenant, etc. there is the danger that it may be impossible to 'see the wood 
for the trees'. The key critical realist concept of structural interconnection is 
'stratification' (e.g. Dialectic, pp.49-56 and p.162; see previous chapters) but 
beyond the mere assertion of the primacy of one social structure (e.g. that of the 
economy) or another it would seem difficult to employ the notion effectively in 
substantive work. Problems are compounded given that such work must also 
incorporate the role of agency. Critical realism tells the social scientist that agents 
reproduce and transform structures but just what structures are being reproduced, 
and how, are entirely matters for substantive work (SRHE, p.124; Lawson, 1997, 
Part IV). The section below will confirm that it is virtually impossible for a critical 
realist social scientist to satisfactorily articulate structures (and so agents). The 
'systematic dialectical' transcendence of the critical realist method affords a general 
solution to the problem of interconnection of social structure that cannot be provided 
by critical realism or indeed any other well known method . 
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New Dialectics and Systematic Dialectics 
'New dialectics' refers to a recent trend amongst social scientists and philosophers 
towards a reassessment of the Marx / Hegel relation. Chris Arthur (1993a) coined the 
term; Castree (1995) and Saad-Filho (1997c) provide overviews (see also chapter 4 
above). A common theme, amongst the otherwise diverse positions held by new 
dialecticians, is some form of defence of He gel against Marx's early critique. Instead 
of emphasising Marx's criticisms, new dialecticians argue, though in contrasting 
ways, that Marx's theoretical work employs Hegel's method to a degree far greater 
than recognised in most of the secondary literature (including Bhaskar's Dialectic) 
and, furthermore, that this method is a contributor to the superiority of Marx's 
theory. One important respect in which the arguments of respective new dialecticians 
vary is according to their relative attraction to two opposing theoretical poles: at one 
pole capitalism is considered to constitute a perverse reality mirroring Hegel's 
idealism (e.g. Arthur, 2002); at the opposing pole Hegel's method is interpreted as a 
materialist one (e.g. Smith, 1990). This section draws from a specific branch of new 
dialectics, termed 'systematic dialectics', in order to present a method for social 
science that overcomes the implausible and self-contradictory method of critical 
realism (and dialectical critical realism) critiqued in the previous section. 
Given that the critique above turned on the non-isomorphic and causal relation 
between thought and its object underlain by Bhaskar's theory of the mind / body 
relation (SEPM), the key question, from a critical realist standpoint, is just how can 
SEPM be replaced without entailing a reductionism or dualism and, more broadly, 
without falling into the epistemic fallacy and related fallacies? It must be admitted at 
the outset that a satisfactory response to the question cannot be found within new 
dialectics. Quite to the contrary, the issue of the mind / body relation is so little 
addressed as to suggest that the relation is without import in any 'new dialectical' 
framework. As noted in chapter 4 above, the symposium on Marxist dialectics in 
Science and Society (1998), Issue 62, Number 3 - with contributions from new 
dialecticians such as Chris Arthur, Thomas Sekine and Tony Smith - did not contain 
any direct reference to the mind / body relation. It is for this reason that E. V. 
Ilyenkov (1977; 1997) was drawn upon in chapter 4 above. Ilyenkov provides the 
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argument for an isomorphism of thought and object that legitimates some aspects of 
the general new dialectical methodology, despite the idealism of this methodology. 
Chapter 6 and 7 below will examine in detail the idealist deficiencies of contemporary 
and Hegel-inspired new dialectics, arguing that this method precludes comprehension 
ofMarx's labour theory of value. This chapter will emphasise the positive features of 
new dialectics, and will not discuss value theory in any detail. 
The presentation immediately below draws upon a specific branch of new dialectics, 
termed 'systematic dialectics' (Smith, 1990; Arthur, 1998; Reuten and Williams, 
1989). The method of systematic dialectics will be brought out employing a 
distinctive terminology, and distinctive gloss, rather than adhering to anyone author 
in particular.7 
The Starting Point for Systematic Dialectics 
The key initial distinction for the method of systematic dialectics is that between the 
transhistorical and historical levels of generality and extension. 'Transhistorical' 
notions are those which are universal through all possible social formations, 
whatever their specific differences. For Hegel such transhistoricals can be 
summarised in the term 'spirit' or 'rationality' (Pinkard, 1996; Smith, 1990). For 
Marx the notion of 'labour' or 'social production' encapsulates his approach at this 
level (Smith, 1990; Ilyenkov, 1977; see chapter 4 above). 'Historical' notions are 
only universal through, and so definitive of, individual social formations. Returning 
to Hegel, each society is seen as a specific form of spirit or rationality, whereas 
Marx, by contrast, viewed each society as a specific form of labour or, in other 
words, a specific mode of social production. It is to this historical level that 
systematic dialectics applies. 
At this early stage an important question arises: is systematic dialectics a method 
applicable only to the current mode of social production, viz. capitalism, or is it 
7 Working within the fields of sociology and human geography, Roberts (1999; 2001a; 2001b) 
contrasts systematic dialectics to critical realism in a way that complements the approach developed 
within this chapter. 
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applicable to other social formations, such as feudalism? According to some authors 
(e.g. Arthur, 1998), systematic dialectics can be applied only to capitalism. 
Systematic dialectics traces the development of a highly peculiar and dominant 
abstraction termed 'capital' (money that begets more money). Outside of capitalism 
systematic dialectics would be of no use to the social scientist, on this view. Other 
authors (e.g. Smith, 1990) take the opposite view that systematic dialectics is 
applicable to societies other than capitalism. Systematic dialectics makes reference to 
a 'whole', a structured totality, without any connotation that it is a particular type of 
structured totality, such as one dominated by the abstraction of capital. In order to 
reproduce and develop it is necessary that a structured whole possesses a moment of 
unity, i.e. there must be some degree of co-ordination of the individuals within a 
system such that the system (structure) endures. Yet, it is by no means necessary that 
the moment of unity should gain independent and dominant form. The fact that this 
occurs within capitalism is grasped through systematic dialectics but is not necessary 
for the applicability of this method. Chapter 4 above supports this latter contention 
drawing, however, upon Ilyenkov's (1977) rather than Smith's (1990) interpretation 
of Marx and Hegel. Whichever view on the matter is taken it remains the case that 
systematic dialectics is required in order to comprehend capitalism and that critical 
realism is deficient in this regard. The example of grasping capitalism will be used to 
illustrate the method below. 
The Systematic Dialectic 'Method of Enquiry , 
The method of enquiry begins by recognising that there are many historical categories 
(denoting aspects of the real social totality), universal through, but specific to the 
current mode of social production, that is, capitalism. For example, there are specific 
forms of state, ideology, gender and religion, which have been subjected to much 
scrutiny across the social sciences. On this, critical realism and systematic dialectics 
can concur. The difference between systematic dialectics and critical realism is first 
revealed in the purpose of the method of enquiry within systematic dialectics. This 
purpose is to search for the most abstract and simple category from which to 
comprehend the structured totality. 
I~ 
98 
On the systematic dialectic interpretation ofMarx's method of enquiry, Marx was led 
down a definite categorical chain: Marx recognised, for example, that the capitalist 
state is bound up in the process of capital accumulation, most obviously through 
fiscal and monetary aspects. Equally, it is absolutely true that capital accumulation is 
bound up in the state (through the very same links). But to comprehend both fully (at 
this 'historical' level of extension and generality) one is led, in thought, to consider 
capital accumulation before the state. In terms of the notion of systematic dialectics, 
this is because capital accumulation is a more abstract and simple category than the 
state. Note that the terms 'abstract' and 'simple' have an ontological as well as an 
epistemological connotation: from an epistemological perspective, capital 
accumulation is considered more abstract and simple than the state because, from an 
ontological perspective, capital accumulation is more abstract and simple than the 
state. Yet, when considering capital accumulation, one is led, in thought, back to the 
specific form of money under capitalism, and from there, on Marx's view, back to the 
specific 'commodity-form', also termed by Marx the 'value-form' of the product.8 
This illustrates how, from the perspective of systematic dialectics, the method of 
enquiry systematically moves from an initial 'chaotic conception of the whole', 
through 'ever more simple concepts' until it reaches the most abstract and simple 
category, the commodity-form (Marx, 1973, p.100). This is the 'cell-form' or, in 
Hegelian language, the 'abstract universal' (Reuten, 2000). The cell-form marks the 
end of the method of enquiry and forms the starting point of the method of 
presentation. For systematic dialectics, the purpose of the method of presentation is 
to develop a comprehension of the whole on the basis of this starting point. The cell-
form will be examined closely below. 
8 This statement follows Banaji's (1979) interpretation of the starting point of Marx's Capital. The 
issue of Marx's theory of value is taken up in chapters 6 and 7 below, where it will be argued that 
the idealism of contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics precludes comprehension of 
Marx's labour theory of value. As noted above, these issues are glossed over in this chapter to 
emphasise the positive features of systematic dialectics, the superiority of this method to that of 
critical realism. 
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The 'Cell-Form' 
The category of the commodity-form articulates an abstract and simple social 
structure, specifically, a structure whereby production generally takes place in 
individual units outside of direct social compulsion, for the purpose of exchange. 
Now this is indeed an incredibly abstract and simple notion. It has no further 
historical content than that just outlined. It does contain all transhistorical content as 
encapsulated, on Marx's view, by the notion of labour or social production. But its 
specific historical content is minimal. All such historical content (such as the specific 
forms of money, capital, state, religion, ideology and gender) has been abstracted 
away from in thought. So far then, there would seem nothing to distinguish this 
notion of abstraction from that of critical realism, as discussed in the previous section 
and in chapter 2 above. That is, 'abstraction' appears as a process of analysis that is 
prior to a stage of synthesis, of reintegrating or 'articulating' the concrete. However, 
there is another side to the commodity-form. For, this category does refer to the 
whole, the specific social totality, if only abstractly and simply. The real social 
totality, known as capitalism, can be characterised, or defined, at the most abstract 
and simple level of all, as the society of generalised commodity production. Private 
production for exchange is the most abstract and simple mode of connection of the 
millions of individuals (people, groups, firms, etc.) within capitalist society, a mode 
specific to that society. In this way, there is a synthetic side to abstraction. The 
abstraction of the cell-form precisely transcends the immediate appearances of 
isolated, haphazard categories by 'focusing' upon their very aspect of unity; upon 
their constitution as a whole. By focusing upon the cell-form it is possible to 'see the 
wood for the trees', to reveal the universal in the particular. The cell-form or abstract 
universal is, then, very abstract and simple. But, by the same token, it provides a way 
of bringing the whole in. 
It would be wrong to suggest that the difference between critical realism and 
systematic dialectics is merely a matter of terminology. The abstraction of the cell-
form is simultaneously a process of analysis (of bringing something into focus) and of 
synthesis (it is the whole - the mode of connection of the individuals within society -
that is focused upon). It is not that systematic dialecticians have merely chosen to 
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gIve two different processes, VIZ. analysis and synthesis, the same name 
(,abstraction'), whereas critical realism has, equally legitimately, chosen to restrict 
the term 'abstraction' to the former but not the latter process. Rather, for systematic 
dialectics, analysis and synthesis occur simultaneously as two, inseparable sides of a 
single process of abstraction, viz. the abstraction of the cell-form. The critical realist 
urge to 'combine' or 'articulate' abstractions so as to grasp the moment of synthesis 
is, in this case, misplaced because synthesis is essential to the process of abstraction 
itself This point is important to the extent that critical realists claim to provide a 
general theory of abstraction and hence a general method. As is well known, general 
claims can be falsified by one specific counter-example. The abstraction of the 'cell-
form' of capitalism, where analysis and synthesis constitute a single process of 
abstraction, is a specific counter-example to the general claim that abstraction is a 
process of analysis that is prior to a separate process of synthesis. Any claim that 
critical realism provides a general theory of abstraction is thereby falsified. More 
fundamentally this new notion of abstraction suggests a practical solution to the 
problem of 'articulation' unavailable to critical realism, to be developed further 
below. 
The Method of Presentation 
How does the presentation proceed from the 'cell-form'? The method of presentation 
entails that, once the most abstract and simple category (in Marx's case, the 
commodity-form) has been focused upon, then the next most simple and abstract 
category is introduced. There are two crucial features of this next category. Firstly its 
introduction is not arbitrary; rather it is systematically required upon consio~[ation of 
the original category. The literature on systematic dialectics suggests at least three 
ways in which this requirement can transpire. Firstly the focus upon the initial 
category might reveal that the social structure defined by the category cannot 
reproduce itself; that it cannot provide for its own conditions of existence (Reuten, 
2000; Reuten and Williams, 1989). In the case of the commodity-form, for example, 
it could be argued that a generalised system of commodity production cannot exist 
without a 'universal equivalent' representing the value of all commodities, and 
providing a medium of exchange. Secondly, and closely related to the first type of 
I~ 
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'forward impulse', it might be argued that agents within the commodity-form would 
necessarily tend to introduce money (Smith, 1993). Agents would tend to measure 
exchange values in a single commodity and they would introduce this commodity (the 
'universal equivalent') as a medium of exchange. Thirdly there may be simply a 
'backward justification' whereby it is obvious that, having focused upon the 
commodity-form, the next most simple and abstract category, as appropriated in the 
prior method of enquiry, is the money-form. 9 
The second crucial feature is that the next category is a development of the first 
category. Thus the money-form contains all the features of the commodity-form - the 
money-form, like the commodity-form, defines a social structure of individual 
production for exchange - but now more aspects have been developed, viz. money 
itself This new category is more concrete and complex than the commodity-form, 
nevertheless it remains very abstract and simple.lO The remarks made above 
regarding the abstract status of the commodity-form (the cell-form) therefore carry 
over to the money-form. The forms of capital, state, religion and gender have been 
abstracted away from at this stage. Yet this is not merely a process of analysis. 
Rather the money-form 'captures' the whole, if only abstractly. In everyday life 
commodity value is measured by money and generalised commodity exchange does 
occur through the medium of money. The money-form is the next most simple and 
abstract way of defining the specific mode of connection of the entire social totality. 
It brings that specific totality slightly more 'into focus' than is the case for the 
commodity-form through the process of introducing money. And it therefore enables 
a slightly clearer comprehension of the totality than the commodity-form. Thus the 
9 This notion of 'backward justification' is an interpretation of Smith (1993, p.34, n. 6). Arthur 
(1998) argues for a more complex notion of 'backward pull' based upon the insufficiency of any 
abstract category to grasp the internally related totality of which it is part. Though not stressed 
above, it is possible to characterise the development from abstract and simple to concrete and 
complex as driven by 'contradiction'. For example, there is a contradiction between the claim that 
the commodity-form grasps a totality and the fact that it cannot reproduce itself as such. A more 
concrete and complex category, viz. the money-form, is necessary in order to resolve the 
contradiction. 
10 The derivation of categories developed above is an application of systematic dialectics to 
capitalism. For this reason, the relationships that are developed between commodities, money, and 
further categories, should not be 'read back' into pre-capitalist societies; there can be no 
presumption that commodities and money play the same role in pre-capitalist societies as they do in 
capitalism. 
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way In which all aspects of the totality systematically interconnect is better 
comprehended. Simultaneous to the process of analysis there is a process of 
unification, or synthesis, in systematic dialectical abstraction, a process little explored 
by critical realism. 
It will be apparent that the method of presentation (or reconstruction) does not stop 
at the level of the newly derived category. Rather, once again, there will be a 
systematic imperative to move the focus from the money-form to the next most 
simple and abstract category. Once again, there are a number of approaches towards 
articulating just how such a forward impulse arises. Smith (1993) argues that, given a 
social structure of generalised commodity exchange in which money acts as a simple 
medium of exchange, people will necessarily tend to exchange for the purpose of 
making money. They will tend to do this in order to hedge against the risk of being 
unable to sell the individual commodities that they own. The social form where 
money has become the end of exchange, rather than its mere medium, defines the 
next, more concrete and complex category, the capital-form. Smith's argument 
provides a 'forward impulse' for the introduction (or 'dialectical derivation') of the 
capital-form. Alternatively, a 'backward justification' of the capital-form's 
introduction is readily apparent: the capital-form, at its most simple, comprises 
money and commodities; in order to comprehend the capital-form it is, therefore, first 
necessary to comprehend the commodity and money-forms. Having done this, the 
capital-form, newly grasped as a development of the commodity and money-forms, 
stands as the next most simple and abstract category of the totality. 
The capital-form can be developed through many levels of increasing concretion and 
complexity. Smith (1990), for example, attempt to show how the abstract and simple 
definition of the capital-form can be developed so as to derive the entire systematic 
content, the 'underlying architectonic', of the three Volumes of Capital. Most 
importantly, the development of the capital-form reveals the origin of profit in 
exploitation, and the simultaneous mystification of this origin in concrete reality (see 
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chapters 6 and 7 below).l1 Furthennore, Smith (2000b) and Reuten and Williams 
(1989) attempt to derive the definitive features of the capitalist state, illustrating how, 
at these more complex levels, there is a great deal of contingency intertwined with 
the derived necessary relations. To take just one example, it is contingent, relative to 
the categorical development, whether the capitalist state takes the fonn of a 
democracy or a dictatorship. But no matter what fonn is taken, the state must still 
reproduce the opposition between use value and value, between capital and labour, 
between price and value, even as it develops these oppositions and attempts to cope 
with their effects. Thus through an iterative process dialectical derivation, a more and 
more focused comprehension of the real social totality is developed, from the abstract 
and simple cell-fonn to ever more concrete and complex levels of social reality. 
At this stage another crucial tenn, 'conditions of existence', can be shown to be given 
widely divergent respective interpretations by critical realism and systematic 
dialectics. This will further clarify the method of systematic dialectics. On Reuten and 
Williams' (1989) view, categorical development proceeds through successive 
'conditions of existence'; each new category is a necessary condition of existence of 
the fonner category (e.g. Reuten and Williams (1989), Part One). Now, for critical 
realism 'conditions of existence' are entities necessary to the existence of a given 
fonn or structure. For systematic dialectics, on the other hand, the only given form or 
structure is the entire object realm (which is itself continually transforming) since the 
initial simple structure of the presentation is abstracted by thought and its condition 
of existence is precisely that it transfonns into the new structure, precisely that it is 
not fixed and the same applies to each new, more complex and concrete structure. 
The gulf between the systematic dialectical and critical realist notions of 'categorical 
hierarchies' follows from their respective views of 'conditions of existence'. 
Categories cannot be ordered according to a 'hierarchy of conditions of existence', as 
critical realists often suggest (e.g. PIF, p.179; Sayer, 1983), because all categories 
11 Chapters 6 and 7 will argue that Smith's interpretation is marred by its idealism such that Smith 
and other systematic dialecticians cannot comprehend the labour theory of value. This should not 
take away from Smith's achievement in setting out with utmost clarity the need for theory to develop 
immanently from abstract to concrete. The positive features of Smith's work are stressed in this 
chapter. 
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are conditions of existence of all other categories. Instead categories are ordered 
according to a hierarchy from abstract to concrete; this hierarchy is developed in 
thought by tracing reciprocal conditions of existence as explained above. The 
'intrinsic and objective order of categories' is the name given to this hierarchy. So, 
although using very similar tenninology, the critical realist notions of a 'hierarchy of 
conditions of existence' (and so of 'social stratification') are very different to, indeed 
transcended by, the systematic dialectical notion of a 'hierarchy of categorical 
structures from abstract to concrete' .12 
In sum the method of presentation is able to reconstruct the fundamental categories 
of the capitalistic mode of social production in thought precisely because it is able to 
grasp their content as necessarily interconnected through its transformation. The 
issue of historical transformation and concrete explanation is taken up below. 
The 'Unity of Diverse Determinations '; Historical Transformation and Concrete 
Explanation 
The logical validity of the categories developed in Capital rests upon the ability of 
the method of presentation to successfully reconstruct the remaining fundamental 
categories of the object realm through further development of the essential social 
structure. The most obvious fundamental categories that remain are the 'state', 
'foreign trade' and the 'world market' (Smith, 1990, p.200). It would therefore be a 
terrible error, from the perspective of systematic dialectics, to consider the theory in 
Capital complete. It would be especially damaging to suggest that Capital represents 
a completed work of 'the economic sphere' and that it is left to other social scientists 
to theorise other spheres such as that of politics or of ideology. Further, it would be 
perplexing for a systematic dialectician should she find that the various diverse 
spheres of society were claimed to be theorised somehow according to their own 
three stage procedure of starting point; method of inquiry; method of presentation. 
Yet such claims are a logical progression of the critical realist method. Bob J essop' s 
12 For the critical realist conception see Collier (1989); Bhaskar (Dialectic, esp. p.53 and p.353); 
Sayer (1992, esp. pp. 140-43). Murray (1983, p.495, f.n. 33) succinctly sets out this aspect of the 
systematic dialectical transcendence of critical realism in his critique of Say er (1983). 
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work (see chapter 2 above) is an influential attempt to outline and apply such a 
method. 
The reconstruction becomes progressively more difficult as more and more 
complexity has to be considered. This is because historical contingencies begin to 
play a more and more crucial role (Fine, 1989, pp.69-72), and must carefully be 
articulated with the derived categories if the theory is to be developed further. It is 
possible however, to develop a grasp, even at an abstract level, of some strong 
tendencies for definite historical developments, as discussed below. 
The progreSSIve reconstruction of fundamental categories, based on systematic 
dialectics, provide a stronger and stronger grasp of the ongoing and systematic 
activities which are necessarily undertaken by social agents, i.e. the basic activities 
specific to capitalism which people necessarily undertake everyday. Such a 
reconstruction may simultaneously reveal any historical tendencies inherent in these 
activities. These will be tendencies of the totality of the given object realm. Equally 
there will be a vast amount of activity undertaken which is only systematic by chance 
or is not systematic at all. The systematic reconstruction cannot provide a grasp of 
such activities except in the negative sense of showing them to be non-systematic and 
so indeterminate relative to systematic dialectical reconstruction. 
The above implies that historical tendencies are both society-wide and medium to 
long run; so they have implications for, but by no means fully determine, all 
phenomena in particular locations and / or in short spans of time. Social activities that 
are not necessarily systematic are not ignored. They are determinate in individual 
locations and over society as a whole. However because they are not necessary they 
fluctuate randomly, so in the medium to long run it is likely that the necessary 
systematic tendencies will prevail. For example it may be that one can derive a 
historical tendency for finance to overpower industry and state; this would have to be 
rigorously derived in the mode of presentation. The tendency would by no means 
imply that all individual nations must be dominated by finance or that, over short 
periods of time, finance will dominate in the world economy. On the contrary, there 
will be all kind of diverse aspects in play at any specific period of time and location. 
I 
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However, if the derivation is valid, these diverse factors will have been shown to 
fluctuate randomly. This fluctuation is likely to be around a trend of increasing 
financial dominance. Note that tendencies are not certainties; it is possible but 
unlikely for random aspects to be systematic over long periods. 
Concrete explanation, by locating the aspects of its specific object according to the 
hierarchy of categories established in the method of presentation, is able to identify 
both the aspects of its specific object that manifest necessary systematic activities (so 
historical tendencies), and those aspects which, however important to the individuals 
involved, have no systematic significance. In this way the method of systematic 
dialectics allows for all the diverse aspects, such as abstract pressures of capital 
accumulation and concrete (and logically indeterminate) individual biographies, to be 
simultaneously understood; indeed the logical validity of the method rests upon its 
ability to do this. Thus the method of presentation provides the basis for a 'unity of 
diverse determinations' (Marx, 1973, p.100) to be achieved. The universal and the 
particular, the abstract and the concrete, are each given their proper place in any 
concrete explanation. An example will be used to illustrate the difference of the 
method of systematic dialectics to that of critical realism in more specific terms. 
'Fordism ' and 'Post-Ford ism ' 
According to certain critical realist accounts, the new developments in economic 
performance that have occurred since around 1974 in the Western economies 
represent a change in phenomenal form to be explained by hypothesising new social 
structural arrangements and mechanisms such as a move from 'Fordism' to 'Post-
Fordism' (e.g. Jessop, 1990a; 1995). The critique presented above denies this claim 
and suggests that critical realist accounts are likely to be (more or less useful) 
descriptions of new phenomena. 13 Hypotheses will not however lead to explanation 
13 Jessop (1995) is insightful in this regard. He admits the 'abstract' and 'meso-level' concepts 
drawn from a critical realist method (argued to underlie the 'regulation approach'), such as his 
suggestion of a 'Schumpeterian workfare state', to be both speculative 'hypotheses' and to be 
descriptive rather than explanatory in character. He advocates the introduction of diverse aspects, 
especially the specific strategies of agents, to provide explanatory content to such hypotheses. Yet he 
cannot specify how the various aspects can be properly integrated. The argument of this chapter is 
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since, as argued above, critical realism provides no systematic basis upon which to 
theorise transformation and interconnection. Explanation requires the necessary 
interconnection of the phenomena to be grasped according to the method of 
systematic dialectics. Even the abstract derivation of the most basic categories 
definitive of capitalism (value and capital) articulate medium to long run tendencies 
of the capitalistic mode of social production. These derived categories help bring out 
the interconnections of different aspects of reality facilitating and calling for empirical 
investigation across many areas. For example, if it were possible to derive a historical 
tendency for finance to overpower state and industry in the mode of presentation then 
the 'Post-Fordist' move to 'globalisation' may be grasped as, amongst other things, a 
manifestation of this tendency through the many aspects in play. The relations 
between these many aspects and their relative ( systematic) importance to the 
development of the capitalist system would be easier to discern. Further empirical 
work and theoretical development would be necessitated and facilitated by this 
abstract contextualisation. The derivation is thus of most use when it comes to 
explaining the medium to long run course of events, and to understanding fuHy the 
specificity and wider significance of particular events, in a rigorous and scientific 
manner. Critical realist inspired theories (and many others) are perhaps weakest in 
this respect - theorists often resort openly to speculation or opinion. 14 
Conclusion 
The main arguments of the chapter are summarised below foHowed by a concluding 
remark. 
The chapter presents systematic dialectical transcendence of the critical realist 
method for social science. Whereas critical realist method starts out from individual 
forms, the method of systematic dialectics starts from, in principle, the entire given 
realm. Whereas the 'method of inquiry' of critical realism consists in the hypothesis 
and test, according to explanatory power, of social structures, the 'method of 
that critical realism necessarily precludes such integration; Jessop's difficulty is an outcome of his 
preferred methodology and is 'soluble' only by its systematic dialectical transcendence. 
14 See previous footnote. 
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inquiry' of systematic dialectics consists in an appropriation of all relevant material of 
the object realm with the specific intent of reaching the most simple and abstract 
category. Whereas the 'method of presentation' of critical realism is a relatively 
secondary matter with all the hard work of theory done, the 'method of presentation' 
of systematic dialectics is of fundamental significance, for it should reveal 
systematically the development and interconnection of the fundamental categories of 
the object realm. In summary, whereas critical realist method is based on the 
attempted hypotheses of non-actual structures and mechanisms, that of systematic 
dialectics is based on a reconstruction of the totality already given at the very starting 
point. For this underlying reason the method of systematic dialectics consists in the 
tracing of necessary structural interrelations through immanent structural 
transformation. If successful this procedure reveals the tendencies for historical 
transformation of the object realm. By contrast, neither transformation nor necessary 
interconnection can be accommodated by the critical realist method. 
Critical realism and systematic dialectics share the same broad scope and the same 
broad goals: knowledge of the real world and human emancipation. It is to be hoped 
that critical realists and systematic dialecticians work together towards these aims. To 
this end a careful examination and debate of their relation is vital. This chapter has 
aimed to contribute significantly to that debate. Despite the great gains of 
contemporary and Hegel inspired systematic dialectics, it has also been noted in this 
chapter that the method suffers from idealism. Chapters 6 and 7 below will serve, 
amongst other things, to recast systematic dialectics on the materialist basis of 
Ilyenkov's philosophy. These chapters will argue for a specific interpretation of the 
labour theory of value and surplus value, and will critique the inability of 
contemporary and Hegel inspired systematic dialectics to uphold that theory. 
~. 
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Chapter 6. Recasting Contemporary Social Theory: Man's Labour Theory of 
Value 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have developed a critique of the philosophy and method of 
critical realism. They have also developed the abstract basis of an alternative to 
critical realism, viz. the philosophy of materialist dialectics and the method of 
systematic dialectics. Though the idealist shortcomings of contemporary and Hegel-
inspired systematic dialectics have been noted, it remains to recast systematic 
dialectics within the materialist mould of Ilyenkov and, correspondingly, to bring out 
in more concrete terms the idealist deficiencies of contemporary and Hegel-inspired 
systematic dialectics (despite the latter's superiority over critical realism). More 
broadly, the argument thus far has promised much regarding the ultimate goal, that of 
forging a basis for addressing the global economy, but has remained at the level of 
philosophy and method, aloof from the essence of contemporary global capitalism, 
viz. capital itself, except by way of 'example'. This and the subsequent chapter focus 
upon the theory of contemporary society (capitalism), drawing together and 
developing the philosophy and method advocated in previous chapters. Marx's theory 
of contemporary society is based upon the labour theory of value. As Marx puts it, 
'[t]he basis, the starting point for the physiology of the bourgeois system - for the 
understanding of its internal coherence and life-process - is the determination of 
value by labour time' (Marx, 1972, p.166). It is therefore, prima facie, a curious fact 
that the theory is much maligned not only outside of but also within Marxism. This 
chapter argues for a recasting of contemporary socio-economic theory on Marx's 
declared basis of a labour theory of value. The next chapter will further develop and 
substantiate Marx's labour theory of value through an interpretation of the theory of 
surplus value. 
For clarity of exposition, the main argument of this chapter will not be cluttered with 
a detailed engagement with the voluminous secondary literature on value theory. 
Rather the issue of the relation of materialist to idealist interpretations of value theory 
will be brought out. In particular, it will be argued that the idealism of contemporary 
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and Hegel-inspired systematic dialecticians both explains and undermines their view 
that Marx's alleged inability to break fully with the problematic of classical political 
economy (Reuten, 2000; Reuten and Williams, 1989), or his alleged methodological 
'confusion' (Arthur, 2000), serves to invalidate Marx's key initial argument regarding 
value. Though other critiques have also portrayed systematic dialectics and more 
broadly 'value form theory' (of which systematic dialectics is a sophisticated variant) 
as idealist, the critique in this chapter is distinguished by its deployment ofIlyenkov's 
(1977; 1982) materialist dialectics. In particular, this chapter draws upon materialist 
dialectics in order to advance a distinctive interpretation of Marx's argument that 
abstract labour is the 'substance' of value. l The contemporary debate regarding 
systematic dialectics can be grasped anew in the context of this interpretation. More 
generally, the chapter aims to bring out the contemporary importance to social theory 
of these, at first sight perhaps, esoteric matters. Thus the exposition aims to locate 
the main argument within the contemporary social sciences and thereby to 
demonstrate the importance of Marx's labour theory of value to social theory. 
Nothing less than a recasting of the latter on the basis of the former is advocated 
below. 
This chapter is ordered into two main sections. The first section attempts briefly to 
assess and partially explain the status of the labour theory of value within the 
contemporary social sciences. It is suggested that the theory is, for the most part, in 
disrepute or simply ignored and that the text of Marx's opening argument in Capital 
contributes to this state of affairs because the argument does not conform to 
I Saad-Filho (2002, ch. I) also draws upon Ilyenkov in order to argue that systematic dialectics is 
idealist. It was noted in chapter 4 above that Saad-Filho's interpretation of Ilyenkov's philosophy 
differs in some important respects to that presented in chapter 4. By contrast, there are no major 
inconsistencies between Saad-Filho's interpretation of the labour theory of value and that presented 
below. However, unlike Saad-Filho, the argument below focuses upon Marx's opening paragraphs, 
and in doing so provides an essential addition to, and deepening of, Saad-Filho's interpretation. 
Very few other Anglo-American authors have made Ilyenkov's materialist dialectical 
comprehension of Marx' s labour theory of value central to their own. One outstanding exception is 
Pilling (e.g. 1980). The interpretation below, inter alia, develops Pilling's work, and that of 
Ilyenkov himself, in the light of recent debates on value theory. It can be noted that Pilling (ibid.) 
has been a catalyst for, and enduring influence upon, these debates and thereby, through Pilling, 
Ilyenkov's work has indirectly influenced contemporary value theory. However, it should also be 
noted that Pilling is best remembered as an initiator of 'value form theory' (critiqued below), 
whereas he was, in fact, primarily concerned to argue for the relevance and nature of materialist 
dialectics, as applied to contemporary political economy. Pilling's own glowing assessment of 
Ilyenkov (1977) can be found in Pilling (ibid., pp. 198-9). 
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contemporary standards of 'logic' and 'science'. The second section presents a novel 
interpretation of Marx' s labour theory of value, drawing upon Ilyenkov's materialist 
dialectics. In opposition to the common view, and to contemporary and Hegel-
inspired systematic dialectics, it is argued that Marx's labour theory of value should 
be at the core of contemporary social theory. Conclusions follow. 
Contemporary Social Theory and Marx's Labour Theory of Value 
Firstly this section will review the place of Marx' s labour theory of value within the 
contemporary social sciences. The review is brief and straightforward because the 
theory is, for the most part, in disrepute (or simply ignored). Secondly Marx's own 
initial arguments establishing the existence of value as determined by labour time are 
scrutinised, along with the various reasons why prices will, unless by chance, not be 
proportional to labour times within capitalism, amongst them the so-called 
'transformation problem'. The clear invalidity of Marx's opening arguments when 
judged by the 'logical' standards prevalent today, coupled with the empirically 
manifest divergence of prices from labour times, are suggested to explain partially 
why the labour theory of value is in disrepute. Contemporary and Hegel-inspired 
systematic dialectics is shown to reinforce, rather than counter, the view that Marx's 
key initial arguments are invalid. In the face of the objections raised within this 
section, the subsequent section aims to vindicate Marx's labour theory of value, 
drawing upon materialist dialectics and critiquing the idealism of contemporary and 
Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics. 
The Contemporary Status of Marx 's Labour Theory of Value 
Generalising across the so~ial sCiences is a straightforward and unobjectionable 
exercise when it comes to Marx's labour theory of value. Quite simply, the structure 
of academic disciplinary boundaries is not built around Marx's theory (such an idea 
would never have been entertained by, and would likely seem absurd to, many 
academics), and no individual discipline is dominated by it. More difficult and 
contentious is to characterise the disciplinary boundaries positively, though some 
such attempt is necessary given the aim of this chapter. Confining the focus to the 
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econoInlcs / non-econoInlcs ( especially sociology) split, it is possible to argue 
strongly that the marginalist revolution of the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
transforming 'political economy' into mere 'economics', was a key development, 
allowing economic science to leave any consideration of social form to other 
disciplines and to concentrate instead upon homo economicus (Clarke, 1982; Pilling, 
1980; Fine, 1980; Mavroudeas, 1990). Weber's influential typology of action comes 
closest, perhaps, to approximating a characterisation, and rationalisation, of 
traditional academic boundaries, though Weber considered himself an economist / 
historian and bemoaned being pigeon-holed as a 'sociologist' (Weber, 1978; Parsons, 
1937; Habermas, 1985). It is this traditional split between economics and 'the rest' 
that has been complexified by the recent colonising tendencies of economics (Fine, 
;200 la). 
i 
I Taken as a whole, Marxist theory has been infected by the academic disciplinary 
structure. Within 'Marxist economics' the labour theory of value remains the subject 
of debate but is not prevalent (see below). The treatment of Marx in sociology (as 
reflected for example in text books such as Giddens, 2001; Craib, 1992; and Layder, 
1994), on the other hand, is likely to be centred around more abstract and qualitative 
considerations, such as structure and agency, historical materialism, the Frankfurt 
School, structural Marxism (Althusser) and critics (E.P. Thompson, post-
structuralists),z the subsequent post-modern turn (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and 
beyond. Though Marx's qualitative characterisation of alienation and exploitation 
cannot but be recognised, any quantitative discussion of the determination price, 
wage and profit magnitudes by labour time is at best peripheral and more likely 
ignored or glossed over, perhaps as matters of 'economics' rather than 'sociology'? 
Accordingly Giddens' (1981) critique ofMarx is entitled A Contemporary Critique 
2 It is notable that, despite their great respective influences on Marxist theory, neither Althusser nor 
Thompson show much faith in the labour theory of value. Althusser (1971, pp.79-80), famously 
recommends skipping the initial chapters in Capital on value (see Pilling, 1980, pp. 130-35); 
Thompson (1978) believes that Marx, in Capital, becomes trapped in the problematic of classical 
political economy. 
3 Spencer (1998) illustrates these themes for the case of the labour process. Firstly he makes the 
general point that the split between sociology and economics has hindered study of the labour 
process. Secondly he laments the lack of value theory in contemporary labour process theory. 
113 
of Historical Materialism; Giddens has no need nor desire to bother with Marx's 
labour theory of value. 
The critical realist interpretation of Marx' s labour theory of value was borne outside 
of the economics profession (see chapter 2 above) and is a good illustration of the 
point at hand. The whole line of development, from Geras (1986), through Mepham 
(1979), to D. Sayer (1983), picked up by Bhaskar (e.g. PON, ch. 4), Jessop (e.g. 
1982), A. Sayer (1992, ch. 4), and most recently Fleetwood (2002), consists of 
theorists who have never actually employed the labour theory of value, in both its 
qualitative and quantitative aspects. Indeed, Geras (1986) has repudiated the theory; 
A. Sayer, at no point in his work (e.g 1981; 1992; 2000) affirms it, nor uses it; Jessop 
(1990a, p.183) states that the labour theory of value has been 'discredited'; and 
~Fleetwood (2002, esp. pp.57-8, p.82) explicitly denies any quantitative dimension to 
Marx's value theory.4 The exposition below demonstrates the importance of the 
labour theory of value in both qualitative and quantitative dimensions and can 
therefore be viewed as an implicit critique of critical realism and of any other method 
that obscures this importance (see also Fine, 2001b). 
For all that, there are Marxists who recognise the importance of, and employ, the 
labour theory of value in both its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. However, 
contemporary debates amongst such Marxists display fundamental disagreements, as 
well as the pernicious recalcitrance of disciplinary boundaries. The example of the 
publication of, and diverse reaction towards, Robert Brenner's The Economics of 
Global Turbulence (1998) is revealing in this regard and highly germane: as a study 
of post war economic development it is an analysis of a most important socio-
economic conjuncture, one that should, therefore, turn upon the theory of value 
employed. The debate surrounding Brenner demonstrates, firstly, that there is no 
consensus on what Marx's labour theory of value is, nor on what it implies for socio-
4 Ehrbar (e.g. 2002) is an economist who, on first appearances, is an exception in that he upholds 
the so- called 'new interpretation' of Marx's value theory. However, according to Fine, Lapavitsas 
and Saad-Filho (2000) the new interpretation risks degenerating into the very sociological 
conception of the labour theory of value (a theory of qualitative exploitation, not of economic 
quantities), indicated above. The argument below will attempt to illuminate abstract foundations of 
Fine et. al. 's view. 
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economic analysis. To take one of the more extreme examples, Brenner would claim 
(personal communication), and Tony Smith (2000c) does claim on his behalf, to 
uphold Marx's labour theory of value whilst most commentators take him to reject it 
(e.g. Fine et. al. 1999; 2000). Secondly, disciplinary boundaries have some part to 
play in these differences. Defenders of Brenner's value theory are more prevalent 
outside of the economic profession and his critics are more prevalent within it. This 
despite the fundamental differences between 'Marxist economists' themselves. The 
editorial introduction to Historical Materialism, 2000, Issue 4, reproduced as the 
Appendix to this thesis, discusses these themes in more detail. 5 
To summarise, Marx's labour theory of value is mostly considered peripheral or a 
. curiosum across the social sciences, where it is considered at all. Even amongst the 
work of many Marxists it does not figure prominently. Rarer still is it employed as, 
simultaneously, both a qualitative and quantitative theory as Marx himself viewed it 
(Marx, 1972, p.166, cited above; see also below). Amongst those who do employ the 
theory there is great divergence at the level of fundamentals. In all this, the split 
between the different academic disciplines, especially economics as studying 
economic quantities and other disciplines as embracing philosophy or qualitative 
matters of social form, has been and remains damaging even though the Marxist 
critique of bourgeois disciplinary boundaries is well versed. Marx's presentation of 
the labour theory of value in Capital must in some way contribute to the situation 
described above. Marx's arguments will be scrutinised below. 
The 'Logical'Invalidity and Empirical 'Falsehood' o/the Labour Theory o/Value 
The point of the next sub-section is not, it must be stressed, to set up criticisms of 
Marx's labour theory of value to be defended. Rather, this sub-section attempts to 
fathom how Marx's argument is perceived given the brief sketch of contemporary 
5 Another example of the recalcitrance of academic disciplinary boundaries within Marxist value 
theory can be found in the work of the various systematic dialecticians discussed in previous 
chapters and below. Moseley (1993, Introduction) indicates that the various authors, though all 
embracing similar themes, found the disciplinary divide between, in this case, economics and 
philosophy of great significance such that they realised 'how valuable the interaction between 
philosophers and economists can be on these issues' (p.13, n. 10.). Moreover, the qualitative / 
quantitative split was evidently an important factor in this regard (pp.9-1O). 
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social theory above and, correspondingly, to indicate possible ways in which the 
presentation in Capital contributes towards the current predicament ofMarx's labour 
theory of value. In addition the sub-section will show how contemporary and Hegel-
inspired systematic dialecticians reinforce the negative perception of Marx's key 
initial arguments for the labour theory of value. The subsequent section will offer an 
interpretation of Marx's labour theory of value that aims to dispel these perceptions 
and so critique contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics. 
The first three chapters of Capital appear, to the modem reader, to be quite possibly 
the most mysterious of any of the classic works in social science or the humanities. 
Marx recognises a problem of difficulty,6 and explains in the preface to the first 
edition that' [e ]very beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences' (Marx, 1998a, p.20). 7 
Marx believes, however, that he has 'popularised' the very first few pages, 
concerning the substance and magnitude of value, 'as far as it was possible' and he 
expresses more concern with the subsequent presentation of 'value-form' (ibid., 
pp.20-21). Yet the argument concerning the substance and magnitude of value 
appears to be a blatant non sequitur at worst or, at best, a clumsily expressed 
'hypothesis' (clumsy because never acknowledged as a hypothesis by Marx). Marx 
writes: 
The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production 
prevails, presents itself as 'an immense accumulation of commodities,' its unit 
being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the 
analysis of a commodity. (ibid., p.S3) 
The reference to the (unexplained) term 'mode of production', and the move from 
the general appearance of wealth as a commodity to the analysis of the latter, imply a 
prior analysis on Marx's part. Given that Capital is the follow up to Marx's A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1987), containing the famous 
6 Marx was painfully aware that his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1987) had 
flopped, no doubt for reasons of difficulty and downright obscurity; Engels was ever impressing 
upon Marx the need for accessibility (McLellan, 1976; Saad-Filho, 2002, pp. 1-6; Smith, 1990). 
7 In the preface to the second edition he notes also that, 'the method employed in Capital has been 
little understood' (Marx, 1998a, p.32), suggesting another possible source of difficulty. 
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preface on the materialist conception of history, it would appear obvious that the 
latter is the what Marx has in mind (contra Gunn, 1992, and Negri, 1991). Marx 
firstly discusses the use value of commodities, ending this ~iscussion as follows: 
Use-values become a reality only by use or consumption: they also constitute 
the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth. In 
the form of society we are about to consider, they are, in addition, the 
material depositories of exchange-value. (ibid., p.55) 
Some unfamiliar expressions are evident in this passage. The notion of use values 
'becoming a reality' (being realised) in use; the notion of the 'substance' of wealth; 
the notion of 'social form' and finally the characterisation of capitalist use values as 
'material depositories' of exchange value. It is in discussion of exchange value that 
Marx appears to move from unfamiliar language to invalid argument. Marx's 
argument is brief enough to be worth reproducing in full. Firstly Marx writes: 
Exchange-value, at first sight, presents itself as a quantitative relation, as the 
proportion in which values in use of one sort are exchanged for those of 
another sort, a relation constantly changing with time and place. Hence 
exchange-value appears to be something accidental and purely relative, and 
consequently an intrinsic value, i.e., an exchange-value that is inseparably 
connected with, inherent in commodities, seems a contradiction in terms. Let 
us consider the matter a little more closely. (ibid., pp.55-6) 
. So far so good. Marx is clearly arguing that the evident variability of the quantitative 
exchange relation between any two commodities through space and over time 
appears to rule out the view that commodities have an intrinsic value. It should be 
noted that Marx has already established that exchange value does have an inseparable 
connection with use value. This is so because Marx has already characterised the 
latter as the 'material depository' of the former. Due to the apparent contradiction he 
is motivated to examine the notion of exchange value further: 
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A given commodity, e.g., a quarter of wheat is exchanged for x blacking, y 
silk, or z gold, &c.-in short, for other commodities in the most different 
proportions. Instead of one exchange-value, the wheat has, therefore, a great 
many. But since x blacking, y silk, or z gold &c., each represents the 
exchange-value of one quarter of wheat, x blacking, y silk, z gold, &c., must, 
as exchange-values, be replaceable by each other, or equal to each other. 
Therefore, first: the valid exchange-values of a given commodity express 
something equal; secondly, exchange-value, generally, is only the mode of 
expression, the phenomenal form, of something contained in it, yet 
distinguishable from it. 
Let us take two commodities, e.g., corn and iron. The proportions in which 
they are exchangeable, whatever those proportions may be, can always be 
represented by an equation in which a given quantity of corn is equated to 
some quantity of iron: e.g., 1 quarter corn = x cwt. iron. What does this 
equation tell us? It tells us that in two different things- in 1 quarter of corn 
and x cwt. of iron, there exists in equal quantities something common to both. 
The two things must therefore be equal to a third, which in itself is neither the 
one nor the other. Each of them, so far as it is exchange-value, must therefore 
be reducible to this third. 
A simple geometrical illustration will make this clear. In order to calculate and 
compare the areas of rectilinear figures, we decompose them into triangles. 
But the area of the triangle itself is expressed by something totally different 
from its visible figure, namely, by half the product of the base multiplied by 
the altitude. In the same way the exchange-values of commodities must be 
capable of being expressed in terms of something common to them all, of 
which thing they represent a greater or less quantity. (ibid., p.S6) 
Undoubtedly many people, myself included, have pored over these paragraphs 
searching for their meaning and validity (e.g. Elson, 1979; Kliman, 2000; Rubin, 
1982). Whatever the final conclusions of such intellectual effort the immediate 
reaction of even the most sympathetic reader is likely to be one of puzzlement. The 
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argument that Marx presents, illustrated by the (infuriatingly named!) 'simple 
geometrical example', does not seem to be quite as watertight as Marx obviously 
believes. A 'logical' counter argument is readily formed: there is no 'logical' 
necessity for the identity of diverse commodities, as exchange values, to be underlain 
by some 'third thing', common to them all, of which exchange value is merely the 
'mode of expression' or 'phenomenal form' (Schumpeter, 1951, develops this view; 
Samuel Bailey had engaged Marx's mind with similar views, see Rubin, 1982, p.l08, 
and Kliman, 2000). It is 'logically' possible for commodities to have (many) exchange 
value( s) without any common substance; this much any beginner in a contemporary 
'philosophical' or 'formal' logic course would soon learn to recognise, on being 
presented with an argument such as Marx's. More pertinently, perhaps, there is no 
physical or, more generally, 'natural' necessity for the common substance, according 
to the conception of scientific laws contained in the best known philosophies of 
science, whether prescriptive (Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos) or descriptive (the current 
'recovery of practice,).8 At best it would seem that Marx is making clumsily a 
hypothesis for which he should not claim necessity.9 
Systematic dialecticians echo the common sentiments regarding Marx's invocation of 
a 'third thing' expressed above. Arthur (l993b, pp.76-7), for example, recounts the 
above argument against the invocation of a 'third thing' and writes, 'it seems to me 
that this argument has much more force than most Marxists allow'. According to 
Arthur, in initially considering exchange value, 'we have only the postulate of identity 
in essence and of common measure' and 'there need not, however, be any such 
identity or resulting immanent determination of exchange ratios' (ibid., p.76). Arthur 
argues, in short, that Marx is wrong to claim necessity for the 'third thing' at this 
early stage of the theory. Only later theoretical developments can establish such 
necessity on Arthur's view. The presentations developed by other systematic 
8 Regarding the descriptive / prescriptive distinction see Backhouse (1994) and Lawson, Peacock 
and Pratten (1996). 
9 The notion that Marx is making a 'hypothesis' accords with the critical realist method of 
'retroduction', discussed in previous chapters above, whereby the social scientist is recommended to 
'hypothesise' essential social structures on the basis of given 'forms'. It can be noted, however, that 
Marx refers to a common third 'thing' of definite magnitude contained in the commodity, rather 
than directly to a social relation, thereby problematising such a straightforward critical realist 
interpretation. 
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dialecticians similarly eschew Marx's key initial argument (e.g. Reuten, 1993; Reuten 
and Williams, 1989; see also below). 
Marx continues: 
This common 'something' cannot be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any 
other natural property of commodities. Such properties claim our attention 
only in so far as they affect the utility of those commodities, make them use-
values. But the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterised by a 
total abstraction from use-value. Then one use-value is just as good as 
another, provided only it be present in sufficient quantity ... As use-values, 
commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange-values they 
are merely different quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of 
use-value. 
If then we leave out of consideration the use-value of commodities, they have 
only one common property left, that of being products of labour. But even the 
product of labour itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make 
abstraction from its use-value, we make abstraction at the same time from the 
material elements and shapes that make the product a use-value; we see in it 
no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a 
material thing is put out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the 
product of the labour of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any other 
definite kind of productive labour. Along with the useful qualities of the 
products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the 
various kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that 
labour; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to 
one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the abstract. 
Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the 
same unsubstantial reality in each, a mere congelation of homogeneous human 
labour, of labour-power expended without regard to the mode of its 
expenditure. All that these things now tell us is, that human labour-power has 
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been expended in their production, that human labour is embodied in them. 
When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they 
are-Values. (Marx, 1998a, pp.56-8) 
There are further curious turns of phrase on first reading of these paragraphs. In 
particular, there are references to 'unsubstantial reality', to 'crystals' of 'social 
substance' and to what Marx will soon stress is 'abstract labour'. Once again there 
appears to be an invalid argument mixed in with the peculiar terminology. To call 
labour the only common 'thing' shared by commodities raises the obvious objection 
other common 'things' can be pointed out. What about scarcity, utility, being 
appropriated (Bohm-Bawerk, 1984, pp.74-5), simply existing on the planet, being 
under the stars, etc? (Kay, 1979, points out the latter examples if only for ridicule). 
What in any case has this 'reductive abstraction' got to do with reality? (Reuten, 
1993, p.97) Again, even if one is sympathetic to Marx's argument, it must be 
admitted, it would seem, that it is illegitimate for Marx to claim necessity for his 
conclusion. At best the conclusion is plausible though it is unlikely to be plausible to 
anyone with either minimal economics or philosophy training: in the former case, 
economic theory teaches that utility is the obvious common 'thing'; in the latter case, 
the 'logical' error of claiming necessity where there is none would be overwhelming 
evidence of muddled thinking. Thus both Marx's move from exchange value to some 
'third thing' and his argument that this third thing is labour, i.e. two initial and 
seemingly crucial steps in order to establish his labour theory of value, appear to be 
quite weak. 
Once more contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic dialecticians echo, indeed 
reinforce, these criticisms. None of the contributors to Moseley (1993) - including 
systematic dialecticians such as Arthur, Murray, Reuten, Smith and Campbell -
vindicates Marx's claim of necessity for his early conclusion that labour is the 
substance of value (see Moseley, 1993, Introduction). As noted above Reuten (1993, 
p.97) specifically objects to the 'reductive abstraction' that Marx appears to have 
undertaken. Furthermore, some systematic dialecticians attempt to diagnose the 
problem that leads Marx into his alleged error. Arthur (1998) concludes that Marx is 
methodologically 'confused' especially regarding the relationship of Hegel's method 
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to that employed by Mane Reuten (1993, p.lIO; 2000) and Reuten and Williams 
(1989) suggest that Marx's reference to labour as the 'substance' of value 
'embodied' in the product is symptomatic of Marx's alleged inability to free himself 
completely of the legacy of classical political economy. Thus Marx was unable to 
embrace a truly rigorous and Hegelian systematic dialectical exposition, on the view 
these authors. 
Marx goes on, in the next but one paragraph, to make the quantitative dimension 
explicit: 
A use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labour 
in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it. How, then, is the 
magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the value-
creating substance, the labour, contained in the article. The quantity of labour, 
however, is measured by its duration, and labour-time in its turn finds its 
standard in weeks, days, and hours. (ibid., p.58) 
Primafacie this paragraph, in conjunction with those cited above (where Marx states 
that the exchange relation between two commodities entails they contain a third thing 
- now established as value - in 'equal quantities', ibid., p.56), would seem to indicate 
unambiguously that Marx is attempting, amongst other things, to explain exchange 
ratios by relative labour times embodied (though many defenders of Marx have 
denied this, a recent example being Kliman, 2000, fn. 7). This quantitative dimension 
to the labour theory of value invites the obvious criticism that it is empirically false. 
Certainly, labour time is an important contributor to the cost price of a commodity 
(through wages) but not, it seems evident, the only contributor; machines, land and 
entrepreneurship also appear to contribute, as contemporary economic theory 
recognises. 10 Furthermore many things have a price which is clearly independent of 
labour time, e.g. non-produced commodities or works of art. Yet perhaps the most 
damning evidence is provided by Marx himself1 In Capital, Volume 3, Marx 
10 To say that contemporary economic theory 'recognises' the appearance that labour is not the only 
contributor to value is not to imply the truth of this appearance. Rather, it will be argued below that 
the appearance is illusory. 
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introduces the evident reality that different production processes entail different 
proportions between means of production used up and labour expended in 
production (different 'compositions of capital'). On correcting for what appears to be 
an elementary error in Marx's calculations (a failure to transform the input prices -
Sweezy, 1968; Meek, 1956) it becomes plain that this fact alone, even excluding all 
above mentioned factors and reducing means of production to 'dated labour', is 
enough to ensure that relative prices will necessarily deviate from relative labour 
times. Contemporary and Hegel inspired systematic dialecticians do not, in general, 
concur with these criticisms of Marx. The criticisms will be addressed in chapter 7 
below as a development of the argument within this chapter. 
All in all, there is an extremely powerful argument, on both 'logical' and empirical 
grounds, that the labour theory of value is wrong. This power serves as one 
important and straightforward explanation for the prima facie curious fact, 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, that the theory is in general disrepute. 
The argument has further and wider implications. If the argument were accepted then 
the only curiosity would be that the labour theory of value ever became popular to 
begin with and, further, that Marx did not recognise the problem and abandon the 
theory. Possible explanations might be the theoretical infancy of economic theory in 
Marx's lifetime and / or Marx's alleged normative prejudices and / or Marx's alleged 
mathematical incompetence. Whatever the explanation for Marx's apparent error, 
acceptance of the argument would entail that a true Marxist today should recognise 
Marx's limitations and abandon the labour theory of value, whilst retaining all the 
deep in sights that Marx provides. These insights, on acceptance of the argument, can 
only be strengthened by being freed from an outmoded and deeply flawed theory of 
value. 11 
11 The early history of the Conference of Socialist Economists witnessed debate around just these 
themes, with Steedman (1977) and Hodgson (1974) articulating most fully the ('left neo-Ricardian') 
case against Marx's labour theory of value. See Clarke (1980) and Fine and Harris (1979) for 'eye-
witness' accounts of, and contributions to, these debates; Mohun (2000) provides a useful 
perspective from the point of view of current developments in Marxist economics. In these debates 
the economics / sociology, quantity / quality splits were also in evidence (ibid.) 
123 
Marx's Labour Theory of Value 
This section interprets Marx's key initial arguments regarding value as a development 
of 'materialist dialectics' for the capitalist mode of production - 'materialist 
dialectics' having already been argued to be the only philosophy that avoids 
scepticism in the previous chapters. The interpretation is advanced via a critique of 
contemporary and Hegel inspired systematic dialectics which, as shown above, 
opposes Marx's initial arguments on value. Systematic dialectics draws upon a 
sophisticated version of 'value form theory,12 and the critique of systematic dialectics 
below is, if accepted, an essential addition to existing critiques of value form theory, 13 
through its novel deployment of Ilyenkov's materialist dialectics and corresponding 
novel interpretation of Marx's initial arguments regarding value. An affirmation of 
Marx's labour theory of value, as the fundamental basis for the study of 
contemporary society, is argued to flow from this interpretation. 
Firstly materialist dialectics will be summarised. Secondly Marx's initial arguments 
regarding value will be considered in turn: his choice of starting point, his argument 
that a 'third thing' must underlie exchange value and his argument that labour must 
be the 'third thing' will be vindicated. The idealist deficiencies of contemporary and 
Hegel inspired systematic dialectics will be critiqued at each stage. 
Materialist Dialectics and the Labour Theory of Value 
Elson (1979, p.123) approvingly cites Marx thus: 
[A]s individuals express their life, so they are. What they are therefore 
coincides with their production, both what they produce and how they 
produce. (Marx and Engels, 1998, p.62) 
12 Taylor (2000) provides a clear presentation of value fonn theory and of Hegel inspired systematic 
dialectics. Important examples of value fonn theory, in addition to the systematic dialecticians 
focused upon in this chapter, include Backhaus (1974), de Brunhoff (e.g. 1978), Eldred (1984), 
Eldred and Hanlon (1981), Lipietz (1985) and de Vroey (e.g. 1982). 
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Thus Elson affirms the well recognised fact that Marx's Capital, including therefore 
his labour theory of value, was developed in the context of a 'materialist conception 
of history' (Marx, 1987; Marx and Engels, 1998; for an opposing view see Gunn, 
1992 and Negri, 1991). This context is registered in the very first line of the first 
chapter of Capital where Marx uses the unexplained term 'mode of production' 
(cited above). More controversially, given the current general antipathy towards 
dialectics in general and 'dialectical materialism' in particular (an understandable 
antipathy due to the Stalinist appropriation of the term), it is affirmed below, 
following Ilyenkov (1977; 1982), that Marx's was a materialist dialectics. Marx's 
approval of Engels' dialectical materialism (expressed in Anti-Duhring and Dialectics 
of Nature), and Marx's well known view that Hegelian dialectics needed inverting 
from idealism to materialism (Marx, 1998a, p.36) support this view. 
Elson (1979), as is also fairly typical of literature on the labour theory of value, 
makes no sustained attempt to articulate the meaning of the 'materialist conception of 
history' even as she invokes its fundamental importance. Rather, she argues that 
Capital is about the determination of 'labour' in the current epoch without any 
further detail on just what 'labour' is or what it implies, other than a few sparse and 
unsupported quotes from the German Ideology. Elson is, of course, justified in 
abstracting from such concerns (due simply to constraints of time, space and the need 
for clarity) but this does not mean that they are unimportant. A fuller picture of 
Marx's labour theory of value can be achieved by incorporating a clear conception of 
labour at the highly abstract, transhistorical level. Indeed, the relevance of such a 
conception to the labour theory of value and so to Capital has motivated the earlier 
chapters of the present study and will be illustrated below. 14 
14 Rubin (1982, p.l), writing in Russia during the 1920s, notes that, from Hilferding onwards, there 
had been a recognition of the importance of Marx's transhistorical concept of labour for the 
comprehension Marx's labour theory of value. Rubin himself provides his own elaborate 
interpretation of this concept, to be considered below. This tradition was, of course, interrupted by 
the Soviet authorities - Rubin himself was arrested in 1930, then exiled and eventually killed (ibid., 
p.xxxx). 
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Marx and Engel's 'new materialism' (1998, p.170), or 'materialist dialectics', as 
interpreted by Ilyenkov (1977, 1982; see chapter 4 above) can be summarised via 
Marx's 'Theses on Feurerbach', especially Thesis 1 and Thesis 10 (Marx and Engels, 
1998, pp. 167-70): 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach 
included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form 
of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, 
practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the 
active side was developed abstractly by idealism-which, of course, does not 
know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, 
really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human 
activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in Das Wesen des Christenthums, 
he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while 
practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence 
he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary', of 'practical-critical', 
activity. 
(Thesis 1) 
The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the 
new is human society, or social humanity. (Thesis 10) 
Three key distinctions are made here. IS Firstly there is 'old materialism'. Of modem 
philosophers, this characterises most obviously Locke (but Hume and Berkeley show 
where Locke's static materialism logically ends). Locke recognises that there are real 
material objects, external to the mind, that the mind must grasp, but he does not 
recognise the philosophical significance of the transformation of these objects by 
human labour. Rather, for Locke, humanity is considered passively to contemplate an 
external material world. On Iyenkov's conception Spinoza had, prior to Marx and 
Engels, reached furthest in comprehending the material activity of thinking beings (so 
15 The discussion that follows draws upon Ilyenkov (1977) and chapters 3-5 above. 
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overcommg Humean scepticism) but still could only see this activity as 
accommodating nature, rather than transforming it. 
Secondly there is idealism, most importantly 'clever' idealism as Lenin described it 
(cited in Iyenkov, 1977, p.254), the culmination of which is Hegel's philosophy. In 
this case the dynamism, the transformative activity of the subject, is recognised, as 
captured fully in Hegel's notion of the 'Idea' (cf Marx, 1998a, p.36). Hegel 
inevitably expounded dialectics because dynamism, interrelations and development 
are themes that only a dialectical logic can grasp (Pilling, 1980, p.137, citing Lenin, 
1972, pp.259-60). However, Hegel cannot, ultimately, sustain the mind-independent 
material world so, in this respect, idealism is more profoundly wrong than the old 
materialism and Hegel's is an idealist dialectic. 
Thirdly there is the new materialism, or materialist dialectics. In this case dialectical 
logic is retained, there is a philosophy of motion, of dynamism, interrelations and 
development, but now this is put on a materialist basis. This means, firstly, that the 
material world is recognised as dynamic, interrelated and developing, so that matter 
can be more precisely grasped, at the most simple and abstract level, as 'matter-in-
motion'.16 Secondly humanity, or any other body that has reached the same or greater 
level of complexity as humanity, is grasped as the most developed form of matter 
(nature). Through labour, humanity (or any like body) transforms both nature and 
itself In this way nature self-transforms through the labour of one of its own bodies 
(the human body, or any like body). It must be stressed that 'labour' refers not just to 
human labour. Rather, it refers to any material body that has attained the level of 
complexity to transform the rest of nature, and itself, according to its own 
(developing) wants and needs. 
The retention of dynamism, interrelations and development but now on a materialist 
rather than idealist basis, implies that dialectical logic is preserved but now, likewise, 
on a materialist rather than (Hegelian) idealist basis. The crucial feature of dialectics 
is the stress on interrelations and development, which, in the case at hand, will be 
16 Engels (1998, p.74) states that 'motion is the mode of existence of matter' . 
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seen to entail the development of the 'law of value' (from 'abstract' to 'concrete'). 
Amongst the current literature on Marx's method, contemporary and Hegel-inspired 
systematic dialectics has articulated the notion of developing a comprehension of 
capitalism systematically from abstract to concrete with great clarity (see chapter 5 
above). However, as noted in the previous section above, Marx's theory of value has 
been judged defective by systematic dialecticians, perhaps due to Marx's alleged 
incomplete break with classical political economy and consequent retention of a 
'physical substance-embodiment metaphor' (Reuten, 1993, p.110). The perspective 
of materialist dialectics suggests, to the contrary, that Hegel-inspired systematic 
dialecticians fail to interpret Marx's theory of value correctly due to their idealism, 
their adherence to an idealist rather than materialist dialectics. According to the 
interpretation of Marx's argument below, materialist dialectics is able to vindicate 
Marx's key initial arguments regarding value and thereby demonstrate that Hegel-
inspired systematic dialecticians cannot comprehend value and hence cannot grasp 
capitalism due to their idealism. 
It can first be noted that, contra the initial appearances outlined in the previous 
section, Marx himself was, well before he came to write Capital, keenly aware of the 
major 'problems' with the labour theory of value though he did not see them as such. 
As argued below Marx had no truck with the idle and empty 'logic' that would deny 
the very existence of value (a logic characteristic of the 'vulgar economy' of his day). 
On the other hand, Marx well recognised the importance of the apparent concrete 
falsehood of the labour theory of value. Ricardo, who was much admired by Marx,!7 
had long since articulated what is, in essence, the 'transformation problem' as 
described above and Ricardo' s critics, chief amongst them Malthus, had used it 
against Ricardo to powerful effect, opening the theoretical way for 'vulgar economy' 
(pilling, 1980; Clarke, 1982; Fine, 1980). For Marx, this concrete false appearance of 
an abstract truth indicated a contradiction to be embraced and developed (sublated)-
in other words to be explained or theorised. It was an example ofMarx's dictum that 
'all science would be superfluous if the outer appearances of things coincided with 
17 Marx considered Smith and Ricardo the 'best representatives' of classical political economy 
(Marx, 1998a, p.1l6, n. 1). 
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their inner essence' (Marx, 1998b, p.1095). Marx not only recognised incongruity of 
the labour theory of value with concrete appearances, he comprehended why this 
was, for Ricardo's theory, an insoluble problem. IS For, Ricardo had no conception of 
'developing' theory from abstract to concrete. As Marx puts it: 
Here [for Ricardo] the contradiction between the general law and further 
developments in the concrete circumstances is to be resolved not by the 
discovery of the connecting links but by directly subordinating and 
immediately adapting the concrete to the abstract ... (Marx, 1972, p.87-8, 
emphasis added, cited in Pilling, op. cit., p.31 and in IIyenkov, op. cit., p.326) 
A materialist dialectic interpretation of Marx's development of the law of value, his 
tracing of the 'connecting links' between the abstract labour theory of value (which 
Marx always referred to the 'law of value') and its concrete developments, so as to 
comprehend the essential features of capitalistic society, is presented below. The 
subsequent chapter will trace Marx's further developments regarding value-form, 
exploitation and the transformation of value into price of production. 
The Starting Point of Marx 's Argument in 'Capital' 
Marx's starting point for comprehending (presenting) the capitalist mode of 
production is the commodity as the elementary form of capitalistic wealth (Marx, 
1998a, p.53, cited above). The precise status of this 'commodity' with which Marx 
begins is important. In examining the commodity, Marx is abstracting out the most 
common appearance of the product of labour under capitalism. Here the term 
'appearance' refers to the consciousness, to the (everyday) experience of people 
within capitalist society. Of course, people experience many individual and particular 
things. The commodity that is Marx's starting point is an abstraction from nearly all 
of these particularities to leave only the characteristic form taken by the product 
under capitalism. What is this? The commodity as a thing that is both a use value and 
18 Ricardo's problem was, according to Marx, 'much more difficult to solve than that of squaring the 
circle which can be solved algebraically. It is simply an attempt to present that which does not exist 
as in fact existing' (Marx, 1972, p.87, cited in Pilling, 1980, p.30 and in Ilyenkov, 1977, p.325). 
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an exchange value. Whatever the particular characteristics of any individual 
commodity, it has this two-fold character. 
Materialist dialectics indicates that Marx is interested in the specific mode of 
production, hence the specific form of labour within capitalism. The fact that Marx 
begins with the product (the commodity), rather than the production process, 
indicates that, in order to comprehend the capitalistic production process, it is first 
necessary to comprehend the peculiar nature of the capitalist commodity, this is 
indicated by Marx: 
The value-form of the product of labour is not only the most abstract, but is 
also the most universal form, taken by the product in bourgeois production 
and stamps that production as a particular species of social production, and 
thereby gives it its special historical character. (Marx, 1998a, p.117) 
The systematic dialectical aspect of Marx's work entails that he has already gone 
through an entire method of enquiry in order to reach this, the most simple and 
abstract 'cell-form' of capitalism and starting point of the method of presentation (see 
previous chapters; Marx, 1973, pp.81-lI1; Echeverria, 1978; for an opposing view, 
Carver, 1980). The method of enquiry entailed the philosophical development of 
materialist dialectics itself (see references to Marx's earlier work given above) along 
with the systematic study (appropriation) of human history, the attempts to 
comprehend that history and to comprehend the current socio-economic conjuncture, 
including, most importantly, the work of the classical political economists. Foremost 
amongst the latter were Adam Smith and David Ricardo. These political economists 
were materialists who advocated and developed the labour theory of value, in doing 
so uncovering its problems (leading Smith to reject the theory) as outlined above 
(Clarke, 1982; Dobb, 1973; Fine, 1982; 1996; Pilling, 1980). 
Though there are many similarities between Hegel inspired systematic dialectics and 
materialist dialectics regarding both the method of enquiry and the starting point, 
there are important differences. Reuten (1993, p.96) sums up these differences very 
clearly: 
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Is this, the commodity, the most abstract all-embracing concept for the 
capitalist mode of production? I doubt it. For example, does it embrace in 
itself a notion of the activity of the creation of useful objects in capitalist 
form? 
For Reuten, and other such systematic dialecticians, the starting point should be an 
'abstract universal notion', embracing all the particulars, if only abstractly. The 
'commodity' with which Marx begins does not do this because (to answer Reuten's 
rhetorical question) it does not embrace 'within itself the notion of production. For 
Reuten, this is evidence for the suggestion that Marx has not broken sufficiently from 
the method of classical political economy. However, a simpler interpretation is that 
Marx's materialist dialectics is different to contemporary and Hegel-inspired 
systematic dialectics. Marx's materialist dialectics is rooted in the characteristic and 
dominant 'appearance forms' of ongoing day to day contemporary social 
production and social life. In our ongoing day to day activity we continually 
encounter commodities, amongst many other particular and individual things. As 
noted above, Marx starts with this characteristic form of the product, the commodity 
as such, abstracting from all other aspects encountered. Later in the presentation 
Marx will introduce further 'forms', i.e. further experiences and activities dominant in 
the day to day life of individuals within capitalism. In particular he will 'derive' the 
form of simple circulation (C-M-C) and then introduce the form of capital (M-C-M'). 
On the interpretation offered here, Marx's key conclusions rest on the firmest of 
foundations, for they rest on nothing more than the indisputable presence of these 
manifest forms, these ongoing experiences and activities which are so common that 
they are seldom rigorously problematised at all. Marx does no more than comprehend 
the nature of these forms, uncovering the relations of production, the specific society 
that their prevalence necessarily (tautologically) implies. 19 
19 Ilyenkov appears to predict Reuten's Hegel-inspired criticism of Marx, cited above. According to 
Ilyenkov (1982, p.83), '[a] Hegel adept would say about the first sections of Capital that definitions 
of one particular form of value are there taken to be universal definitions of value, while they are not 
universal definitions at all'. In opposition to such a view, Ilyenkov argues that, according to 
materialist dialectics, 'direct commodity exchange ... [is] ... a phenomenon in considering which 
one may obtain a universal definition of value' (ibid.). The above interpretation of Marx's starting 
point concurs also with Lenin (1972, pp.360-61, cited approvingly both by Ilyenkov, ibid., p.85, and 
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The Existence of the 'Third Thing' 
Thus far, it has been argued that the standpoint of materialist dialectics is able to 
make sense of Marx's starting point and aims. But what of the powerful arguments 
against the labour theory of value? As described above, Marx moves on to argue that 
a third thing must underlie the exchange value of the commodity. The first charge laid 
against the theory, recounted above, concerned the point that it is both 'logically' and 
'naturally' possible for commodities to have (many) exchange value(s) without any 
underlying common substance. From the standpoint of materialist dialectics such an 
empty 'logic' simply displays its irrelevance in this instance. On the materialist 
dialectical view it is an absolute material necessity for common powers to be 
underlain by a common material form. According to the materialist argument objects 
are specific forms of matter. Matter is inherently in motion; it is matter-in-motion. An 
object, or specific form of matter, is therefore the unity of a specific form of motion 
and a specific spatial form. The powers or 'ways of acting' of an object, its motion, 
are in unity with its spatial attributes. This is not so much a profound philosophical 
principle as a statement of the obvious: powers do not spring up on their own, rather 
they are inherent expressions of definite forms of matter. 20 
In the case at hand, commodities must be underlain by a common and determinate 
material property enabling their common power, or way of acting, of 
'exchangeability' in definite proportions. This common property must be 
'deterrninate,21 which means that the variations in the particular form taken by the 
Saad-Filho, 2002, p.1l3): 'Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most 
common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of 
times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of 
bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all the contradictions) of 
modem society'. On the surface, there is some resonance of this view with the critical realist notion 
offounding social science upon 'demi-regularities', in this case the 'demi-regularity' of commodity 
exchange. However, the critical realist view utterly fails to register the synthetic side to abstraction 
(in this case, the abstraction of the commodity), so the appearance of resonance is illUSOry. See 
chapter 5 above and Brown, Slater and Spencer (forthcoming). 
20 This statement is a basic summary of the relevant aspects of Ilyeokov's Spinozist based materialist 
dialectics (see chapter 4 above). Prevalent views within contemporary philosophy and prevalent 
contemporary interpretations of Marx do not affirm the statement. 
21 The notion of 'determinate' abstraction used here adapts the straightforward distinction between 
'determinate' and 'determinable' abstraction employed by Dancy (1987, ch. 3) in the course of his 
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property In each respective commodity (e.g. the particular respective length or 
weight or age of each commodity) must be systematically related to the 
corresponding respective exchange values of each commodity. The circumstance that 
each commodity has length as such is not, for example, enough to suggest that length 
is the sought after 'third thing' underlying exchange value. Only if variations in 
exchange value were systematically related to variations in the length of the 
commodity could length be the common material form. A relationship of 
proportionality between the magnitude of the underlying material property and the 
magnitude of exchange value is the simplest possible systematic relationship that may 
obtain but proportionality is not necessary. All that is necessary, according to the 
materialist argument, is that some or other systematic relationship obtains between 
the underlying determinate material property and the magnitude of exchange value. 
This is because matter exists only in particular forms so that to abstract from all such 
forms (to have no systematic relationship any such form) is to abstract from (have no 
systematic relationship with) matter itself.22 Such an abstraction is precisely what 
materialism forbids. 23 
interpretation of Berkeley's critique of Locke. There are a number of more complex definitions of 
the term within the literature on value (e.g. Gunn, 1992, and Murray, 1988). The precise way in 
which Dancy's distinction has been 'adapted' will be indicated below. 
22 It can now be seen how Dancy's (1987, ch. 3) straightforward notion of 'determinate abstraction' 
has been adapted in the above discussion. For Dancy, abstraction is a mental operation - particulars 
are 'abstracted from' in thought. In the above discussion, however, to 'abstract from' means to 'have 
no systematic relationship with' - thus this notion refers to a relationship that holds in immediate 
reality, rather than to a mental operation. In the literature on value this has sometimes been called 
'real' (e.g. Artbur, 2001) or 'actual' (e.g. Reuten and Williams, 1989) abstraction. 
23 Like Marx, Ilyenkov (1977; 1982) does not spell out in such explicit detail the line of reasoning 
made explicit above with regard to exchange value, no doubt because it is, for a materialist, a 
statement of the obvious. In the course of his discussion of the relationship between thought and 
being, however, Ilyenkov does make explicit the same mode of argument. Ilyenkov cites Marx: 
'What is the distance between the syllable A and a table? The question would be nonsensical. In 
speaking of the distance of two things we speak of their difference in space ... Thus we equalise 
them as being both existences of space, and only after having equalised them sub specie spatii 
[under the aspect of space], we distinguish them as different points of space. To belong to space is 
their unity' (Marx, 1971, p.142). Ilyenkov expands upon Marx's point '[i]n other words, when we 
wish to establish a relation of some sort between two objects we always compare not the "specific" 
qualities that make one object "syllable A" and the other a "table", "steak", or a "square", but only 
those qualities that express a third something, different from their existence as the things 
enumerated. The things compared are regarded as different modifications of this "third" property 
common to them all, inherent in them as it were. So if there is no "third" in the nature of the two 
things common to them both, the very differences between them become quite senseless' (Ilyenkov, 
1977, p.18). In the case at hand, the intelligibility of the exchange relation of commodities requires 
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On the interpretation offered here, Marx's argument takes for granted this, to him, 
patently obvious materialist principle (in previous chapters, above, it was argued that 
the only alternative is a collapse to Humean scepticism).24 This materialism is 
indicated at the outset (the reference to 'mode of production' cited above) and 
suffuses the whole of Capital. What Marx is interested in bringing out, in the 
paragraphs under discussion, is how this common property is 'contained' in a 
commodity only to be manifested or to appear as exchange value. The commodity 
appears as something with an exchange value. But, as Marx points out, in actual fact, 
the commodity has as many exchange values as there are other types of commodity. 
Reference to 'the' value of the commodity must in fact be reference to something 
inherent in the commodity, rather than being shorthand for 'exchange value'. The 
notion of the value of a commodity is then either a misnomer (as Bailey argued) or, 
given the above argument, it is an unwitting reference to the common material 
property that underpins exchange value (whatever this 'third thing' may be). 
Systematic dialecticians do not recognise the materialist principle articulated above. 
This is demonstrated starkly by Arthur (personal communication), who comments on 
this argument directly: 
a 'third thing' as which they can be compared and materialism requires that this 'third thing' is 
material. 
24 Rubin interprets the argument for a 'third thing' as follows: '[L]et us take exchange in the form in 
which it actually takes place in a commodity economy. Then we will see that every object can be 
equalised with all other objects. In other words, we see an infinity of proportions of exchange of the 
given products with others. But these proportions of exchange are not accidental; they are regular 
and their regularity is determined by causes which lie in the production process. Thus we reach the 
conclusion that the value of a quarter of wheat is expressed once in two pounds of coffee, another 
time in three chairs, and so on, independently of the fact that the value of a quarter of wheat has 
remained the same in all these cases. If we assumed that in each of the infinite proportions of 
exchange, the quarter of wheat has another value (and this is what Bailey's statement can be 
reduced to), then we would admit complete chaos in the phenomenon of price formation, in the 
grandiose phenomenon of the exchange of products by means of which the comprehensive 
interrelation of all forms of labour is carried out' (Rubin, 1982, p.1IO). Rubin is correct in noting 
that, unless 'value' (the 'third thing') exists no explanation of exchange would be possible; complete 
chaos, or at least, complete unintelligibility would ensue. This is precisely what the materialist 
conception of matter-in-motion (more complexly, the notion that powers are expressions of material 
forms) recognises. The materialist dialectic conception goes much further, in that it coherently 
applies that principle of 'intelligibility' to all things, and recognises that the only 'alternative' is 
(Humean) irrationality. 
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I see know reason why an artificial form thrown up in exchange necessarily 
has a common substance. The supposed 'power' of exchangeability would be 
a fetish imputed on the basis of what exchangers do. 
It is important to consider carefully the implications of this, at first sight, quite 
plausible comment. In essence the comment implies that society is able to create 
systematically ('throw up') something (a 'form') that has no necessary relation to 
matter. This further implies that society is able systematically to create something that 
abstracts entirely from (is entirely unrelated to) material production. Arthur's view 
expresses precisely idealism according to the materialist philosophy advocated within 
this chapter and within this thesis overall. Indeed, in the history of philosophy the 
paradigmatic case of a 'thing' which abstracts entirely from matter is precisely the 
ideal, or 'mind', and the paradigmatic argument in favour of such a 'substance' is 
that offered by Descartes (see chapter 4 above). These issues will be discussed 
further below. 
The Identification of Congealed Abstract Labour as the 'Third Thing' 
The second major criticism ofMarx's logic raised above concerned his argument that 
labour was the only common property contained in all commodities, when there 
would appear to be other candidates. As argued above, Marx is not searching for just 
any old predicate applicable to all commodities; he is not following a formal logic. 
Nor does he hold a typical interpretation of the laws of nature, whereby 'powers' can 
spring up on their own. Rather, the only 'thing' that will count for Marx is a common 
determinate material property to which the power in question - quantitatively 
determinate universal exchangeablity - is tied. The various suggested alternative 
'common properties' (ignoring the ridiculous) - utility, scarcity, being appropriated -
refer to relations that the commodity enters into as a use value. Thus commodities 
confer utility to people as use values. A commodity is scarce in so far as there are 
people who want, but are unable, to use (consume) it. Commodities are appropriated 
for use (consumption). However, Marx notes that 'the exchange of commodities is 
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evidently an act characterised by total abstraction2S from use-value' (Marx, 1998a, 
p.57). This means, firstly, that those properties common to all commodities as use 
values - mass, height, age, etc. - have no systematic relationship with exchange 
value, hence cannot be the sought after third thing (common property). Secondly the 
diverse material forms that constitute different commodities, giving them their 
specific use are, by definition, not common to all commodities. 
The complete abstraction from the commodity as a use value in exchange must 
immediately strike a materialist as contradictory. For, it would appear that exchange 
value does after all abstract entirely from all determinate material properties of the 
commodity and thereby that exchange value falsifies the materialist principle that 
powers are tied to determinate material properties. Marx, on noting this apparent 
feature of commodities as exchange values, is therefore keen to stress and to explain 
this 'ghostly' nature of value. Contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic 
dialecticians also stress this feature. 26 There are, however, two crucial respects in 
which these systematic dialecticians differ from Marx and materialist dialectics. 
Firstly the abstraction from natural matter in exchange suggests the need to invoke 
the existence of a new 'substance' different from natural matter, just as Descartes 
invokes the new substance, 'mind', on finding it impossible to explain the behaviour 
of thinking beings in terms of matter (see chapter 4 above). Thus, having discussed 
the abstraction from use value in exchange, Marx characterises the third 'thing' 
underlying exchange value as a common 'substance' (Marx, 1998a, pp.56-8, cited 
above). Hence Marx's use of the term 'substance' is philosophically precise, rather 
than being, as Reuten (1993) and Reuten and Williams (1989) argue, a mistaken 
'metaphor' to be explained by Marx's alleged inability to rid himself of the outmoded 
problematic of classical political economy.27 
25 In the terminology discussed above this is an example of a 'real' or 'actual' abstraction. 
26 Arthur (2002) argues that value is 'spectral' in nature, drawing upon copious citations from 
Marx. Reuten and WilIiams (1989) refer to value as a 'pure form' that is as abstract as time and 
space. 
27 Murray (1993, p.49) suggests that Marx's discussion of abstraction in exchange is purposefully 
redolent of Descartes' famous discussion of wax in the Meditations (Descartes, 1980, pp.64-7). 
However, the interpretation above emphasises the importance of the disanalogy between Descartes' 
discussion of wax and Marx's discussion of exchange value. For Descartes, 'all observed 
phenomena', including therefore wax, can be 'explained by ... the size and shape of the various 
particles into which ... [matter] .. .is divided' (Cottingham, 1995, p.190). This is why the 'substance' 
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Secondly, unlike contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics, Marx's 
materialism requires that there must be a material form underlying exchange value, 
despite the 'spectral' (ghostly) nature of value. In order to comprehend just what this 
'common substance' is, it is necessary to recognise that, as argued in chapter 4, 
labour is the highest form of matter and reacts back upon other forms of matter in a 
process of self-development. The product is therefore an embodiment or 
objectification of human labour. This view is not a remnant of the outmoded 
problematic of classical political economy, as Reuten (1993) suggests, rather it is a 
feature of Marx' s materialist dialectics. When considered as embodiments of labour, 
Marx notes that there is a social 'residue' (Marx, 1998a, p.S7, cited above) left after 
abstraction from all natural material properties of the commodities in exchange, viz. 
congealed socially necessary labour. Marx's view is explained in detail in the 
paragraphs below. Prior to that discussion, it can be noted that Hegel-inspired 
systematic dialecticians do recognise, indeed stress, that value is socially specific. 
However, without the basic materialist principle that common powers are tied to 
common material forms, and without recognition of the commodity as an 
objectification of labour, Hegel-inspired systematic dialecticians see no reason to 
pursue Marx's argument regarding labour and labour time. They see no reason to 
search for a common material form underpinning exchange value, nor hope of finding 
such a common material form. For these and related reasons (some of which are 
recounted above) Hegel-inspired systematic dialecticians cannot validate Marx' s 
argument regarding the substance of value and, instead, are left with the observation 
- utterly nonsensical from a materialist standpoint - that 'value' is 'pure form'. 28 On 
the interpretation offered within this chapter, idealism is the essential flaw from which 
the various defects of Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics, and more broadly of 
'value form theory', should be derived?9 Marx's view is explained below. 
of wax is, for Descartes, not 'mind' but 'matter'. In contrast to Descartes' discussion of wax, Marx 
notes that exchange value cannot be explained by reference to natural matter and hence a new 
substance must be invoked. Marx's discussion parallels Descartes' discussion of 'thought' (ibid., 
p.191; see also chapter 4 above), rather than of wax. 
28 Likitkijsomboon (1995, pp.90-94) notes that the tendency to reduce value to 'pure form' is 
characetristic of the general strand in 'value form theory' that draws its inspiration from Rubin. 
29 Saad-Filho, 2002, ch. 2, summarises extant critiques of value form theory. One important facet of 
these critiques is that value form theory cannot explain the magnitude of value because it cannot 
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Just as commodities have a natural material commonality, just as they are all 
constituted by 'matter' (Spinoza's 'substance'), whatever the specific form of that 
matter, they also have the common material property of being products (hence 
embodiments) of labour. This second commonality is dependent on the first, since 
labour is itself a special form of matter able to creatively transform, so as to produce 
the diverse products here taking the form of commodities. As described above, 
exchange value completely abstracts from (has absolutely no systematic relation with) 
the natural material properties of the commodity. So value is a total abstraction from 
natural 'matter'. It would seem, then, that absolutely no material properties are left, 
even when commodities are considered as products of labour. For, each and every 
individual and particular property of labour must have been abstracted from in 
exchange. If exchange abstracts from (has no systematic relation with) size, weight, 
colour, etc., then it abstracts from (has no systematic relation with) the particular and 
individual labours that have produced and crafted these particular determinate 
properties. However, along with the universal attributes of natural matter (size, age, 
etc.), the products of labour in all social formations (whether or not the products 
predominantly take the form of commodities), have the property of requiring a 
definite quantity of social labour time. All societies must distribute labour in definite 
proportions, so that the necessary social labour time for production of items of 
material wealth must be determined and must take effect within any society. Unlike 
the natural material attributes, exchange value (the characteristic form of the product 
only of capitalistic society) does not utterly or palpably abstract from (lack any 
systematic relation with) social labour time necessary for production of the product, 
as discussed below. 
There are, of course, many cases where a commodity's exchange value magnitude 
appears to have little relation to social labour time, e.g. antiques, memorabilia, 
cultivated land, not to mention those things that have no social labour time 
contained in them at all (e.g. uncultivated land). Furthermore, in most cases there 
recognise the constitution of value (congealed abstract labour) in the sphere of production. See 
chapter 7 below. 
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appear to be other factors independently determining the magnitude of exchange 
value even if necessary labour time is one factor: examples are the rate of profit 
(apparently reflecting, amongst other things, the level of competitive pressure), the 
rate of interest and of tax (see section 1 above). However, these various apparent 
differences between the relative magnitudes of social labour time and of exchange 
value pale into insignificance relative to the total abstraction of all other determinate 
material properties from the commodity, in exchange. Specifically, this means that it 
is obviously impossible to establish a systematic relationship between exchange value 
magnitude and size, weight, age, etc. whereas such a relationship may obtain between 
exchange value magnitude and socially necessary labour time, though it is clearly not 
a proportional relationship. It was noted above that materialism requires only that 
there is some systematic relationship between exchange value and the underlying 
material property; this does not have to be a proportional relationship. Given that 
socially necessary labour time is the only possible candidate for such a relationship, it 
must be concluded, with Marx, that the property of being an embodiment of socially 
necessary labour of definite duration is the material property that underlies exchange 
value. The deviations from proportionality between social labour time and exchange 
value must be systematically accounted for through further theoretical development -
this is the quantitative implication ofMarx's stipulation that the law of value must be 
developed from abstract to concrete (e.g. Marx, 1972, pp.87-8, cited above).3o 
Indeed, the fundamental reason for these infractions of proportionality is already 
contained within the basis established, as will be made clear below, after clarification 
of the argument thus far. 
The starting point of the argument was the consideration of the commodity as the 
characteristic form of the product under capitalism. Examination of this form 
revealed that reference to the 'value' of the commodity is in fact reference to an 
inherent property of the commodity, rather than a shorthand for 'exchange value', the 
latter (exchange value) being merely the form of appearance of the former. This is 
30 If the arguments of this chapter were to be accepted then the explicit articulation of this 
quantitative implication above would constitute a significant contribution to the literature. The 
qUalitative implications of Marx's argument (further discussed below) have been better recognised 
than the quantitative implication spelt out here (see for example the discussion of critical realism in 
section 1 above). 
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because a commodity has, in fact, many exchange values. Thus 'value' can be taken 
as the correct reference to this intrinsic property and 'exchange value' as the form 
through which value appears and takes effect. A complete abstraction from use value, 
hence from natural 'substance', has been revealed in considering the commodity as a 
value. The argument has uncovered social labour time necessary for production as 
the determinate property intrinsic to the commodity and manifested as exchange 
value. Further, it has been argued that the idealism of systematic dialectics explains 
systematic dialecticians' rejection ofMarx's argument. For an idealist the fact that the 
magnitude of socially necessary labour time is the only material property, the only 
facet of material production (of 'the mode of production') that could possibly be 
systematically related to exchange is of no consequence, i.e. it cannot justifY the 
labour theory of value. 
Marx's materialist argument leads to curious conclusions regarding the 'substance' of 
value, regarding, in other words, that which socially necessary labour time is a 
quantity oj, i.e. socially necessary labour. It is labour that is totally abstract, entirely 
devoid of any intrinsic objective material form, entirely divorced from natural 
substance. It must be an entirely social substance strangely devoid of inherent 
sensuousness, of any inherent objectivity (all of which has been abstracted from in 
exchange). Through being represented as exchange value it gains a sensuous form 
and establishes itself as a 'ghostly' object, as one side of the two-fold existence of the 
commodity. As the 'thing' that individuals within capitalist society call 'value'. It 
cannot be stressed too highly just how peculiar and contradictory this notion is. 
Value is embodied labour, yet the material body of the commodity has been 
abstracted from in exchange. In other words there is embodiment without a body! In 
order to characterise this absurd situation Marx (1998a, p.58, cited above) refers to 
value as 'congealed' abstract labour, a 'congelation' of abstract labour pure and 
simple. Abstract labour becomes a 'social substance' and gains effect 'congelated' as 
a separate side of the two-sided commodity, its 'value' as opposed to 'use value' 
side. Once again it must be noted that Marx's terminology is philosophically precise. 
Marx is not suffering from an inability to shake off the mindset of classical political 
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economy, nor IS he wilfully contradicting himself. He IS, instead, accurately 
characterising an 'absurd' reality. 31 
Thus the abstract nature of the labour that constitutes value fits exactly with Marx' s 
earlier stress that the 'third thing' - now recognised as value or congealed abstract 
labour - is 'contained in' a commodity, is 'expressed by', and gains 'phenomenal 
form' as exchange value. For labour in the abstract, independent of its individual and 
particular form, is not something that can be manifest immediately. A single 
commodity appears as a product of particular and individual labour. All such 
particular and individual labour does, of course, 'contain' those aspects that are 
common to labour as such, for these aspects are what give particular and individual 
labour its character as 'labour' in the first place. But such common features exist only 
as the particular and individual forms by which commodities are distinguished as use 
values. Exchange value is indeed necessary in order to provide the 'form of 
manifestation' of abstract labour, establishing the commodity as qualitatively identical 
to, but quantitatively divergent from, other commodities. Reflecting, thereby, the 
abstract labour contained in it (Marx, 1998a, chapter 1, section 3, analyses this 
process of value expression; see chapter 7 below). 
Marx's recognition of the abstract character of the labour constituting the substance 
of value, and thereby of exchange value as the appearance form of value, may sound 
like a technicality, a minutia. Yet, as Marx puts it, in the first Preface to Capital, the 
analysis of the value-form 'does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same 
order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy' (ibid., p.21). In fact, this 
recognition establishes, as classical political economy never could, firstly that value 
and exchange value are socially constituted (and constitutive) things: the labour that 
is stripped of individuality and particularity is purely social. Secondly, that 
generalised commodity production characterises a specific form of society, rather 
than just any society. It is a society where the social organisation of labour occurs 
only through indirect means, through purely social (neither individual nor particular) 
31 This 'absurdity' is revealed starkly in the money-fonn of value and so it is this fonn that Marx 
(l998a, pp.109-10) refers to as 'absurd'. See chapter 7 below for an interpretation of Marx's 
development of value-forms. 
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labour gaining independene2 existence and effect through taking the appearance form 
of the exchange value of the product. 
This development brings to the fore the specific fact that, under capitalism, social 
labour is only recognised as such in an indirect way. Whereas the social function of 
slaves, or of peasants, their respective organic relation to their respective social 
whole, was recognised by all members of the corresponding respective society, this 
direct recognition is absent in capitalism. Instead, the sociality of labour finds 
expression as 'value', whose sensuous form is 'exchange value'; an expression which, 
at first sight therefore, pertains to relations between things and not people. The most 
abstract reason why the magnitude of value, measured in labour time, must delimit 
the magnitude of exchange value thereby becomes apparent: a society where social 
labour is organised through, and appears as, exchange value can only self-reproduce 
and develop if socially necessary labour time quantitatively delimits exchange values. 
If this does not happen, if exchange value gives the wrong 'signals' vis-a-vis the 
allocation oflabour, then not enough food, drink, shelter, etc., will be produced and 
distributed in order to sustain the members of society and it (the society) will 
collapse. To the extent, then, to which capitalism is an ongoing, self-reproducing 
society, socially necessary labour time must tether exchange value magnitude. 
At the same time, the development brings out the most abstract reason why the 
magnitude of value, measured in labour time, will not be precisely proportional to the 
magnitude of exchange value, even as it is tethered by it. For, in this society there is 
no conscious control, or recognition, of the sociality· of labour. The tethering of 
exchange value by labour time must occur by a social process which goes on 'behind 
the backs' (Marx, 1998a, p.66) of the individuals within the society. It must be the 
entirely unintended consequence of the actions of millions of people who have no 
direct recognition of social labour at all; where labour is undertaken privately, 
without direct social control, except through the discipline of exchange value. 
32 This 'independence' is not absolute: if the material body of the commodity is destroyed than so is 
the value of the commodity. 
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Yet, at this abstract starting point, Marx is yet to determine what this social process 
is. He has not determined how value appears as, and quantitatively delimits 
(determines), exchange value. He has merely established, at the most abstract and 
simple level possible, what exchange value is (the appearance form of value), what 
the commodity as such is (the unity of use value and value), what value is (congealed 
socially necessary abstract labour) and what labour within capitalism is (concrete 
labour producing use value; abstract labour creating value). The 'force [power] of 
abstraction' (Marx, 1998a, p.21) thus uncovers the starting point for comprehending 
capitalist society, the labour theory of value. From this starting point, the apparent 
'things' that constitute the 'economy', such as money, capital, wages, profit, interest 
and rent can, eventually, all be grasped as they truly are, i.e. as forms of social labour 
in a complex and peculiar system of social production. The specific social relations of 
production, entailed in the existence of value, can thus be grasped, in a step by step 
fashion. In this process of comprehension, the starting point is slowly developed, in 
thought, so that the economic categories (referred to above) are, one by one, 
comprehended differently to their immediate appearance. They are newly 
comprehended as aspects of the specific social whole, as particular forms taken by 
social labour. 
Conclusion 
Marx summanses succinctly the procedure advocated above, m response to 
scepticism regarding the labour theory of value, as follows. 
Every child knows a nation which ceased to work, I will not say for a year, 
but even for a few weeks, would perish. Every child knows, too, that the 
masses of products corresponding to the different needs required different and 
quantitatively determined masses of the total labour of society. That this 
necessity of the distribution of social labour in definite proportions cannot 
possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production but can 
only change the mode of its appearance, is self-evident. No natural laws can 
be done away with. What can change in historically different circumstances is 
only the form in which these laws assert themselves. And the form in which 
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this proportional distribution of labour asserts itself, in the state of society 
where the interconnection of social labour is manifested in the private 
exchange of the individual products of labour, is precisely the exchange value 
of these products. 
Science consists precisely in demonstrating how the law of value asserts itself. 
So that if one wanted at the very beginning to 'explain' all the phenomenon 
which seemingly contradict that law, one would have to present science 
before science. It is precisely Ricardo's [1951] mistake that in his first chapter 
on value he takes as given all possible and still to be developed categories in 
order to prove their conformity with the law of value. (Marx, 1988) 
Even though the Marx's labour theory of value is based upon the most basic fact of 
contemporary society, the prevalence of the commodity, its implications for the 
contemporary social sciences are momentous. 'Economics' as the science of 
commodity, money, capital, wages, etc. cannot be a merely quantitative science, for 
its objects are nothing less than peculiar alien forms of social labour, of value, which 
is the specific defining feature of the contemporary social formation, of capitalism. 
Conversely 'sociology' and the other social sciences cannot be purely qualitative 
because the object, the contemporary social formation, is organised through this 
peculiar one-dimensional substance of value, pure abstract labour, congealed as one 
side of the 'commodity', varying only quantitatively. In short, social theory, the 
science of society, is ineluctably qualitative and quantitative, it must be based upon 
the labour theory of value, a unitary science, neither 'economics' nor 'sociology'. 
The contemporary disciplinary boundaries, through burying the labour theory of 
value, serve simply to distort the real relations of production upon which 
contemporary society is founded. It has been argued above that contemporary and 
Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics, whilst making great strides forward relative to 
critical realism, ultimately cannot grasp contemporary capitalism because it cannot 
penetrate beneath the appearances of value to its essence, congealed abstract labour. 
The idealism of systematic dialectics renders it unable to fathom the meaning of 
'congealed abstract labour' let alone recommend basing social science upon this 
notion. 
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However, the argument thus far has remained at an incredibly abstract and simple 
level. Another reformulation of the objections to Marx's labour theory of value can 
be made at this abstract stage. For, it can be objected simply that Marx fails to show 
how the labour theory of value is substantiated; he fails to show how the socio-
economic process embodies the reality of the labour theory of value. The 
'transformation problem' can then be raised as 'proof of this objection. Doesn't 
Marx's transformation procedure show, once Marx's mistakes are corrected, that the 
socio-economic process does not conform to the labour theory of value? That the 
magnitude of socially necessary labour time has nothing to do with (has no systematic 
relationship with) the magnitude of price? Hence, that exploitation, as supposedly 
demonstrated in Volume 1, is not established either? The proof of the pudding is in 
the eating and does Marx's pudding taste as good as he claims prior to serving it up? 
These questions are answered below. 
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Chapter 7. The Substantiation of the Labour Theory of Value: Value-Form, 
Exploitation and the Transformation Problem 
Introduction 
The arguments presented in chapter 6 above, important though they are, provide 
merely the starting point for grasping Marx's labour theory of value and for 
addressing the many debates regarding Marxian political economy. Controversy rages 
regarding, for example, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the transformation 
problem, simple and expanded reproduction, accumulation, wages, exploitation and 
the development of the value-form. The chief contribution of this chapter is to the 
theory of surplus value and exploitation. Drawing upon Ilyenkov's materialist 
dialectics, and on the arguments of chapter 6 above, a new perspective on the theory 
of surplus value will be offered. According to this perspective the theory of surplus 
value does not rest upon the labour theory of value as in traditional interpretations, 
rather the opposite is closer to the truth: the theory of surplus value is a crucial step 
in substantiating the labour theory of value. The argument will be contextualised by 
bringing out the necessary linkages between the abstract argument of chapter 6 
above, the theory of surplus value, and the issues surrounding the interpretation of 
Volume 3 of Capital. The issue of the transformation problem will be taken up 
explicitly and it will be argued that there is no 'problem' with the transformation 
rather it is a further substantiation of the labour theory of value and surplus value. 
This argument is one made by Saad-Filho (1997b; 2002, ch. 7) and pioneered by Fine 
(1983). Indeed, the theory of surplus value put forward in this chapter is argued to be 
a 'deepening' of Fine and Saad-Filho's approach (not just to the transformation but 
to political economy more generally). The structure of the chapter is outlined below. 
The first section discusses briefly Marx's lengthy development of the forms of value 
in Capital, Volume 1, chapter 3. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the 
interpretation of Marx's development. The section does not aim to resolve all the 
issues that the development raises, rather it aims to bring out some important themes 
that both develop the exposition in chapter 6 above and prepare the ground for the 
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presentation of the theory of exploitation that follows. On the basis established, the 
subsequent three sections present the key argument regarding the theory of surplus 
value. Firstly the precise nature of the initial definition of the 'capital-form', and 
hence of 'surplus value', is argued to be overlooked in much of the literature. A 
distinctive account of this nature (an interpretation of Marx, 1998a, chs 2-5) is 
presented developing previous themes. Secondly a correspondingly distinctive 
interpretation is put forward of Marx's discussion of the 'contradictions in the 
general formula of capital', (ibid., chs 5-6). Thirdly the resolution of these 
contradiction in the theory of surplus value (exploitation) is detailed. The common 
notion that labour has a 'special status' vis-a-vis other inputs to production is 
developed in a new direction, drawing upon Ilyenkov's account of labour. On the 
view advocated, the theory of surplus value does not 'assume' or 'hypothesise' the 
labour theory of value. Rather, the theory of surplus value is the crucial step in the 
substantiation of the labour theory of value. The penultimate section addresses the 
final key step in the substantiation of the labour theory of value, viz. the 
transformation from values to prices of production. Though the relevant literature is 
vast, the section is brief because it supports and develops Fine's (1983, p.520) 
'astonishing' claim that the literature has fundamentally misinterpreted Marx' s 
procedure, a claim that has since been developed by Saad-Filho (1997b; 2002, ch. 7). 
It is argued that the theory of surplus value developed in this chapter 'deepens' Fine 
and Saad-Filho's interpretation, by firmly establishing the existence and causal status 
of surplus value. A final section concludes, drawing out the wider significance of the 
argument for social theory, drawing upon the example of the theory of economic 
cnsls. 
The Forms of Value and The Process of Circulation 1 
Chapter 6 above stressed that Marx's starting point for the presentation in Capital is 
the commodity as the characteristic and everyday 'appearance form' of the product 
under capitalism. From this is a starting point, rooted in everyday life and experience, 
'value' as congealed socially necessary abstract labour was shown to be unearthed. 
1 This section is an interpretation ofMarx. (1998a, chapter 1, section 3). 
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Having unearthed the nature of value through analysis of the commodity, the next 
task is to show how value comes into existence, how the product of labour comes to 
be recognised as a commodity, as both a use value and a value (expressed by 
exchange value). This is a task undertaken in Marx's 'development' of the value-
form. It is known from the outset of the development that value does appear through 
the exchange relation (that the commodity is recognised as a value). Therefore the 
development must progress, in thought (a dialecto-Iogical development), to the point 
where it is grasped how value, congealed abstract labour, gains existence and 
appearance as exchange value. Marx starts this development with the simplest 
possible way in which value can be 'expressed', termed the 'elementary commodity 
form'. He finds that the simplest value expression is 'inadequate'. This means that the 
expression does not successfully establish that the product is a value, and so there is a 
logical warrant to move to a more complex and concrete expression; an expression 
that may itself be inadequate. It is known that, in reality, the commodity is recognised 
as a value, so the step by step progression from an abstract and simple yet inadequate 
expression to, ultimately, the concrete, complex and fully adequate expression (which 
will turn out to be the money-form) is readily justified. It should be noted that the 
coming into being of money is a historical as well as logical process. The nexus of the 
logical and historical in the value-form development is an important issue, one that is 
integral to the value-form development contra the apparent view of many systematic 
dialecticians, but will not be addressed here. 2 There is space here only to pick out two 
crucial developments: firstly the 'elementary' commodity-form; secondly the money-
form, along with the consideration of exchange (circulation) as an ongoing process. 
The Elementary Commodity-Form 
As in the case of the measurement of weight through a pair of scales, the value of a 
commodity is 'externally' measured and simultaneously expressed by an equivalent 
2 For examples of different positions regarding this issue see Arthur (1997), Fine and Lapavitsas 
(2000), Likitkijsomboon (1995), Reuten and Williams (1989), Saad-Filho (2002, ch. 1) and Zeleny 
(1980). Ilyenkov (1977, Essay 8), in what can be considered one of the crowning achievements of 
his work, provides an interpretation of Marx' s value-form development as part of an account of the 
most fundamental issue in philosophy, namely the relationship between matter and the ideal. If 
nothing else, Ilyenkov' s account serves to highlight just how many deeply controversial issues must 
be addressed if the value-form development is to be grasped fully. 
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form, i.e. relative to another commodity that is equivalent, in value, to it. Unlike the 
case of weight, value exists only through such measurement (owing to its inherently 
non-sensuous nature). This measurement is not consciously performed but 
haphazardly, through an entire social process based upon private, individual decisions 
without conscious social co-ordination and having nothing to do with any conscious 
'measuring' of value. Indeed, subsequent theoretical developments will demonstrate 
that conscious appearances appear to contradict the essential process of value 
measurement that is, in truth, occurring. 
The elementary commodity-form (which can be denoted C-C) is the simplest possible 
form of value expression. Here one commodity expresses its value in one other 
commodity (this latter commodity is an exchange value of the former commodity). 
The former commodity expresses its value relatively hence is the 'relative' form of 
value; the latter commodity serves as equivalent so is the 'equivalent' form. Marx is 
keen to stress that all the fundamental features of the exchange relation as an 
expression of value, the 'whole mystery of the form of value' (Marx, 1998a, p.7l) are 
present in this elementary form. This is stressed because further developments 
towards the complexities of reality reveal how the form of appearance of value 
becomes more and more bizarre, and more and more has the effect of concealing the 
true nature of value from the participants to exchange, even as it brings value into 
existence. The seed of this mystification, present in the elementary commodity-form, 
is that value cannot gain an objective (sensuous) appearance as it 'truly' is. Value is 
an abstraction from all determinate objective properties. Neither a definite height nor 
weight nor colour, it is congealed labour, in abstraction from all such objective 
determinate properties. Thus in the elementary form value, a non-sensuous 'thing', 
appears as a sensuous thing, as the body of the commodity serving as an equivalent. 
This need to be expressed through something else, through appearing as something 
opposite to itself, as something sensuous, despite being inherently non-sensuous, is 
the root of the mystification that value expression causes.3 
3 This interpretation draws upon Murray (1993) who points out that the need for an 'essence' to 
appear as something other than itself is an aspect of Hegelian Essence logic. 
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The Money-Form and the Process o/Circulation 
The elementary form is very deficient as an expression of value because it does not 
express the generality of value. Value is expressed only in another individual and 
particular commodity so does not appear to be a general 'substance' contained in all 
commodities. Nor, therefore, does the notion of a 'value', attached to each individual 
and particular commodity, arise in the minds of the participants to exchange. The 
specific result, the culmination, of Marx' s lengthy development of progressively more 
adequate forms of value is to establish that only through money, as measure of value 
and medium of exchange, does the notion arise in the consciousness of commodity 
owners that the commodities each have a value. Prior to this, e.g. without fully 
developed money, commodity owners see only many exchange values, thus the 
notion of a value, inherent in the commodity, is not yet fully developed because it 
does not fully appear. 4 
There are many important subtleties in Marx's discussion of money. Perhaps most 
importantly there is the peculiarity of social labour in the abstract gaining an 
appearance form, outside of individual and particular commodities, as the universal 
equivalent that is money. This means that an individual and particular commodity, the 
money commodity, has become the socially accepted form of purely abstract and 
general labour. The individuality and particularity of the money commodity counts 
only as the appearance form of abstract and general (universal) labour. Thus, the 
particular and individual here counts as a mere aspect of the universal. This is a 
precise reversal of the normal state of affairs where the universal is a mere aspect of 
the particular. (Marx, 1998a, pp. 1 09-1 0). Crucially, Marx has shown that this 
peculiarity of money is a mere reflection, a consequence, of the very nature of the 
labour that is the substance of value. Money gives form to the value inherent in 
commodities. It (money) is necessary to the existence of value because the latter 
(value) is non-sensuous and in need of sensuous form. But money by no means 
creates value, rather money is a consequence of it. To put it another way: value and 
4 Weeks (1981, pp.27-40) stresses the need for value to gain an objective appearance and he offers a 
brief but lucid account of Marx's value-fonn development. 
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money are necessarily tied to one another but the former dominates the latter, :sin(;e 
the latter is the sensuous form of the former. 
As noted in chapter 6 above, systematic dialecticians employment of 'value form 
theory' entails that they either deny that labour is the substance of value (Reuten, 
1993; Reuten and Williams, 1989; Taylor, 2000) or suggest that the relationship 
between labour and value is 'incidental' for the value-form development (Arthur, 
2001; personal communication). This is despite the argument, presented above, that 
the recognition of abstract labour as the substance of value is the raison d'etre of 
Marx's development of the forms of value! The reason for the stance taken by 
systematic dialecticians is, according to the argument presented in chapter 6 above, 
their idealist standpoint whereby 'society' can 'throw up' 'forms' which abstract 
entirely from (have no systematic relation with) the process of material production, 
whereas this is impossible from a materialist perspective. Marx's stress on the 
elementary form of value can now be more fully appreciated. In the elementary form 
it is clear that the value, the congealed socially necessary abstract labour of the 
relative form, is the 'active' factor causing the exchange relation and reflecting itself 
in the equivalent. Money, despite (or because of) being the perfectly adequate form 
of value (fully expressing the independence and universality of value, i.e. of 
congealed abstract labour), is at the same time a mystifying form. For, it appears to 
individual participants to exchange that the substance of the money commodity itself 
is responsible for value. Rather than mere appearance form of value, the money 
commodity appears as inherent substance and originator of value. The true nature of 
reality is mystified through the bizarre inversions inherent in the money-form. 
Systematic dialectics and value form theory remain mystified because they do not 
penetrate beneath these forms to their essence, viz. congealed socially necessary 
abstract labour. 
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The Capital-Forms 
Having grasped the forms of value, Marx moves on to consider a new and empirically 
given appearance form in the exchange process. This is the form of capital, initially 
denoted 'M-C-M'. It is on consideration of the capital-form and more specifically the 
resolution of the 'contradictions' within that form that Marx is led to develop the 
theory of surplus value. This is a theory of capitalistic exploitation. The exposition 
below stresses two crucial factors, the analytical significance of which has been 
overlooked in the contemporary literature.6 Firstly, building upon the interpretation 
developed thus far, Marx's exposition is rooted in the day to day activity and 
experience of individuals and the capital-form is one such experience. The specific, if 
apparently banal, fact about this experience, the significance of which has been 
overlooked is that, in the capital-form, money appears to make more money through 
exchange. Secondly, Marx's copious references to 'fresh' and 'new' labour have a 
significance for the theory of surplus value that is little recognised. Recognition of 
these two factors contributes towards the main argument of the chapter overall, viz. 
that the theory of surplus value is a key step in substantiating the labour theory of 
value, not a deduction resting upon the labour theory of value. This section will 
discuss the capital-form and some crucial presuppositions contained within that form. 
The subsequent two sections will present and resolve the contradictions in the 
capital-form. 
Like the commodity with which Marx initially begins, the capital-form is an empirical 
given rather than being in any way derived.7 Though, having grasped the significance 
5 This section draws upon Marx., 1998a, chapters 2-5. 
6 This literature includes the 'traditional' and 'Sraffian' traditions, value fonn theory (including 
systematic dialectics), the 'new interpretation', the 'temporal single system interpretation' and 'open 
Marxism'. It also includes the interpretation pioneered by Fine (e.g. 1989) and Weeks (e.g. 1981), 
within the broad parameters of which this thesis is intended to fall (and to which this thesis is 
intended to 'deepen' - see below). For the most recent overviews and approaches, see Arthur (2001), 
Foley (2000), Saad-Filho (2002) and the symposium on Brenner and world crisis in Historical 
Materialism, issues 4-5, which illustrates various approaches 'in action', i.e. in the context of 
explaining a concrete historical conjuncture. The Appendix to this thesis reproduces the editorial 
introduction to the aforementioned symposium. 
7 There is a debate as to whether or not Marx. should have derived the capital-fonn. Saad-Filho 
(2002, ch. 1), drawing upon Rosenthal (1998), criticises systematic dialecticians on grounds that the 
latter illicitly aim to derive the capital-fonn. However, there is a danger of taking this argument too 
far. It is vital to recognise that the prevalence (as opposed to more or less fringe occurrence) of the 
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of the simple form of circulation, C-M-C, Marx is able to interpret this new capital-
form, M-C-M, as a form of value, and so he has a basis to fathom its true 
significance. In other words simple circulation, C-M-C, is both logically and 
historically prior to the capital-form, M-C-M, and so simple circulation must be 
grasped before the capital-form is considered. Marx notes that the capital-form 
appears alongside the form of simple circulation in the capitalist mode of production. 
Indeed the generalised appearance of simple circulation is a more universal 
appearance than capital. In other words the C-M-C form occurs more often, and to 
more individuals, than does the experience of M-C-M. This is because the most 
general experience within capitalism is the selling of a special commodity, 'labour-
power', for the purpose of purchasing consumer goods - a process taking the form of 
C-M-C (however, at this stage of the presentation the notion oflabour-power has not 
been introduced). 
Marx's discussion of the capital-form, M-C-M, is very keenly observed. Peculiarities 
are shown to abound in this form. For one thing, within this form, the individual 
starts with a sum of money rather than with a commodity. The commodity (C) serves 
only as an intermediary between the starting point and the end point of the capital-
form (M). Therefore the fact that money is a mere form of the value that is inherent 
in commodities becomes even further obscured. Money, divorced from commodities, 
becomes the starting point and end point of exchange. 
Another peculiarity is that the form M-C-M as such is irrational. It implies that an 
individual starts with a sum of money (M) and uses it to purchase commodities (C) 
with the sole intent of reselling these commodities for precisely the same sum of 
money with which the individual started! Therefore the capital-form must in fact be 
represented as M-C-M', where M' is greater than M. For, the only rational possibility, 
given the form, is that the individual must be aiming to achieve a greater sum of 
form of simple circulation (C-M-C) within society necessarily implies the prevalence of the capital-
form (M-C-M') within society; they are mutual conditions of existence. One can quite readily accept 
this proposition whilst simply introducing the capital-form as an empirical given, as does Marx 
(1998a, p245), who writes, '[h]ad we gone further, and inquired under what circumstances all, or 
even the majority of products take the form of commodities, we should have found that this can only 
happen with production of a very specific kind, capitalist production. Such an inquiry, however, 
would have been foreign to the analysis of commodities'. 
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money at the end of the process (M') than was possessed at the start of it (M). Yet 
this entails another peculiarity. The aim of the individual behind the capital-form 
(who is, by definition, the capitalist) does not have a limit. No matter what magnitude 
of M is possessed, there is always an even greater magnitude, an M', conceivable. 
Moreover M' does not present itself as it is, as the initial sum of money (M) plus an 
increment (labelled dM and termed 'surplus value'). Instead, M' comes as a 'package' 
that is theoretically labelled M' but, as far as the capitalist is concerned, M' is just 
another M to start the process of 'buying to sell dearer' all over again. In this way the 
capitalist qua capitalist becomes a mere pawn of the capital-form. The form controls 
the individual, and not the reverse. Given the previous development of value, Marx 
accurately characterises this situation as one of apparent self-expansion of value. 
Through the capital-form, value grows in magnitude, of its own accord, individual 
capitalists becoming servants of value expansion, of capital, rather than the other way 
around. 
From consideration of the peculiarities of the capital-form, Marx moves on to 
consider its contradictory aspects, to be resolved, it will later be revealed, through the 
grasping of the specifically capitalistic form of exploitation. Before presenting the 
interpretation of Marx's argument certain additional aspects of the capital-form and 
of the form of simple circulation that precedes it will be clarified below. 
Simple Circulation and the Abstract Capital-Form: Some Important Observations 
Through the development of the notion of simple circulation and of the capital-form 
thus far, important qualitative aspects of the capitalist mode of production have been 
comprehended. It remains the case however that the presentation is at an extremely 
abstract and simple level. This high level of abstraction is crucial because it underpins 
Marx's well known, if often misunderstood, notion of 'surplus value'. Why, for 
example, doesn't Marx call the increment in the sum of money that is the aim of the 
capital-form (dM) 'profit' rather than 'surplus value'? Because 'profit' (which itself 
has different forms) is not the only appearance of dM possible. Interest and rent are 
also ways in which dM can appear. In the case of interest, the capital-form is 
truncated to M-M', i.e. the mediation of commodities (C) does not occur. But interest 
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is still a form of capital because it is still a form where an increasing sum of money is 
the outcome and aim of exchange; it still results in a dM, in this case having the 
specific label, 'interest'. Hence the term 'surplus value' is more general than the 
respective terms 'profit', 'interest' and 'rent'. All three of these latter forms (which 
themselves split into different categories) count equally as forms of surplus value. 
Examination of these particular and individual forms of surplus value is, and can only 
be, undertaken much later in the presentation (in Volume 3 of Capital). 
The high level of abstraction carries the crucial implication that the presentation of 
the mechanism whereby the magnitude of relative prices is determined cannot be 
undertaken (again, this level of complexity is reached only by Volume 3). This is not 
only, nor even primarily, because the distribution of 'initial endowments', the nature 
of individual tastes and the technical determinations of the production process have 
yet to be considered (these factors are the key exogenous variables in the general 
equilibrium analysis characteristic of mainstream economics). Fundamentally the 
mechanism(s) determining relative price magnitudes cannot yet be presented because, 
in order to grasp the mechanism(s), it is necessary to introduce the specific forms of 
surplus value that enter the consciousness of individual capitalist. First and foremost 
it is necessary to introduce 'industrial profit' which drives industrial production. 
Without first having introduced this 'profit motive' the process of competition, which 
is the enforcer of relative prices, cannot be considered at all. 8 
8 The process of competition is so important that Marx does mention it in Volume 1, but each time 
he does so he adds a rider, that indicates precisely the point being made above. Firstly, on the 
introduction of the notion of relative surplus value (which is in fact a process outwardly driven by 
competition) Marx writes, 'it is not our intention to consider, here, the way in which the laws, 
immanent in capitalist production, manifest themselves in the movements of individual masses of 
capital, where they assert themselves as coercive laws of competition, and are brought home to the 
mind and consciousness of the individual capitalist as the directing motives of his operations. But 
this much is clear; a scientific analysis of competition is not possible, before we have a conception of 
the inner nature of capital, just as the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies are not intelligible to 
any but him, who is acquainted with their real motions, motions which are not directly perceptible 
by the senses. Nevertheless, for the better comprehension of the production of relative surplus-value, 
we may add the following remarks, in which we assume nothing more than the results we have 
already obtained .. .' (Marx, 1998a, p.454). Secondly, in considering centralisation (again, a process 
outwardly driven by competition) Marx writes, 'the laws of this centralisation of capitals, or of the 
attraction of capital by capital, cannot be developed here. A brief hint at a few facts must suffice. 
The battle of competition is fought by ... ' (Marx, 1998a, p.898). 
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A further implication of the high level of abstraction, at the introduction of the 
capital-form, is that the presentation remains at the level of the process of commodity 
exchange, in abstraction from the process of production. In the absence of any 
specification of production, it can only be assumed that the commodity owners who 
appear within the exchange process have themselves produced the commodities that 
they bring to the market (an assumption which will turn out to be false, in the case of 
the capitalist mode of production). 
All the visible and general appearances of the exchange process are taken account of 
at this stage (at the introduction of the capital-form). Marx takes these appearances 
to be as follows. Firstly the price of any given commodity displays some average 
magnitude, an empirical average over time (the 'long run'), visible to the participants 
to exchange. These participants consider the long run average price the 'true' value 
magnitude of the commodity, as against the vagaries of day to day price fluctuations. 
A distinction between true value and day to day price is a corollary of the notion of 
value already uncovered in the preceding analysis. This is so because value can only 
gain form through the anarchic market process where there is no direct social control 
such that the day to day actual price magnitude is likely to deviate randomly from the 
true value magnitude. However, contrary to Marx's notion oflong run average price 
magnitude, it seems unlikely that there is a stable and meaningful long run average 
magnitude within modem day capitalism, if the 'long run' is taken to be a period of 
years, because the true value magnitude will itself change over such a length of time. 
This has no effect on Marx's analysis because it is the basic distinction of true value 
magnitude versus price deviations around that true value that is important. Marx's 
notion of average price will be retained, therefore, in the exposition below. 
Accordingly the question of the relation between price magnitude and underlying 
labour time magnitude concerns the relation between what Marx terms the 'average 
price' magnitude and the magnitude of socially necessary labour time. Even if 
average price and labour time magnitude were proportional, an incongruity (non-
equality) of the actual price magnitude and labour time magnitude is built into 
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Marx's presentation because the actual price is not, in general, equal to its long run 
average magnitude, rather it fluctuates around this magnitude.9 
Also taken to be given empirically, at this stage, are the evident reasons for the 
fluctuations of actual price magnitude, e.g. short run variations in 'supply' and 
'demand'. These are, in the long run, taken to 'have no effect', as captured in the 
notion of the long run average price magnitude around which the actual price 
magnitude fluctuates (explained above). It should be noted that these notions of 
supply and demand are not tied to the 'equilibrium' conceptions of supply and 
demand found in the mainstream economics of today. The notions simply recognise 
the appearance to individuals within the exchange process of fluctuations due to what 
they term 'supply' and 'demand'; the notions do not come with the baggage of 
abstract neo-classical economic theory. 
In fact Marx is explicit that not even long run average prices and labour times will be 
in a proportional relationship, he writes, 'average prices do not directly coincide with 
the values of commodities, as Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others believe' (Marx, 
1998a, p.240). Nevertheless Marx makes the entirely innocuous simplifying 
assumption of price / valuelO proportionality, at this stage, in the absence of the more 
concrete categories required to determine their true systematic quantitative 
relationship, when this assumption can readily be relaxed. Unlike the innocuous 
assumption of proportionality, the view that there is some systematic relationship 
between labour time magnitude and price magnitude is crucial (see chapter 6 above). 
Thus Marx states that the average price magnitude is 'ultimately regulated' by the 
abstract labour time magnitude of a commodity, though the two magnitudes do not 
'directly coincide' (ibid., p.240). However, Marx has yet to present the social process 
whereby labour time magnitude tethers price magnitude, i.e. he has yet to substantiate 
the labour theory of value. Therefore he does not simply take this quantitative aspect 
9 Marx is simply following the classical political economists (and others) in invoking this 'average 
price' notion. According to Marx, 'price of production ... is really what Adam Smith calls natural 
price, Ricardo calls price of production, or cost of production, and the physiocrats call prix 
necessaire, because in the long run it is a prerequisite of supply ... ' (Marx, 1998b, p.263). 
10 In this context 'value' refers to the magnitude of socially necessary labour time, and 'price' to the 
long run average price, as discussed above. 
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of the labour theory of value as a given 'assumption' or 'hypothesis'. In order to 
emphasise this point, and to present Marx's substantiation of the labour theory of 
value, the discussion below will, where possible, refer to long run 'average prices' 
rather than values.ll In this way it will be shown that Marx's discussion of the 
contradictions of the capital-form and their resolution in the theory of surplus value 
does not rest on the assumption that labour times tether prices. Instead, the theory of 
surplus value is a key step in substantiating the latter proposition. Many critics have 
argued that Marx's own presentation in Volume 3 (when corrected for mistakes) 
undermines the claim that labour times tether prices (this is the 'transformation 
problem'). To the contrary it will be argued below that Marx's transformation 
procedure is the second crucial step in substantiating this claim. 
A further aspect of the abstract development up to the stage of the introduction of 
the capital-form is a conception that would today be termed 'endogenous money' 
(see Lapavitsas and Saad-Filho, 2000). The basic notion is that the number of 
transactions that occur in the economy, divided by the average number of times a 
single unit of money is involved in a transaction, causes, for any given time period, 
the quantity of money that is in circulation. At this stage of the presentation there is a 
money commodity. The relevant causal mechanism underlying endogenous money is 
the ever present existence of money hoards (due, amongst other reasons, to what 
today would be called the non-substitutability of money), which adjust to ensure that 
the money supply maintains the appropriate quantity. Note that the value of money is 
assumed constant in the analysis such that (long run average) price changes are 
relative price changes, rather than being due to inflation or deflation. 
11 It is not always possible to follow this procedure below because the notion of 'price' necessarily 
implies the notion of 'value' and because 'surplus value' is defined in monetary terms (it is the 
increment denoted 'dM'). Where the term 'value' is used within this section it is the monetary form 
of value that is referred to. There is no assumption of proportionality between the substance (labour) 
and form (money) of value, or even of any systematic relationship between the two. Instead, the 
social process will be shown to embody such a relationship. 
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Contradictions in the Capital-Forml2 
On the basis of the preceding clarifications it is possible to interpret Marx's 
discussion of the contradictions in the capital-form. His resolution of these 
contradictions, through the distinction of labour and labour-power, can then be 
presented along with the associated uncovering of capitalistic exploitation. 
In the capital-form a commodity is purchased at a sum of money equal to 'M' for the 
purpose of a future sale, at a price ofM', which is M + dM (M and dM being positive 
in sign). Following the discussion above, the price of sale and of purchase would 
normally be taken to be the long run average price magnitudes which are proportional 
to socially necessary labour times given Marx' s innocuous assumption of price / value 
proportionality. However, the surplus value inherent in the capital-form clearly 
appears to break the law of 'equivalent exchange'. Marx stresses the freedom of the 
parties to exchange in this context. This is a reference to the equal power and status 
of the exchanging parties inherent in the sphere of exchange. Private individuals, free 
to dispose of their respective commodities, enter the exchange process. They face the 
given, objective average prices of commodities. The average prices are given to all 
individuals hence determined by none of them - all participants to exchange are free 
and equal in this sense. Long run average price determination is the unintended 
consequence of their actions and occurs 'behind their backs' (Marx, 1998a, p.66). 
Marx calls this the 'normal' form of simple circulation, its form in abstraction from 
the consideration of outside factors. For example, any monopoly power to influence 
average price is to be considered an infraction of the normal laws of exchange and is 
abstracted from at this stage. In this context, surplus value appears to be inexplicable. 
There is one average price attached to every single commodity, known to commodity 
owners, prior to exchange. Rational commodity owners will not (in the long run) sell 
below the average price for then this would entail willingly and knowingly losing 
money in exchange. They cannot (in the long run) sell above average price (though 
they would if they could) because this would entail an irrational buyer. How, then, is 
surplus value possible? 
12 This section draws upon Marx (l998a, chapter 5). 
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One obvious possibility is to drop the assumption of the 'normal' laws of exchange. 
Through some external factor, say monopoly power or asymmetric information, an 
individual is enabled, for example, to push the average price of a commodity above 
the average price that would prevail under 'normal' conditions. Dropping the 
assumption does not, however, provide an explanation of surplus value. The ability to 
push up or down a long run average price and thus gain an advantage creates as 
many losers as it does winners. Thus, and as is well known, the increase that a 
monopolist achieves causes a redistribution of average prices in its favour but it does 
not increase the total revenue in the economy. Just as the monopolist, as seller, 
receives a higher price, so the consumer of the monopolist's product has to pay a 
higher price. The gain of the monopolist is thereby exactly matched by the loss of the 
consumer and the net gain within the economy as a whole remains zero. In terms of 
the characterisation of surplus value and the capital-form outlined above, the general 
experience and activity of losing money through exchange would be exactly as 
prevalent as the experience of gaining money through this process. This is not 
capitalism. 
A second possibility is to consider explicitly the case of individual production of 
commodities. This is to consider a process that lies outside the sphere of circulation 
(exchange) and hence that has been abstracted from hitherto. The only way of 
conceiving of production, at this abstract level, is to assume individuals produce the 
products they take to the market. So cannot individuals create surplus value through 
such production? In fact, they cannot. The increment in money that that they create 
through their own labour is, by definition, not achieved through the process of 
exchange. In the case of individual production, then the individual, in their ongoing 
activity, does not experience money self-expanding. The individual knows that their 
own work to create a new or transformed commodity can indeed yield extra money 
(a commodity with a higher average price), but this increase occurs through the 
labour of the indiVidual, and not through the process of exchange. This argument 
illustrates the importance of Marx:' s keen observation of just what surplus value is. It 
is not just an increment in money. Rather, it is an increment in money that 
individuals, in their ongoing activity, experience as occurring through exchange. 
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The mass of surplus value that accrues to the individual capitalist within the capital-
form, M-C-M', is dependent not directly on the amount of work that the individual 
does but on the magnitude of money that the individual is able to advance: the larger 
the magnitude of the capital that can be advanced, the more surplus value that it is 
possible to accrue. Marx must explain this day to day activity and experience, this 
empirically given appearance. This appearance would not be explained if the 
increment in money is due directly to the labour of the individual. The amount of 
labour time and effort contributed by the individual to production is not increased one 
iota by the quantity of money that the individual advances. This means that, if the 
increment in money is due to individual labour, then it cannot be attributed to the 
process of exchange. Instead of the appearance that money begets more money, there 
would simply be the appearance that individual labour, a process outside of exchange, 
begets money. Exchange itself would retain the appearance of simple circulation and 
there would be no capital-form. In order to illustrate further this point, and to pave 
the way for Marx's resolution of the problem of surplus value, it is useful to examine 
the case of (what is now termed) machinery. This is done below. 
Why, it could be asked, cannot an individual producer purchase a machine in order to 
increase the quantity produced, hence the amount of money made on sale? Why can't 
the extra money be used to purchase more machines so further increasing output and 
so on? Would not this be surplus value? Would not the problem of surplus value be 
solved on consideration of machinery? It should first be responded that machinery, as 
it now appears to individuals of the present day world, is the result rather than the 
cause of the capitalistic mode of production. Nevertheless consideration of the 
question of machinery is revealing at this stage, as will be explained below. 
The purchase of a machine by an individual is the purchase of a thing with a specific 
and pre-specified use; this makes it a use value. Unlike consumption goods, this use 
consists in the ability to make some specific contribution to the production of new 
use values, rather than in the ability to satisfy directly human needs and wants. The 
machine exists as a potential use value on sale and is realised as a use value on being 
employed on production. In other words the useful quality of the machine, the ability 
to make a specific contribution to production, exists only as a potential on sale, 
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becoming a reality after sale, in the production process. This potential/actual 
distinction is common to all commodities. For example on purchase of a Mars bar, I 
purchase the potential 'eating of a Mars bar' and I realise this potential only in 
consuming the bar after purchase. Or, on purchase of a pen, I buy a potential 'thing I 
am using to write with' and I realise this potential after purchase, when actually 
writing. 
A corollary of the above is that the contribution of the machine to production is fully 
paid for prior to production, in the sale of the machine, just as the consumption of a 
Mars bar or the use of a pen is fully paid for prior to realisation, in sale. Although this 
point is simply a clarification of what 'buying a machine' actually means, something 
that is taken for granted in everyday life, it is very important. It is, moreover, 
applicable to the purchase of any non-labour input, not just machines but land, raw 
materials and tools. The contribution of land, raw materials and tools is fully paid for 
prior to production just as the consumption of a Mars bar or the use of a pen is fully 
paid for prior to realisation, in sale. 
If the same reasorung were applicable to labour input as to non-labour input 
(machines, tools, raw materials and land) then it would follow that all input 
contributions to a production process are paid for, on purchase of all the relevant 
inputs on the market. Clearly the result, the objective realisation, of all the input 
contributions taken together is the output that they produce. Hence, if all of the input 
contributions are fully paid for, on purchase of the inputs on the market, then by way 
of tautology the specific output that they produce has been fully paid for, on purchase 
of all these inputs. To buy the inputs would, in short, be equivalent to buying the 
specific output that they produce (and vice versa). In terms of the magnitude of price, 
it would follow that the respective magnitudes should, likewise, be equal. If labour 
input is akin to non-labour input in the manner described above, then the cost of 
production of the output, the sum of the prices of the individual inputs, should be 
equal to the price of the output. 13 The only additional assumption to that made 
13 Thus, in Volume 3, Marx refers to the illusory appearance that 'cost price' is the true price, or 
value, of the commodity and that profit is an (apparently inexplicable) surplus over and above this 
cost price. The key to the illusion is the appearance that all input contributions, including that of 
162 
regarding labour input, is the assumption, in accordance with the presentation above, 
that each commodity is allotted some (average) price magnitude that is given to the 
individual participants to exchange, rather than being determined by them. The sum 
of the input contributions, on the one hand, and the output, on the other hand, are 
simply different forms of one and the same use value, once in 'fluid' form (the 
production process), once in objective form (the product). Hence they should have 
the same price, according to the minimal assumption that each commodity (each type 
of use value) has a given price. 
In sum, it would seem that neither the purchase of the machine, nor the purchase of 
any other input, can explain surplus value. Whatever is purchased, it seems, yields the 
same monetary value, if used as a contribution to output, as it cost to purchase. Far 
from being a source of increasing value, the exchange process, and hence money, 
would appear to be barrier to it - only ever yielding in value what it has previously 
taken away. But if an item has not been purchased on the market then it cannot yield 
surplus value either, because surplus value is not just an increment in value, it is an 
increment that has occurred, or appeared to occur, through exchange. 
To repeat: the above argument holds regardless of the pricing mechanism (which has 
yet to be grasped). The only fact about the mechanism determining (long run 
average) price magnitude that has been established is that each type of commodity is 
allotted some average price magnitude and that this occurs 'behind the backs' of 
individuals. This average price must be 'ultimately regulated' by (systematically 
related to) labour time magnitude but the social mechanism that enforces this ultimate 
regulation has yet to be developed. For this reason the presentation has not assumed 
a systematic relationship between price and value. The presentation of capitalistic 
exploitation below is a key step in showing that such a relationship is entailed within 
the capitalist system, i.e. in substantiating the labour theory of value. 
labour, have a price, and that this price is paid by the capitalist, on purchase of the inputs. Marx 
refers back to the analysis of surplus value and exploitation in Volume 1 as the uncovering of the 
true value relations beneath this illusory appearance. Thus far in the presentation of the problem of 
surplus value, above, the 'illusory appearances' have been articulated. The true nature of surplus 
value will be presented below. 
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Resolution of the Contradictions: Labour-Power and Capitalistic Exploitation 14 
Marx goes on to argue that the special commodity, 'labour-power', is the source of 
surplus value. He argues that, by purchasing labour-power, the capitalist is enabled to 
acquire surplus value. Above, in interpreting Marx's prior argument on the 
contradictions in the capital-form, it was stressed that Marx's argument does not rest 
on any explicit pricing mechanism. Thus it does not rest on the assumption that the 
immanent measure of value (socially necessary labour time) is proportional to the 
external measure of value (average price magnitude), nor even on the assumption of a 
systematic relationship between the two. Marx's argument regarding labour-power 
can, at first sight, appear firmly based upon such an axiom, however. Therefore an 
interpretation of the argument will be provided below whereby no such axiom is 
invoked. Marx's argument is a further development and substantiation of the labour 
theory of value (the law of value), not a deduction resting upon it. 
Throughout Capital Marx continually and clearly stresses that the labour that the 
capitalist receives upon consumption of labour-power differs from all other inputs 
because, unlike these inputs, labour is 'value creating', it is 'fresh', 'new' labour, that 
creates correspondingly 'fresh' and 'new' value. IS Many interpretations of Marx 
concentrate upon the fact that labour-power and labour involve, thereby, two 
different quantities of labour time. The labour-power has a value that is the socially 
necessary labour time for its reproduction. On the other hand, the labour performed 
upon realisation of the labour-power, in the production process, has a variable 
duration, in no way related to the value of labour-power. Hence the labour time 
received is not the same as the labour time paid for and surplus value is possible. 
However, this divergence of quantity is not the only important point that Marx is 
making. For, Marx also expresses, with the very same words, that labour is creative 
of value, that it is fresh and new. The reference to freshness and creativity is 
important because it is a reference to the crucial and definitive transhistorical aspects 
of humanity. Moreover the reference to creativity of value is also of enhanced 
14 This section draws upon Marx (l998a, chapters 6-7). 
15 See, for example, Marx (1998a, ch. 8). 
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significance once it is recognised that value, as a definite form of labour, has a 
transhistorical aspect, even though value is an historical, rather than transhistorical 
notion. That is to say one cannot grasp value (congealed abstract labour) without 
having first grasped the transhistorical features of labour. As a specific form of these 
general aspects value incorporates these aspects, as well as providing the new 
dimension of form to them. 
To fail to articulate the transhistorical with the historical aspects of value is to miss 
the key causal factor that Marx's entire presentation rests upon. For, though the 
point most interpretations do pick up upon (the two different magnitudes of labour 
time associated with labour-power and its realisation) explains surplus value, it does 
so· only given the prior premise that the labour theory of value is true. But this 
'premise' has yet to be substantiated: prior to Marx's uncovering of the source of 
surplus value, Marx's presentation does not provide any elucidation of the causal 
mechanism (social process) whereby the magnitude of value 'ultimately regulates' the 
magnitude of average price. It will be argued below that the articulation of the key 
transhistorical features of labour with the key specific features of value is crucial to 
Marx's elucidation of this mechanism, an elucidation which begins with his theory of 
exploitation and is further developed in Volume 3. 
The argument below by no means consists in the mere claim that the ontologically 
distinct nature of labour, or of social production, justifies the labour theory of value 
and surplus value. Such a claim is commonplace (e.g. Elson, 1979; Mohun, 1994; 
Smith, 1990, pp.121-2). Rather, it is the articulation of the key transhistorical 
features of labour (features that are the culmination of Ilyenkov's philosophy, as 
detailed in previous chapters above) with the specific social form of labour that is 
crucial. For this reason it may be helpful to clarify how the argument within this 
chapter differs essentially from (or essentially develops) such commonplace claims. 
Mohun (1994, pp.215-6) argues that '[v]alue is labour-time because of an essentialist 
ontology that what defines human existence as specifically human is purposive 
productive activity'. The 'new interpretation' that he advocates develops a robust 
accounting procedure whereby National Accounts statistics are transformed into 
Marxian categories based upon the labour theory of value (Mohun, 2002; 
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forthcoming).16 From the perspective of this chapter, the key problem with the new 
interpretation is that the labour theory of value remains at the level of a mere 
'premise', 'assumption' or 'hypothesis', albeit one drawn from a transhistorical 
principle. At no point is the premise substantiated: Mohun (and the new 
interpretation more generally) does not grasp the social process whereby labour and 
surplus labour cause price and profit, and through which the magnitudes of the 
former tether the magnitudes of the latter. Similar remarks apply to other such claims 
within the literature. Without substantiation, then at the very best the labour theory of 
value appears as an interesting 'accounting procedure' with no apparent causal 
import (though, perhaps a moral one).17 Hence the labour theory of value would be 
scientifically redundant, just as Steedman (1977), and so many others, have claimed. 
Firstly the relevant transhistorical features of labour will be made explicit. Secondly 
their articulation within the capital-form will be shown to substantiate Marx's theory 
of surplus value. The presentation of the key transhistorical aspects draws upon 
Ilyenkov (1977) in addition to Marx's lucid account in chapter 7 of Cap it ai, Volume 
1. Chapter 4 above articulates these transhistorical aspects in much greater detail as 
the key to Ilyenkov's materialist dialectics; chapter 6, above, contains a brief 
summary of materialist dialectics. 
The key aspect of labour as a transhistorical notion is as follows. Social individuals 
creatively and purposively transform themselves and the object through their labour. 
Through labour, the social individual thus creates new objects and newly acquired 
abilities. The labour that the social individual does is· not structurally inscribed, not 
pre-programmed within that individual, within their inner chemical, biological or 
neurophysiological structures. Rather, the key relevant inner structures must be 
susceptible of transformation. Social individuals must have the ability to transform 
their inner structural constitution in such a way as to enable the creative self-
transformation of outward bodily activity and simultaneous creative transformation of 
16 Other advocates of the new interpretation include Dumenil (e.g. 1980), Foley (e.g. 1982), Glick 
and Ehrbar (1987), and Lipietz (e.g. 1982). 
17 Thus Fine et. al (2000) argue that the new interpretation reduces to a sociological theory with no 
baring on economic theory (i.e. the theory of prices, wages, profit, interest, etc.) 
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the object; so as, in other words, to enable labour to be performed. In contrast to 
humanity (or any like creature within the universe), the most sophisticated of 
machines does not produce anything that is new. To the extent that it transforms 
itself, or other objects, at all, a machine does not do so creatively. It produces 
nothing that was not already pre-programmed within its inner structural constitution. 
Thus machines, unlike humans, are: (1) Specialised. Indeed the more sophisticated a 
machine is, the more specialised it tends to be. Thus the computer that 'beat' Gary 
Kasparov at chess, was incapable of walking on and off the stage, or making a cup of 
tea, or doing anything other than suggest chess moves; (2) Pre-specified. Machines 
have an essentially fixed inner structure, hence a fixed range of outward activities. 
The most 'intelligent' of machines is not yet able to self-transform itself, let alone an 
object in anything but a fundamentally limited way. If, one day, the 'robot' of science 
fiction were to come to be real, if a 'robot' could creatively transform to the same 
extent as humanity, then it would be a conscious being, a social individual, equal in 
status to humanity and not a 'robot' at all. It would, in other words, be a labourer. 18 
What then is the significance of these transhistorical aspects of labour for the specific 
historical form denoted surplus value? On the purchase of labour-power, the 
capitalist is buying a commodity with no fixed inner structure, hence no fixed and 
pre-specified ability to contribute to production. So to buy labour-power is not to 
commit to any specific quality and quantity of labour (no matter what the labour 
contract formally specifies). The capitalist pays precisely for the sole right to 
determine this quality and quantity in consumption of labour-power; the capitalist 
does not pay for the labour but for the right to determine this labour. Indeed the 
actual quality and quantity oflabour performed is not an aspect oflabour-power; it is 
literally immaterial to the nature of this labour-power what quality and quantity of 
labour is performed upon the capitalist's consumption of labour-power. By contrast, 
on purchase of a machine, the capitalist acquires something with a fixed inner 
18 Smith (1990, p.70) and Carchedi (1993, p.216) try to defend the labour theory of value against the 
criticism which imagines that all production could one day be 'robotised' (e.g. Hodgson, 1982). 
However, Smith and Carchedi do not recognise the straightforward rebuttal of such criticism 
articulated above. 
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structure and so a materially fixed and pre-specified contribution to production. In 
terms of the potential/actual distinction common to all commodities, the 
transformation from potential labour, i.e. labour-power, to actual labour involves 
new, fresh labour and hence the creation of something new. In the case of the 
transformation from the specific potential contribution of a specific machine to its 
actualisation, in production, nothing new is created. There is a transformation from 
potential to actual but this is not a creative transformation. 
Thus, only in the case of labour-power is the separation between purchase of 
potential input contribution and the actual determination of the quality and quantity 
of this contribution possible. It follows that, though the product is the collective 
realisation of the inputs, one of the input contributions, viz. labour, has not been paid 
for by the capitalist producer. Hence the sum of the prices of labour-power and 
means of production paid by the capitalist producer does not equal the price of the 
output. The difference represents the difference between the labour-power that is 
paid for and the actual labour performed (which is not, and cannot possibly, be paid 
for prior to its performance). Of course, for individuals to actually offer this 
commodity (labour-power) for sale requires that 1) They 'own' it - they consider it 
to be a possession of theirs (hence slave labour does not define the capitalist mode of 
production) and 2) They do not own anything else in quantity sufficient to provide 
for their needs and wants. For, the sale of one's very ability to labour, regardless of 
the specificity of the labour, is neither natural (it is not characteristic of all societies) 
nor desirable (it constitutes the sale of the very essence of oneself to another person). 
Surplus value is, then, congealed unpaid (,surplus') labour, as represented in the 
increment of money at the end of the capital-from (dM). This argument holds 
regardless of the mechanism that determines (long run average) prices (save the fact 
that each type of commodity has a given average price). Indeed it is a tautology but 
one with great causal import. For, without labour-power, hence the possibility of 
unpaid labour, there is no surplus value, hence no capital-form (nor further 
developments such as profit, interest and rent). Unpaid labour is the cause and 
substance of surplus value, and therefore it is the necessary and sufficient condition 
for surplus value and, abstracting from realisation problems, for its monetary forms, 
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profit, interest and rent. Just as value, as represented by price, is the objective form of 
social labour under capitalism, surplus value, as represented by dM, is the objective 
form of surplus labour under capitalism. For, any class society must generate a 
surplus product which is appropriated by the non-producers such that the producers 
are exploited (this is a transhistorical claim that has not been developed above). It has 
now been established that the specific form taken by exploitation is that of the sale of 
labour-power to the capitalist, and the appearance form of surplus labour is the 
increment denoted dM appropriated by the latter. Yet all of this is mystified within 
capitalism because the forms of appearance are not immediately recognised as such 
(as objective representations of social labour) by individuals. Indeed, exchange itself 
is a bastion of freedom and equality. Later, in Volume 1, the form of wages is shown 
to further obscure the real relations behind it. 
From Exploitation to the Transformation 'Problem' 
Having, in Capital, Volume 1, chapters 1 to 6, established what value, capital and 
surplus value are, the next logical step is to develop explicitly the nature of the 
production process implied in the notion of surplus value and the form of capital, but 
not yet grasped. The immediate task is to grasp the production process as a process 
of surplus value creation. This is because surplus value has been uncovered as the 
distinguishing feature of the capital-form, a form that is itself the distinguishing 
feature of capitalist, as opposed to pre-capitalist, exchange. Once this task is 
accomplished then the transformation of surplus value into capital, i.e. the ongoing 
process or circuit whereby surplus value is re-advanced as fresh capital, which in turn 
creates further surplus value, can be grasped (this is the process of accumulation of 
capital). Accordingly Marx follows this logical procedure which fills the rest of 
Volume 1. 
It must be stressed that Marx is doing no more than drawing out the implications, 
both logical and historical, of the generalised capital-form (M-C-M'), that appears 
before the eyes of all individuals within capitalism and is the ongoing daily experience 
of the capitalist. The development, in this order, is the only logical and rational way 
to proceed. If surplus value is congealed surplus labour then it must be made explicit 
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what this implies for the production process. The production process must be 
grasped as it is and must be given the initially won grasp of the nature of the capital-
form (M-C-M'). There is simply no theoretical point, nor logical possibility, of trying 
to grasp fully further aspects characteristic of capitalistic society until the implications 
of what has already been grasped about it have been drawn out. Furthermore in 
following this logical ordering a more developed explanation of the prevalence of the 
commodity within capitalist society will be gained. To anticipate, the capital-form, 
M-C-M', is a continually expanding process of production sweeping away other 
forms of production where the commodity does not predominate. Thus the starting 
point, the most general appearance of the product within capitalism i.e. the 
commodity, will be grasped yet more fully on the development of the capitalistic 
production process. 
In presenting these further developments, the capital-form, M-C-M', must be 'taken 
at its word'. This idea can be explained as follows. The preceding analysis has 
grasped M-C-M' as the objective social representation of the process of surplus value 
production and of accumulation. However, it still remains to be grasped fully how the 
social process achieves this representation, how it enforces the quantitative link 
between cause, labour time and surplus labour time, and effect, the appearance forms 
of value and surplus value (where cause and effect have already been established as 
such in the previous analysis). The quantitative tethering of price by labour time and 
of dM (the appearance form of surplus value) by surplus labour time remains to be 
explained fully. Specifically, the theory of exploitation has established that surplus 
value must be due to surplus labour, given only the evident fact that each commodity 
receives a given (average) price, but the process whereby such average prices are 
'allotted' has yet to be grasped. This process of pricing cannot be grasped until the 
nature of the capitalist production (hence labour) process, necessarily implied in the 
development thus far, but not yet made explicit, is itself made explicit. In other words 
it cannot be grasped until the process of surplus value production and accumulation 
that has been uncovered as the essence of the capital-form is grasped fully in 
abstraction from (and preparation for) further developments. 
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Throughout the entire level of Volume 1, therefore, a very high level of abstraction is 
maintained. Long run average prices are considered proportional to values in lieu of 
the development of the processes that enforce the quantitative link between price and 
value (the 'ultimate regulation' of prices by values). An acute awareness that the 
production of surplus value requires some definite social process linking it 
quantitatively to it's own objective form of appearance in circulation must be 
maintained therefore. Moreover it must be recognised that this social process of 
quantitative representation must occur haphazardly, unconsciously, 'behind the 
backs' of individuals, given that no individuals have control over price determination 
nor have direct consciousness of the true nature of value and capital. Hence the 
process of quantitative representation is likely to be highly imperfect and 
contradictory (e.g. non-products may be given a price). It will certainly be illusory 
because, even at this stage of the presentation, it is clear that individuals will not 
recognise immediately the cause of, and essence represented in, the economic forms 
they are in day to day contact with. 
Nevertheless the fact is that capitalism is an ongoing social form. Despite, or through, 
its contradictions capitalism has become predominant (as reflected in the generality of 
the commodity, with which the presentation began, and of the capital-form, 
introduced later in the presentation). This entails that there must be some tendency in 
place to enforce the tethering of the respective monetary measures of value and 
surplus value by their respective immanent measures of labour time and surplus 
labour time. 19 If prices do not quantitatively reflect labour times to some extent then 
society will collapse. Likewise, if the money form of surplus value does not 
quantitatively reflect unpaid labour time, then this risks production moving away 
from the source of surplus value (from industrial production). The theory of 
exploitation has established - given only the evident fact that each different 
commodity is allotted an average price - that without unpaid labour there will be no 
surplus value at all and capitalistic production (production for surplus value), hence 
capitalistic society, will collapse. Without surplus labour, through the purchase of 
19 The tethering of price magnitude and of the money magnitude of surplus value are not, of course, 
independent processes. 
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labour-power, there will be no surplus value, no profit, no interest, no rent. Unpaid 
labour is the substance of surplus value. Surplus value exists; it is congealed surplus 
labour. Quantitative infractions of proportionality between surplus labour time and 
the magnitude of the monetary form of surplus value are, therefore, to be considered 
quantitative modifications of a single substance as it gains an appearance form as 
money, rather than factors independent of labour time. By assuming price / value 
proportionality capitalism is thus developed in its essence, in its purity, prior to the 
immanent and necessary modifications of this essence. It can be noted that the very 
fact that there is an immediate non-identity between value substance (labour) and 
value-form (money) is the most abstract reason why crises are possible, an immanent 
possibility developed in Volume 3. 
Marx's development of surplus value production and accumulation will not be 
presented here. Nor will the development of the circulation process, in the light of the 
newly grasped production process, undertaken in Volume 2, be presented. Instead, 
the pricing mechanism referred to above and developed in Volume 3 will be 
presented briefly. The aim of the presentation is to vindicate Marx's theory and to 
sketch the reason why there is no major transformation 'problem' in Marx's 
presentation, contrary to many interpretations as recounted above. This sketch aims 
to deepen, i.e. develop the abstract basis of, the interpretation of the transformation 
put forward by Fine (1983) and Saad-Filho (1997b; 2002, ch. 7). The reader is 
referred to their work for a full presentation at a more concrete level. 
The Transformation 'Problem ,20 
The transformation problem has long been considered the Achilles' heel of the labour 
theory of value. Accordingly the literature on the problem is vast. 21 However, the 
presentation below does not need to delve into this vast literature and will be 
relatively brief This is because the presentation draws upon a line of interpretation 
pioneered by Fine (1983) and developed by Saad-Filho (1997b; 2002, ch. 7) that has 
20 This sub-section interprets Marx (l998b, chapter 9). 
21 See Saad-Filho (2002, ch, 7) and references therein. 
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comprehensively 'solved' the transformation 'problem' by showing that Marx's 
actual problem and its solution has entirely escaped the vast literature. That the 
literature should be so overwhelmingly mistaken is as Fine (1983, p.520) writes, 
'astonishing'. Below it will be shown how Marx's transformation is a further 
development and substantiation of the theory of value and surplus value presented 
above. In this way one possible contributory factor towards the 'astonishing' number 
of mistaken interpretations will suggest itself. The interpretation of the theory of 
surplus value developed above was also claimed to be little known. This 
interpretation of the theory drew, in turn, from Ilyenkov's materialist dialectics which 
itself is relatively unknown within the literature. Yet this theory provides, according 
to the argument below, a necessary 'deepening' of the interpretation offered by Fine 
and Saad-Filho. The relative neglect of Ilyenkov's materialist dialectics may, 
therefore, be one contributory factor towards the relative neglect of Marx's own 
approach to the transformation procedure. It will be suggested by way of conclusion 
below that the significance of this argument is far wider than may at first be apparent. 
In line with the interpretation of Volume 1 presented above, the transformation in 
Volume 3 shows, finally, how congealed abstract socially necessary labour time, both 
value and surplus value, quantitatively tethers its own appearance forms, prices and 
profit (the cases of interest and rent are abstracted from at this stage). It shows what 
the social mechanism is that determines average prices and so brings about this 
tethering. The transformation shows how systematic deviations from proportionality 
between labour times and prices occur; hence it shows how a systematic, but not 
proportional, relationship between prices and labour times is enforced. The key 
mechanism is competition between capitals. Note that competition is a phenomenon 
recognised by all individuals within capitalism. It is a 'surface' phenomenon, entering 
into the consciousness of individuals directly but not, it is now apparent, 
transparently rendering its own essence. For, competition obscures the substance of 
surplus value, viz. surplus labour. Competition appears as the quest for profit on the 
entire capital that has been advanced by the capitalist. Thus both the means of 
production and the labour-power appear on equal footing. It appears that this entire 
capital is the source of profit, whereas in fact only labour-power generates the 
surplus value underlying profit. Moreover, it appears that both labour and the means 
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of production are paid in full. Thus, as elaborated in Volume 1, the form of wages 
masks the fact that labour is not paid for and that only labour-power is. 
Competition occurs between industrial capitals, both within and between industries. 
Capital migration causes a tendency for the equalisation of the rate of profit on 
capital advanced across the average capital of each industry. Profit rate equalisation 
is incompatible with price / value proportionality because profit is calculated on total 
capital advanced. A capital with a relatively high proportion of means of production 
used up (constant capital) to labour expended will be priced the same as a capital of 
same size but with a lower proportion, despite the former capital having a lower 
labour content than the latter. In the presentation a constant ratio of labour-power to 
labour expended, i.e. a constant 'rate of exploitation', is assumed. Given this 
assumption the ratio between constant capital and variable capital is denoted the 
'composition of capital'. Marx's 'problem' is then to show how the cause, labour-
time, tethers the effect, price magnitude, in the face of this pricing mechanism, which, 
on the surface, appears to contradict the labour theory of value. Marx achieves this 
by his recognition that what has occurred is a redistribution of surplus value between 
capitals such that the profit rate is equalised. Conceptually this is clear. 
Mathematically Marx's demonstration requires a two-step procedure that is equally 
clear despite so many misinterpretations and is explained below. 
The first step is to abstract from the change in value of the inputs as the profit rate is 
equalised across industries. This procedure is demonstrated in Volume 3, chapter 9. 
The abstraction from input price variation entails that what is called the 'organic' 
composition of capital is being studied. As is well known two aggregate equalities 
hold in this case. Total prices equal total values; total profit equals total surplus 
value. Thus Marx shows clearly how the transformation is indeed a redistribution of 
surplus value. The aggregate equalities remain intact as long as the effect of the 
changes in the circulation ( exchange) process on the prices within the production 
process is abstracted from. Note the absurdity of the interpretation of Marx's 
procedure that insists he has made a mistake by not transforming the inputs when this 
is the whole point of this first step! 
r 
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The second step is to allow the input prices to change (this entails that the 'value' 
rather than the 'organic' composition of capital is being studied). In this case, as is 
well known there will not be an aggregate equality of profit and surplus value. Marx 
never presents an actual example of this but the relevant calculations have been 
performed many times since (the method of calculation being similar to that of the 
Sraffian analysis). Thus Marx has shown theoretically (without presenting an 
example, on this occasion) that changes in the circulation process lead to 
modification of input prices so that even in aggregate surplus value does not equal 
aggregate profit. 
Thus Marx's entire analysis is vindicated and developed further. Through the process 
of competition labour times do indeed tether money forms, as expected, but a process 
of redistribution of surplus value occurs, further distorted by the impact of price 
changes on the price of inputs. Such distortions were also expected. Individuals face 
given and fixed prices (the change in price that occurs in the procedure is a logical, 
not actual one) just as they did in Volume 1, chapters 3 to 6, but now it has been 
shown how these prices are 'allotted' by a social process going on 'behind the backs' 
of individuals. The outward appearance of this process is that of the competition 
between capitals. Furthermore it has been shown how this process engenders a 
systematic relationship between prices and labour times: systematic deviations from 
proportionality have been shown to occur. Because the conditions required within 
Volume t chapters 3 to 6, hold (and indeed have been shown to hold) then the entire 
abstract analysis of surplus value and exploitation made in Volume 1 holds also at 
this much more concrete level. It remains the case that the only contribution to 
production that the capitalists do not pay for is unpaid labour. Without this there 
would be no surplus value to distribute. It is the cause and substance of profit for 
reasons that hold just as much in the current analysis as they do in Volume 1. And 
value is inherently abstract, it must gain form through money. Now the quantitative 
tethering of money form by underlying essence (labour time) has been presented (at 
the most abstract and simple level possible). The qualitative mediation of value as 
price has been shown to entail a quantitative mediation of the immanent labour time 
magnitude. Neither price / value proportionality, nor even aggregate surplus value / 
profit equality, hold due to this necessary process of value representation. This being 
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primarily due to the redistribution of surplus value in profit, coupled with the further 
distortions as changes in circulation reflect back upon input prices. 
Thus there is a quantitative modification of the essence that has already been shown 
to exist. A number of factors contribute to the observed price magnitudes therefore. 
But these are to be conceived as modifications of the causal substance and essence of 
labour time rather than separate factors. They are the immanent result of the fact that 
value is inherently non-sensuous so must gain appearance form; must appear as 
something sensuous, so opposite to the inherently non-sensuous value. To repeat: 
there is a quantitative mediation, hence deviation of price from value, as expected. 
There is nevertheless quantitative tethering of price by value as expected. At the same 
time it is now clear how the pressure of competition is the outward drive of the 
processes analysed in Volume 1, viz. the various systematic and historical processes 
of surplus value production and accumulation, the very laws of motion of capitalism. 
The 'inner essence' does indeed determine the outer form of appearance, even as it is 
distorted by it. These processes can be further developed given this newly developed 
grasp of competition. 
Conclusion 
The presentation above has attempted to argue that the labour theory of value 
tautologically follows from the prevalence of the commodity and of the form of 
capital (M-C-M') that is empirically evident. A failure to recognise this tautology 
must, therefore, entail a failure to grasp fully the differentia specifica of capitalism. 
The key original contribution has been to demonstrate this tautology for the case of 
surplus value and exploitation, drawing upon Ilyenkov's materialist dialectics. The 
tautology is not something defined by any individual. Rather, the tautology flows 
from the empirically observed characteristic forms of capitalism. Value, grasped as 
congealed labour time, and surplus value, grasped as unpaid labour time, therefore 
have fundamental causal impact in contemporary society, an impact that is not 
grasped by prevalent interpretations of Marx, nor by other social theorists. 
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Thus the interpretation of Marx's theory of value has been argued to deepen the 
theoretical foundations of the interpretation of the transformation 'problem' 
pioneered by Fine (1983) and developed by Saad-Filho (1997b; 2002, ch. 7). Yet this 
latter interpretation is not widely accepted (rather the 'traditional' and 'value form' 
interpretations are more prevalent within the sympathetic literature - see Saad-Filho, 
2002, ch. 2 and ch. 7). In order to appreciate the wider significance of this chapter, it 
is vital to note that the approach to the transformation problem that has been 
advocated is an integral part of a broad conception of the architectonic of Capital 
and of capitalism, pioneered by Fine (e.g 1989) and Weeks (e.g. 1981). The 
distinction between the 'value' and 'organic' compositions of capital recounted above 
is crucial for the further developments of Marx's theory. For example, the very next 
such development is Marx's theory of crisis as encapsulated in his conception of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall. This theory is shown by Fine (1992) and Weeks 
(1981, ch. 8) to be a logical development of Marx's transformation procedure, 
allowing theoretical explanation of that great symptom of capitalism and of capitalist 
crises, viz. rapid technical change. A clear indication of the need for wider 
dissemination of this theory is that none of the contributions to the recent debate 
regarding Brenner and global economic crisis referred to this crucial feature of 
Marx's theory, except the contributions of Weeks and Fine (and associates) 
themselves! 22 
In sum, there already exists within the literature a clear comprehension of the 
fundamental laws of motion of capitalism, laws that explain the complex and crisis-
ridden processes of capitalistic growth and destruction. Equally they are laws which 
facilitate and demand detailed concrete research and political action. But this 
comprehension, based upon a sound interpretation of Marx, developing the approach 
pioneered by Fine (op. cit.) and Weeks (op. cit.), is not widespread even amongst 
Marxist economists. Undoubtedly these circumstances are, as Pilling once put it, 'a 
reflection of political and ideological differences which can only be resolved in 
practice' but as Pilling goes on to write, 'another important aspect of many of these 
22 See Weeks (2000), Fine et. al. (1999) and, for example, the symposium in Historical Materialism, 
Issues 4-5. 
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disputes has been the relative neglect of the fundamental questions of Marxist 
method' (pilling, 1980, p.2). Through an interpretation of the theory of value and 
surplus value which is firmly rooted in the philosophy and method of Ilyenkov, viz. 
materialist dialectics, it is hoped that some obstacles towards the further 
dissemination and collective development of the theory have been removed by this 
chapter. If the reader is moved to consult the above references on Marx's theory and 
is helped to grasp and develop these on the basis of the philosophical, methodological 
and theoretical development (deepening) presented within this chapter (and thesis 
overall) then the chapter (and thesis overall) will have served its purpose. 
.. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
Introduction 
In view of the endemic flaws of mainstream economics and the social sciences, and 
in face of the tyranny of global capital, this thesis has argued for a return to the 
writings of Marx, as illuminated by I1yenkov's materialist dialectics. The thesis 
offers a set of starting points, at a range of different levels, for the development of 
Marxist thought. Each respective chapter has contributed to understanding at a 
specific level of analysis. Taken as a whole, the main chapters have helped to 
illuminate the thread that ties the various levels together, viz. that of materialist 
dialectics. The basis of materialist dialectics is the argument that ideas arise only 
through labour. On this view, the labourer self-transforms and, simultaneously, 
transforms the object through their labour. For this reason, the 'mode of production' 
is fundamental to Marxism. The recasting of Hegelian systematic dialectics on this 
materialist basis provides a method adequate to inform the theorisation of the 
contemporary mode of production, viz. capitalism. Chapters 2 to 5 of the thesis both 
critique 'critical realism' and serve to elaborate the abstract basis of materialist 
dialectics. Chapters 6 and 7 draw upon materialist dialectics in order to present the 
abstract basis of Marx' s theory of capitalism, viz. Marx' s labour theory of value and 
surplus value. 
Marx's Philosophy and Method 
The most abstract and simple aspect of philosophy is the relationship between 
thought and being. In order to uphold the possibility of rational thought, it is 
necessary to articulate an identity-in-opposition between thought and being, as 
argued by I1yenkov, in his interpretation of Spinoza. Yet the notion of such an 
identity-in-opposition is unpalatable to most Marxists, let alone to mainstream 
philosophers or social scientists. For this reason, I1yenkov's ideas are best presented 
via detailed consideration of relevant aspects of contemporary Marxist thought. 
Accordingly, chapters 2 to 5 detail a critique of critical realism, and contrast critical 
realism to materialist dialectics and systematic dialectics. 
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Since its original systematisation by Roy Bhaskar, the key aspects of the critical 
realist ontology and method have found a broad appeal and a distinctive articulation 
across the social sciences and Marxism. As discussed in chapter 2, social scientists 
and Marxists (the chapter focuses in particular on the work of Bob Jessop) have 
adapted and developed critical realist themes, such as abstraction, retroduction, the 
transformational model of social activity and stratification, in the attempt to explain 
the global economy. Jessop and other social scientists note the outward congruence 
between the language of critical realism and Marx's statements regarding method 
(however, later chapters of this thesis argue that this outward congruence is 
illusory). Though the key features of critical realism are easy to discern, it is more 
difficult to expose the philosophical principle, or 'conceptual essence', from which 
these features derive, and to evaluate critical realism (and dialectical critical realism) 
on that basis. Subsequent chapters attempt just such an exposition and evaluation. 
The critical realist 'emergence' theory of mind leads critical realism to stress the 
difference between an idea and its object, the 'non-isomorphism' or 'non-identity' of 
these two, causally related things. On close examination, the whole edifice of critical 
realism, and indeed Bhaskar's 'dialectical critical realism', is built upon the 
foundation of this fundamental difference between an idea and its object. Yet, as 
Hume argued, causal 'real essences' independent of, and not directly accessible to, 
the mind must be unbounded by the needs of human knowledge. In particular, they 
could cause the 'known laws of nature' to cease to exist at any moment. Far from 
being a 'philosophy for science', critical realism thereby turns out to lead directly to 
Humean scepticism, an argument developed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 develops an 
alternative philosophy to critical realism, viz. Ilyenkov's 'materialist dialectics'. 
According to Ilyenkov, the abstract basis of materialist dialectics is Spinoza's 
argument that, through ongoing spatial activity, the thinking body achieves 
accordance with, or an isomorphism between, its own general mode of activity and 
the specific shape or trajectory of the object. Adequate ideas consist in self-
awareness of this isomorphism; they are not separate from and causal upon the 
outward spatial activity of the body, as critical realism would have it. The ground for 
Humean scepticism is thereby removed. Marx transcends Spinoza fundamentally 
through the recognition that humans transform not only themselves but also the 
object through their labour. On this foundation, Ilyenkov develops in great detail 
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materialist dialectics at the level of philosophy. Ilyenkov argues that Hegel's 
philosophy is ultimately idealist because Hegel fails to address the mind-body 
relation successfully, in the manner of Spinoza. As chapter 4 notes, Ilyenkov's 
critique of Hegel is applicable to contemporary (Hegel-inspired) 'new dialectics' 
because new dialectics does not even recognise the significance of the mind-body 
relationship. It is hoped that the reader will be persuaded to consult Ilyenkov's many 
writings on Marxist philosophy. Given the aim to pursue the unifying thread of 
materialist dialectics across philosophy, method and theory, it is the issue of method 
that is taken up next. 
Critical realism, as argued in chapter 5, ultimately flatters to deceive in its promise 
to deliver a method adequate to the social totality. The method is based upon the 
non-isomorphic and causal relation between idea and object. All that can be 
attempted, given this premise, is the hypothesis of static underlying essences that 
produce given forms. This is because the forms are non-isomorphic to their 
structural cause thus cannot contain information regarding the development of new 
forms through structural (essential) transformation. Dialectics is uniquely suited to 
the task of theorising transformation. Yet dialectical critical realism, despite its 
apparent promise to overcome deficiencies of critical realism regarding the 
theorisation of transformation, is based upon the conceptual essence of critical 
realism and so fares no better at theorising structural transformation. The branch of 
new dialectics termed 'systematic dialectics' offers a superior interpretation of 
Marx's method. Marx's starting point is the whole object realm, not a single 
'appearance form' as in critical realism. His method of enquiry involves a systematic 
advance towards the 'cell-form' and thus is alien to the critical rea:list approach 
based on 'hypothesis and test'. Marx' s method of presentation involves a dialecto-
logical development from the abstract and simple 'cell-form' to ever more concrete 
and complex categories; in contrast to critical realism this does not entail a 
juxtaposition of individual 'essences'. Notwithstanding this advance over critical 
realism, systematic dialectics fails to address the crucial issues regarding mind and 
object addressed in chapter 4. For this reason, systematic dialectics is ultimately 
idealist, in the sense that Ilyenkov argues that Hegel is idealist, as noted in chapter 4. 
The idealist defects of contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics, and 
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the superiority of materialist dialectics, are brought into sharp relief on closer 
examination ofMarx's theory of capitalism, undertaken in chapters 6 and 7. 
Marx's Theory of Value and Surplus Value 
The most striking characteristic of contemporary Marxist thought is the neglect or 
miscomprehension of Marx's own theory of capitalism. Whereas, for Marx, the 
determination of value by labour time is the key to the comprehension of capitalism, 
for most social theorists, and for many Marxists, the labour theory of value is an 
anachronism, of no contemporary scientific worth. Even amongst those Marxists 
who attempt to affirm Marx's labour theory of value, the interpretations of that 
theory are many, varied and, for the most part, mutually incompatible. For example 
the recent Marxist debate regarding post-war development, sparked by the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98 and fuelled by Brenner (1998), did not, as might be expected, 
focus on the empirical specificity of this conjuncture. Rather, the debate centred 
upon widely different interpretations of Marx's theory of value and surplus value 
(see, for example, various contributions in Historical Materialism, Issues 4-5; the 
editorial introduction is reproduced in the Appendix to this thesis). Ifphilosophy and 
method are to prove their worth then they must be able to inform theory and 
practice. As chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate, materialist dialectics does indeed help in 
this regard. Materialist dialectics can help to explain, and overcome theoretically, 
some of the fundamental reasons behind the stifling ofthe collective development of 
a Marxist theory of contemporary global capital. 
As argued in chapter 6, materialist dialectics identifies the value-form as the 'cell-
form' of capitalism. In this regard, there are important parallels with contemporary 
and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics. Unlike idealist variants of systematic 
dialectics, materialist dialectics is able to uncover the true nature of the cell-form 
and developments thereof Marx points out that 'exchange value' must be 
distinguished from 'value'. The exchange value of commodities implies that they 
possess some common substance, as which they are 'values', and of which exchange 
value is the manifestation. Furthermore Marx argues that this substance is labour. 
Marx's argument is an expression of materialism. According to materialism, the 
powers of objects are aspects of their material form; powers do not spring up on 
I-~ 
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their own, outside of some definite material form. Yet in exchange, all palpable 
material determinations of commodities are 'abstracted from'. In other words, the 
magnitude of exchange value bears no systematic relation to any palpable material 
property of the commodity. For a materialist, the phenomenon of exchange value is 
therefore deeply puzzling. Yet there is a 'residue' left after abstraction from all 
palpable material properties. Each commodity (at this level of abstraction) is an 
embodiment, an objectification of labour, requiring a definite quantity of socially 
necessary labour time. This quantity is not totally 'abstracted from' in exchange. In 
other words, there may be a systematic relationship between labour time and 
exchange value, though it is evident that this relation will not be one of strict 
proportionality. Materialism requires that exchange value must be underlain by some 
material property. Hence, by elimination, socially necessary abstract labour time is 
the common and quantitatively determinate material aspect of commodities 
manifested in their exchange value. Accordingly, the substance of value is socially 
necessary abstract labour. Further theoretical development must fathom the 
systematic deviations from proportionality between labour times and exchange 
values. Lacking the premise of materialism, contemporary and Hegel-inspired 
systematic dialecticians provide no clear rationale for Marx's argument, and many 
systematic dialecticians reject it outright, as does 'value form theory' in general, 
without offering an adequate alternative. Thus dialectics is necessary to help 
comprehend important notions such as 'method of enquiry' and 'method of 
presentation' but dialectics is insufficient to comprehend value and hence to 
comprehend capitalism. Only materialist dialectics can do this. 
Systematic dialectics is one of the few contemporary interpretations of Marx that 
recognises the importance of the value-form development subsequent to Marx's 
initial discussion of the cell-form. However, as argued in chapters 6 and 7, 
contemporary and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics, lacking a grasp of the notion 
of labour as the substance of value, is, at best, indifferent to the raison d'etre of 
Marx's value-form development, viz. the necessity for congealed abstract labour to 
gain a form of appearance. The most important outcome of Marx's development, 
achieved in chapters 5 and 6 of Capital, is the demonstration that the distinctive 
characteristic of capital, viz. surplus value, is the manifestation of capitalistic 
exploitation. Nowhere within the contemporary literature on systematic dialectics is 
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an adequate exposition of surplus value and exploitation to be found, that is 
congruent with Marx's own. Within the wider literature a number of interpretations 
mistakenly take the labour theory of value as a fixed axiom upon which Marx's 
demonstration of capitalistic exploitation is based. Once again, materialist dialectics 
is able to shed light on crucial issues of theory, in this case the theory of surplus 
value. The creative and transformative nature of labour, detailed by materialist 
dialectics, confirms that there is a transhistorical as well as an historical aspect to the 
notion of value creation and that the articulation of both aspects is required to grasp 
Marx's argument on surplus value. In all societies labour is creative and 
transformative. In capitalist society, where value comes into general existence, such 
creative and transformative power is the only possible source of surplus value. This 
distinctive quality ensures that the only contribution to the product not paid for by 
the capitalist, on purchase of the inputs, is the contribution of labour. Surplus labour 
is the cause and substance of surplus value, therefore it is the necessary and 
sufficient (ignoring realisation problems) condition for the monetary forms of 
surplus value, viz. profit, interest and rent. 
As demonstrated in the latter sections of chapter 7, the materialist and dialectical 
interpretation ofMarx's theory of value and surplus value can be developed in order 
to grasp the three Volumes of Marx's Capital. Crucial to this interpretation is the 
comprehension of Marx' s distinction between of different 'compositions of capital' . 
Given the distinction of 'organic' and 'value' compositions the much discussed 
transformation 'problem' is not a problem at all, rather the transformation is a 
further development and substantiation of the labour theory of value (Saad-Filho 
1997b; 2002). 
This thesis focuses upon only the most abstract and simple aspects of philosophy 
and theory. There is much scope for more concrete developments, and for further 
engagement with the vast range of relevant literature. For example Hegel's own 
writings have not been scrutinised within the thesis. Thus the thesis opens up many 
avenues for the development of materialist dialectics and Marxism at the level of 
philosophy, method and theory. Simultaneously, the thesis shows the superiority of 
materialist dialectics over both critical realism and new dialectics at all of these 
levels. The thesis also affirms that Marxism does not await a perfect philosophy and 
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abstract theory, before it can provide true comprehension of contemporary global 
capitalism. For, the relationship between theory and philosophy runs both ways: 
philosophy should inform theory and theory should inform philosophy. Thus the 
argument has drawn from, and attempted to provide the necessary philosophical, 
methodological and abstract theoretical support to, indeed deepening of, the many 
extant Marxist writings on contemporary global capitalism by Fine, Saad-Filho, 
Weeks and others. This concrete work can be developed significantly in light of the 
abstract arguments of the thesis. At the same time, the thesis has contributed towards 
the removal of the philosophical, methodological and theoretical barrier that stands 
in the way of the wider dissemination and comprehension of this work, viz. the 
antipathy towards materialist dialectics across Marxism and the social sciences. In 
short, a return to Marx's materialist dialectics would constitute a vital step towards 
the comprehension of global capitalism. 
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Appendix 
Editorial Introduction to Historical Materialism, Issue 4, Symposium: Robert 
Brenner and the Worlds Crisis (Part 1), ~ 7 
The world economic crisis of 1998 provided a perfect environment for another 
exercise of Robert Brenner's skills as controversialist. These he had already 
demonstrated in the now-classic 'Brenner debate' on the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, as well as in his devastating critique of the regulation school a decade 
ago. Deploying his characteristic combination of self-confidence and conceptual 
forcefulness, Brenner has launched on the world a magisterial and thoroughly 
researched reinterpretation, both of the post-war history of world capitalism and of 
the Marxist theory of crisis. Whether or not one agrees wholeheartedly with this 
account, there can be no doubt that both in its timing and its form it has served as a 
powerful catalyst in stirring up renewed debates among Marxists on the causes, 
nature and consequences of capitalism's recurrent tendency to crisis. Even those who 
profoundly disagree with Brenner admit that the discussion stimulated by his 
provocative account has served as in invaluable stimulant and goad for others to 
provide what they see as a more adequate and comprehensive theory. This in itself is 
an enormously important contribution. 
This is the first part of a sympOSIUm In which leading Marxists address the 
explanation of global crises with reference to Brenner's text. This cashes out, in 
some way, the promissory note we proffered in the previous issue of Historical 
Materialism to address questions of political economy. Given the richness and 
variety of the contributions we received, we have taken the exceptional step of 
spreading this symposium over two issues. The following issue will therefore 
continue the discussion, with articles by Werner Bonefeld, Franyois Chesnais, Alan 
Freeman, Michel Husson, Anwar Shaikh, Tony Smith, Richard Walker and John 
Weeks. Robert Brenner has also promised us a response for this issue. 
Of course, despite the contributors' diverse backgrounds and perspectives, some 
aspects of their criticism of Brenner converge. However, we have made the decision 
not to edit out such overlapping, as we felt it important that each contribution to the 
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debate be self-standing. We believe that the value of each contribution to the debate 
outweighs some small degree of repetition, and we hope readers will agree. 
As a general introduction we highlight four themes uniting these very diverse 
articles: (i) they attempt to uncover the long-run and system-wide causes of the 
recent crisis and of future tendencies of the world economy; (ii) they can justifiabl y 
claim to overcome the antinomies of mainstream thought, avoiding both dogma and 
'post-Marxist' folly; (iii) they make vivid and relevant the perennial debate within 
Marxist economics on value theory and on the falling rate of profit; (iv) they 
underline the interdisciplinary nature of Marxism - with all the benefits and costs 
entailed. 
The long-run and system-wide causes of crisis 
Brenner stresses the system-wide and long-run perspective of Marxism. This is a 
wide angle eschewed by postmodernism, yet manifestly essential to the full 
comprehension of global capital. It is also a view embarrassing to a mainstream 
economics that is unable to fathom the apparent universal power taken on by money 
under capitalist social relations. The contributions to the symposium embrace the 
broad perspective, in very different, and sometimes opposing, ways. They do not 
attribute the fundamental causes of the recent crisis merely to the mistakes of 
individual governments, financial institutions or other contingencies, as in orthodox 
explanations. Instead, any such mistakes form part of a broader picture. Two phases 
of post-war development stand out: a period of relatively rapid expansion of the 
advanced economies in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by a period of significantly 
slower growth triggered (but not caused) by the oil-shock of 1973 and lasting up to 
the present day. The respective explanations offered can be summarised as follows. 
There is near unanimous agreement with Brenner's refutation of the view that rising 
workers' strength lies behind the secular downturn. Brenner marshals a wealth of 
evidence against the theory that the power of labour to push up or to maintain the 
level of the wage, and to lower productivity through slackening of effort levels or 
opposition to change at the workplace, causes the falling rate of profit and so the 
long down turn. This argument is very important given that the most prominent 
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developments in crisis theory of the past twenty years - the 'social structure of 
accumulation' school and 'regulation theory' - emphasised worker strength as an 
explanation for the downturn. Brenner recognises that even when and where the 
condition of labour is characterised by relative weakness, crisis is still endemic. This 
emphasis on relative weakness is central to the accounts offered by Clarke and 
Lebowitz. This is strikingly different to the mainstream and media consensus that 
sees union strength as the source of all economic ills. 
Brenner's own View, defended by Wood, below, is that the intensity of world 
competition within the manufacturing sector, as both Japan and West Germany 
steadily caught up with the US in the post-war period, led to the rapid and unforeseen 
obsolescence of masses of US fixed capital. It was this that generated the falling rate 
of profit from the mid-60s and hence a crisis. Brenner argues that the crisis became a 
secular downturn because the sunk costs of US manufacturers, combined with 
Keynesian fiscal policies, ensured there was insufficient exit from the industry, even 
as new entry from other economies, such as the Asian 'tigers', further intensified 
competition. 
For Dumenil and Levy, a secular decline in the physical productivity of capital, due 
to unfavourable technical change, lies at the heart of the falling rate of profit and 
resulting crisis. Ongoing class struggle over wages helps explain variations around 
the secular trend. This view comes nearest to that of the regulation approach within 
the symposium, especially given that Dumenil and Levy consider institutions to have 
a central role in mediating class struggle. 
Both Moseley and Smith forward the much-debated distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour as key to profit-rate decline. According to these authors, a 
secular rise in the proportion of labour that is unproductive of surplus-value has 
occurred which has taken its toll on the rate of profit. Moseley suggests that, inter 
alia, the inherent inability of technological advance to replace sales functions (which 
are necessary but unproductive of value according to Moseley's argument) is one 
recent factor contributing to the relative increase in unproductive labour. 
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Barman, endorsed by Callinicos, argues that the notion of a 'permanent arms 
economy' can explain the trends in the rate of profit and so global economic 
development. On this view, military spending serves to dampen accumulation which 
would otherwise, in the absence of other countervailing factors, raise the ratio of 
constant to variable capital and hence lower the profit rate and generate crisis. The 
high US (and USSR) military spending in the 1950s and 1960s is the key to 
explaining the relative success of the period. The concomitantly growmg 
competitiveness of West Germany and Japan explains the downturn. 
Clarke is one of the few dissenters from the view that the magnitude of the rate of 
profit is central to crisis theory. Be argues that Brenner is right to stress over-
production and over-accumulation but that Brenner provides no substantiation of just 
why the process of accumulation should necessarily tend to overheat (a criticism also 
made by Laibman, Carchedi and others). Clarke summarises his own interpretation 
of Marx' s crises theory where the role of fixed capital and of money and credit are 
integrated. Carchedi also develops a crisis theory which incorporates the role of 
money and credit and suggests briefly how exchange-rate theory might also be 
incorporated. 
Overcoming the antinomies of mainstream thought 
Brenner stresses competition between capitals (the 'horizontal' relations between 
different capitals). Lebowitz argues that Marx, by contrast, and for good reason, 
emphasises the ('vertical') struggle between capital and labour at the level of 
'capital-in-general' - a level which is 'essential' such that competition is merely the 
illusory form in which capital appears to the individual. It is just this claim that 
Wood - like Brenner - contests. It is competition, not capital-in-general, that has 
causal (and historical) priority according to Wood. This sort of debate, between two 
historians and a number of economists and philosophers is rare but very revealing, 
and is one we hope to encourage. The debate over horizontal and vertical relations 
relates to the antinomies of social theory. Take, for example, the structure-agency 
opposition. Brenner states that he wants a reconciliation of structural laws and 
agents' motivations. And, indeed, we do not find a rigid split or failure of 
interpenetration of the two. The critic will search the symposium in vain for the 
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article (an introduction that Brenner does not endorse), that Marxist debates 
regarding value theory and the falling rate of profit are stale, mechanistic and 
generally involve outmoded deductions with no basis in social reality. 
Interdisciplinarity 
Brenner overarches history and economIcs. This intrinsic interdisciplinarity has 
opened the field for a great variety of disciplinary perspectives on these questions. 
Writers traditionally specialising in history, sociology, philosophy, politics, as well 
as economics, have all participated in this debate. This new 'Brenner debate' has 
highlighted difficult philosophical arguments over method and history, and the 
suspicion or even fear of mathematics or value theory debates amongst some non-
economists. These continued points of tension between economists and others 
illustrate the recalcitrance of academic disciplinary boundaries. 
We can examine this problem more closely through the lens of Brenner's relation to 
Marx's value theory. Whichever position one takes on this question, it is clear that 
further debate across disciplinary divides is vital (as Laibman's contribution points 
out). There is a clear split such that no economist in this symposium agrees with 
Brenner's theory. All his supporters are outside of the economics profession. Also, 
all economist contributors interpret Brenner as rejecting Marx's value categories, yet 
Brenner himself insists he does no such thing. Some of the non-economist 
contributors espouse Brenner's view regardless (Wood); some are willing to attribute 
Marx's value theory to Brenner (an excellent example being Tony Smith, whose 
contribution is to be published in the next issue). Overall, then, we must recognise 
the tenacious existence of bourgeois academic disciplinary boundaries - the different 
tacit assumptions and histories they institutionalise - even as, and in the process of, 
breaking them down. 
